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This book provides a broad but integrated analysis of the psychology of COVID-
19. The book is the product of the combined effort of four social psychologists: Jolanda 
Jetten (top left; Professor of Social Psychology and Australian Laureate Fellow at the 
University of Queensland), Stephen (Steve) Reicher (bottom left; Wardlaw Professor of 
Psychology at the University of St. Andrews), S. Alexander (Alex) Haslam (top right; 
Professor of Psychology and Australian Laureate Fellow at the University of Queensland) 
and Tegan Cruwys (bottom, right; Senior Research Fellow at the Australian National 
University).  
What these four social psychologists have in common is that over the last decades 
their research has inspired, and been inspired by, research and theory around the topic of 
social identity. In this, they have shown how the social identity approach helps us to 
understand processes as diverse as leadership, health, well-being, emergency behaviour, 
risk perception, stigma, inequality, stereotyping, collective action, crowd behaviour, 
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intergroup violence, social cohesion and solidarity, populism, political rhetoric, 
obedience, and the psychology of tyranny.  
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the authors have been advising a range of bodies 
on how to best support the COVID-19 response. They have provided input on topics 
including communications and messaging, adherence to lockdown and physical 
distancing, trust-building, leadership, public order, how to motivate people to download 
the COVID-19 tracing apps, and the mental health impact of physical distancing 
measures. They have advised the U.K. Government and the Scottish Government, the 
U.K. police force, and the Australian Government’s Behavioural Economics Team 
(BETA) in the Department of Prime Minster and Cabinet. They have also been members 
of a number of bodies and task forces including the G08 Australian Roadmap to Recover, 
the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s COVID Monitor project, the British 
Psychological Society COVID Coordinating Group, and the Rapid Response Information 
Forum on COVID-19 tracing in Australia. In this engagement with policy makers and 
governments it has become clear how psychological theory — and the social identity 
approach in particular — can help us better understand, and respond to, the COVID-19 
crisis. This book is an attempt to put what they and their colleagues have been talking 
about over the past three months into print — so that insights from the social identity 
approach can contribute to public debate around the most significant world event of our 
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The idea for this book emerged in early March, 2020 when it was clear that COVID-19 
was going to affect the lives of a large proportion of people on our planet in profound 
ways. Starting from the premise that an effective response to the pandemic depends upon 
people coming together and supporting each other as members of a common community, 
the aim of this book is to use social identity theorising to provide a comprehensive and 
integrated analysis of the psychology of COVID-19. This is a big task and it is not one 
we could have undertaken alone. Accordingly, as the list of contributors above indicates, 
we needed to approach a large number of researchers at the forefront of social identity 
theorising to help us develop and flesh out this analysis. The result is a book which is a 
hybrid between a monograph and an edited book. Although this is an unusual format, we 
believe that this structure allows us to showcase the power and excitement not only of 
social identity research but also of the collective processes this research involves. We 
hope you agree.  
The way this book developed was also somewhat unusual. First, we not only 
experienced considerable time-pressure to write the book within the time frame we set 
ourselves (less than two months), but also, given the rapidly evolving nature of the 
COVID-19 crisis, we needed to re-evaluate and re-think our analysis on an almost daily 
basis. We were studying a phenomenon that had not yet ended. Second, we wrote this 
book while self-isolating at home. Even though we are normally spread across the world 
in three different cities, and even though writing a book together would always have 
meant being physically distant, this somehow felt different. This was perhaps because it 
is the first time that we ourselves were not only researchers, but also participants and thus 
at the heart of the thing we were studying. Indeed, because we are still in the midst of the 
COVID-19 crisis, it is very likely that aspects of our analysis will be somewhat outdated 
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and incomplete by the time the book appears and readers should be mindful of this. 
Nevertheless, we are confident that much of the book’s content has enduring relevance — 
and indeed it was this that really motivated us to produce it.    
What is clear is that both the time-pressure and the immersion in the focus of 
study made this a unique book to write. To meet the deadline and to understand the daily 
unfolding dynamics world-wide, regular Zoom meetings brainstorm sessions were 
essential not just to coordinate the writing, but also to get a grip on the reality that was 
taking shape around us. The truly collaborative nature of this project hopefully shines 
through in terms of the level of integration across sections and chapters. This is a project 
built around partnerships not personalities, and authorship (of both the book and the 
chapters) should be understood as a reflection of shared social identities (‘we-ness’) not 
of disconnected personal identities (‘me-ness’). 
In the same spirit we would also like to draw attention to others who were 
invaluable in this collective endeavor. In particular, we are grateful to the team at SAGE, 
led by Amy Maher, who were enthusiastic about our plans from the start and have 
worked tirelessly to facilitate a rapid publication of this book. Thank you too to Christine 
McCoy and Joe Sheahan for their excellent support in proof reading and reference 
checking—all under a fair amount of time-pressure. We would also like to thank the 
funding bodies without whom much of the research that forms the basis of this book 
would not have been possible. Principal amongst these are the Australian Research 
Council, the National Health and Medical Research Council in Australia, as well as our 
respective universities; the University of Queensland, the University of St. Andrews, and 
the Australian National University. It is our hope that this book will form a solid 
foundation on which future analysis, intervention and policy relating to the COVID-19 
crisis can be built, and that it can help pave the way for a future together.  
 7 
  
Section A  
INTRODUCTION 
    
         The Need for a Social Identity Analysis of COVID-19 
 
 
As we write, at the start of May 2020, 4 million people have been infected with 
the COVID-19, over a quarter of a million have died and more than a third of the entire 
population of the planet is under some form of restriction of movement. It is the biggest 
health emergency of our generation. And yet, unless or until a vaccine is developed, or 
we discover medicines to treat the virus, our means of controlling the spread of infection 
depend on behavioural changes and hence upon human psychology. 
This is most obvious in the case of lockdown. While it is all very well to tell 
people that they must stay at home in order to flatten the curve of infection, the 
effectiveness of the policy depends on whether or not they do. Just how sensitive the 
curve is to even minor changes in compliance is made clear by Figure 1, which was 
created at the end of March by Mark Woolhouse — one of the epidemiologists advising 
the UK government. As this graph shows, a fully compliant population could reduce the 
proportion of those infected at the end of a 3-week lockdown by a factor of 10: from 
4.1% to under 0.4%.  In Britain, this would amount to a vast difference in infection 
numbers — from approximately 2.75 million to 270,000 people infected. Similar 
calculations around the world have inspired many government-led campaigns to 
encourage people to ‘Stay at Home and Save Lives’. Behaviour, then, is clearly critical. 
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Indeed, all we can do to control the virus right now is get people to behave appropriately 
— to ‘do the right thing’. 
 
Figure 1.  Sensitivity of the COVID-19 infection curve to different levels of compliance 
 
A sceptic might retort that this is a matter of picking low-hanging fruit. Of course, 
the lockdown is a matter of changing what people do. But one of its key aims is to give us 
time to prepare and reduce the levels of infection so that they can then be dealt with by 
other types of intervention. This sceptic’s argument suggests that as the days of lockdown 
are numbered, so too is the relevance of behaviour and psychology to controlling 
COVID-19. To assess the validity of this retort, let us consider two of the interventions 
that have been most discussed in recent weeks. One is the wearing of face masks. The 
other is the use of ‘Test, Trace, Isolate’ (TTI). In other words, find out who is infected, 
find out who they have been in contact with, isolate those people so they cannot infect 
others and, in that way, nip the spread in the bud. 
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The issue around face masks seems very simple. The masks available to the 
public probably do not prevent a tiny virus getting through and infecting you. But they do 
stop you breathing, coughing and spluttering the virus over others if you are infected. 
Overall, it seems a no-brainer: wear masks and reduce the virus spread. Where is the 
psychology in that? 
It is worth starting off by making a small but important distinction. By itself, a 
mask does not stop anything. It is wearing masks that makes the difference. And wearing 
masks is a behaviour. Then, just as with the behaviour of staying at home, the question is 
will people do it or not? Furthermore, the literature on the effectiveness of mask wearing 
to prevent infection provides rather mixed results. If you wear them properly and dispose 
of them carefully, they probably have a modestly positive effect (Greenhalgh et al., 
2020). But people do not wear them properly. They fit them badly, they lift them to 
speak, they touch them, they leave them lying on surfaces, and they casually toss them 
aside. And if they do too much of this, masks may do more harm than good. There are 
very few high-quality studies of how people actually use masks in everyday settings. But 
such behavioural investigation is crucial before we can really determine if masks are 
worthwhile. 
And then, there are all the impacts of mask wearing that go beyond the physical 
impact of the mask. Will they cut us off from others, dehumanise us, further isolate us 
from other people even when we venture out of our homes? Will they signal danger, 
increase anxiety, and serve as a further detriment to mental health at a time when people 
are already scared and anxious not only of getting ill and dying, but also of the economic 
and political hardship that the pandemic is causing? Will they cause social division and 
even conflict between those who do and do not wear masks — so that some people 
accuse others of acting recklessly and foolishly? Conversely, insofar as masks serve to 
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protect others from us rather than us from others, will wearing them create positive social 
norms? Will masks serve as a public sign that people are acting for the common good and 
hence strengthen impulses towards kindness and compassion? These questions are just 
some of the many ways in which the impact of masks on the trajectory of COVID-19 is 
critically dependent on psychological considerations. 
Similar points can be made about ‘Test, Trace, Isolate’. Briefly, the strategy is 
totally dependent on people’s willingness to be tested, to be tracked, and then to isolate 
themselves. And hence compliance is as important here as it is with lockdown and with 
mask wearing. The issue of tracking is particularly problematic. In many countries, 
people are being asked to download an app onto their phones that will continuously 
collect data about their proximity to others (or, rather, to others’ phones). Then, if 
someone tests positive, this information can be used by health agencies to trace the 
people with whom they have had contact. But will enough people comply to make the 
system work? Will they be happy with a state agency having such detailed information 
about their social interactions? In particular, will groups who are more antagonistic to 
authority willingly submit themselves to this type of ‘Big Brother’ surveillance?  
What these examples make clear is that there are a great many psychological 
issues that shape the impact (for good and for ill) of every measure that governments 
around the world are contemplating or using to deal with the pandemic. And just as the 
pandemic itself is unique in our lifetimes, so too we see for the first time a realisation by 
governments (and by society more widely) that it needs to harness psychology as a key 
element in strategies to defeat COVID-19. Moreover, and this really is new, governments 
are seeing psychology not only as relevant to individual-level outcomes (e.g., the effects 
of the pandemic on mental health) but also as integral to societal level outcomes (e.g., the 
maintenance of social cohesion or conversely the development of public disorder).  
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However, it is not enough to understand that we need psychology as a core part of 
efforts against COVID-19. It is also important to understand what sort of psychology 
helps or hinders in those efforts. 
We need a psychological analysis that recognises people are the solution not the 
problem  
Both within and beyond the academic discipline of psychology, there is a 
longstanding and influential tradition which views people as mentally frail, beset by 
biases, and unable to deal with uncertainty, complexity or stress — and therefore prone to 
unravel completely in a crisis. This kind of psychology holds that when the going gets 
tough, the people panic (an idea we will examine in more detail in Sections B and D). 
When the crisis hits, the people become part of the problem. So, they need to be shielded 
from harsh truths, and shepherded by a paternalistic government who must factor in the 
frailty of the masses when deciding what forms of disaster management are viable. 
We have seen various aspects of this ‘frailty’ tradition in responses to COVID-19. 
As the dangers posed by the virus began to become clear, the media was full of stories of 
‘panic buying’. We were warned that people did not have the willpower to sustain 
prolonged restrictions and that ‘behavioural fatigue’ would set in. And after lockdown 
was imposed, the media shifted their attention to so-called ‘covidiots’ who were flouting 
regulations, flocking to outdoor spaces, and organising indoor parties. 
This lack of trust in the psychology of the people had important practical 
implications (Reicher, 2020). At worst, it was used to undermine medical 
recommendations as to what measures were needed to control infection. In many 
countries, the concept of ‘behavioural fatigue’ was notoriously invoked to justify a delay 
in lockdown. It also encouraged a punitive response towards those who failed to adhere 
to lockdown regulations. The notion that such non-adherence (e.g., going to the park) was 
 12 
the product of psychological weakness or malevolence led to threats of both individual 
punishment (imposing fines) and collective punishment (closing down the parks). 
There are many problems with such an approach. The first is that it is contradicted 
by what actually happened. In many ways, the headline story of COVID-19 is not the 
weakness but the strength of the people. Breaking the rules tends to make better headlines 
than observing the rules, and so stories of people plundering supermarket shelves for 
toilet rolls or flouting lockdown have filled the front pages (e.g., see Figure 4 in Chapter 
4). Nonetheless, the overall figures show that very few people stockpiled scarce 
commodities. Equally, the great majority observed restrictions (indeed, far more than 
authorities in many countries had expected). And it was not easy. One analysis shows 
that, of the 92% of the UK population supporting lockdown, roughly half (44% vs. 48%) 
were suffering hardship as a result of the lockdown. It is no hyperbole to say that their 
behaviour has been heroic. 
What is more, when people did violate the lockdown, this had less to do with 
psychological frailties than with practical difficulties. One particularly telling study 
showed that the poorest people in Britain were three times more likely than the most 
affluent to go out to work (Bibby et al., 2020; Smith, 2020). But, crucially, there was no 
difference in their psychological motivation to stay at home. It was simply that they 
needed to go to work to put food on the table. 
The implication here is that, when attempting to increase adherence, waving a big 
stick at people generally misses the point. Instead of seeking to enforce lockdown on an 
unwilling population, the priority must be to enable people to do what they actually want 
to do. If they leave home from economic necessity, then provide the funding that allows 
them to stay in. If they leave home to exercise (as they are allowed to do in many 
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countries) and inadvertently find themselves in crowded parks, then make available more 
green space (such as golf courses and playing fields) so they can keep a safe distance. 
It is worth dwelling on this point for a moment, for it illustrates another central 
theme of this book — the role of social inequalities in this crisis and the impact of this 
crisis on social inequalities. The following statement was made by an inhabitant of the 
Paris suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois (a suburb with a high proportion of residents of North 
African descent), but could be from almost anywhere:  
People are trying to respect the lockdown, but what do you do if you’re a family of 
five or more in a small apartment on the 15th floor? How do you keep children in? 
How do you feed them when the markets where you buy cheap fruit and vegetables 
have closed and you can’t afford supermarkets? How can families whose children 
normally eat in school canteens now make three meals a day?”  
This makes the point that poverty has placed significant demands on people which have 
limited their ability to comply with lockdown regulations (a point we develop further in 
Section E). Moreover, if these demands led people to venture out, the French state 
intervened with severe sanctions. In the first sixteen days of lockdown alone the police 
carried out 5.8 million controls and issued 359,000 fines (FR24 News. 2020). Little 
surprise that suburbs like Clichy-sous-Bois were the origins of rioting which then spread 
across France. 
This takes us to the second main problem with the ‘psychological frailty’ 
perspective. It is not just wrong to see people as the problem in a crisis, it is also 
dangerous. On the one hand it leads policy makers to look to psychology as the basis of 
problems of adherence and so ignore the real practical problems people face (much like 
the famous story of the British guns in Singapore pointing out to sea and thereby ignoring 
the fact that the real threat came from the land). On the other hand — and potentially 
even more seriously — a punitive approach may actually corrode the public’s motivation 
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to accept measures put in place by the authorities, breed resistance, and even lead to 
social disorder.  
But the most important problem with the ‘psychological frailty’ approach is not 
the problems it causes, so much as the opportunities that it misses. For it is not just that 
the public proved very willing to comply with what they were told by the authorities. 
Rather, the public have played a highly active role in this pandemic. In many countries, 
they pushed governments into taking action, both to implement policies like lockdown 
and to provide the packages of support to make adherence possible. Moreover, across the 
globe, the mutual self-help shown at neighbour, street, community and national levels has 
been overwhelming. For instance, in the Netherlands, COVID-related volunteering has 
been at levels not been seen since the North Sea flood of 1953 (van Dijke, 2020). And 
this is only the tip of the iceberg. In many countries, formal groups have been 
supplemented by countless individual acts of kindness to erstwhile strangers: putting 
notes offering help through the door, baking cakes, delivering shopping, and much else 
besides. 
In so many ways, then, the public have not been the problem but a key part of the 
solution in this pandemic (Levy, 2020). They have not been a source of frailty but of 
resilience. Indeed, arguably, their response has been the most precious resource available 
in combatting COVID-19. The role of governments should be to support and enlist this 
public resilience. As we discuss further in Section B, the ‘frailty’ perspective encourages 
governments to ignore or even to suppress community solidarity and resilience — an 
error of tragic proportions. As a counterpoint to this, what we therefore need is a 
psychological perspective which addresses the roots of such resilience and which can 
therefore help us understand how it can be developed, nurtured and sustained.  
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At one level, the solution to this is very simple. It requires recognition that 
resilience is more than a personal quality located inside particular people. It is also a 
collective quality that develops between people (Williams et al., 2019). It arises when 
people come together as a group, when they come to see others as a source of support 
rather than as competitors who stand in their way (Yzerbyt & Phalet, 2020). However, to 
reach this simple conclusion, we must sweep away a century of anti-collectivism which 
regards people coming together in groups as a source of deep anxiety and hostility. 
We need to get our heads around the ‘we’ concept 
Another consensus that has developed both inside and outside the discipline of 
psychology, and in much of social science, is that individuals are rational and good, while 
groups are irrational and bad. Indeed, rationality has generally been understood as the 
enlightened pursuit of individual self-interest (particularly in economics; but for a 
critique see Akerlof & Kranton, 2010). From this perspective, becoming part of a group 
is a process of subversion and loss: as we become part of the mass, we lose our sense of 
self, we lose our capacity to reason, we shed our moral compass, we lack agency and 
become like sheep — helplessly following the herd. Fine upstanding citizens morph into 
a mindless mob. Sensible people become victims of groupthink. Thinkers become 
zombies. According to this model, if you want optimal outcomes, the best advice you can 
give people (and society) is to stand alone and apart from the group. 
We will critique this analysis further in Sections B and D, but already we can see 
where this logic takes us in the midst of a pandemic. Audrey Whitlock was one of the 
leaders of the anti-lockdown protests in North Carolina. The lockdown, she argued, was 
an act of tyranny from central government, and stood in contradiction to the fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed to her under the U.S. constitution (Owen, 2020). Audrey became 
infected with COVID-19, at which point she then argued that the requirement to 
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quarantine herself was a further denial of her rights to go out, to mingle with others, and 
to join further protests. In this way, her consistent and determined pursuit of her 
individual rights increased the probability of infection spread and compromised the safety 
of the community as a whole. As long as Audrey Whitlock and others frame COVID-19 
as a ‘me’ thing, this pandemic will be longer, deeper and deadlier. 
Fixating on the individual ‘me’ is therefore a way of thinking — and a way of 
acting — which many have recognised as profoundly limiting in a pandemic. As New 
York’s Governor, Andrew Cuomo, put it:  
Yeah it's your life do whatever you want, but you are now responsible for my life…. 
We started saying, 'It's not about me it's about we.' Get your head around the we 
concept. It's not all about you. It's about me too. It's about we. (Slattery, 2020) 
Now, in many ways, we could stop here. For Cuomo’s words are hard to improve upon as 
a statement of the core theme of this book. COVID-19 is not about me, it is about we. If 
you respond on the basis of me, then everyone is in trouble. If you respond on the basis of 
we, then the future is far brighter. To make the point, let us reflect on some examples. 
Most people’s sense of personal risk of succumbing to COVID-19 is rather low, 
particularly amongst younger groups (in March 2020 the WHO estimated that while 3% 
of people who contract the virus will die, the mortality rate is far higher for older people; 
Fink, 2020). So, if people were making decisions only in terms of what happens to them 
personally, many might conclude that it is not worth abiding by lockdown, and adherence 
rates would be much lower — possibly around 25% (the dark green curve in Figure 1). 
But most people are not behaving in ‘me’ terms. In fact, one’s sense of personal risk 
barely affects adherence to lockdown at all. Rather, according to data we have collected 
from nearly 6,000 respondents across eleven countries, what best predicts adherence is a 
sense of “we are all in it together and we all need to come out of it together” (Jetten et al., 
2020). That is, it is thinking in terms of ‘we’ that leads people to behave in the ways that 
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are necessary to control COVID-19. This raises the issue of how to develop a sense of 
‘we-ness’ and, in particular, how leadership can encourage a collective mindset. This is a 
key issue that we address in Section B. 
But thinking in group terms is important not only in determining whether we 
adhere to lockdown and other such measures. It also determines how well we cope. So 
while physically isolating ourselves from other people has been necessary in order to 
limit infections and thereby preserve our physical health, this social isolation also has the 
potential to compromise both physical and mental health. A large body of work has 
shown that being part of groups is a powerful prophylactic against such conditions. 
Feeling part of a group, and having a sense that others are there to support you when you 
need them, reduces anxiety and stress, and thereby improves not only mental but also 
physical health (Haslam et al., 2018). The question then arises how can we build such a 
sense of ‘we-ness’‚ of social connectedness — even when we are distanced from each 
other? How can we keep people together when they are apart? That is one of the great 
challenges of this pandemic (which is why we referenced it in the title of the book). We 
address this question in Section C. 
One more example of why ‘we-thinking’ is so important concerns the dynamics 
of solidarity and citizenship. In a disaster of any size, and certainly one as enveloping as 
this pandemic, the public sector simply lacks the capacity to deal with everyone’s needs. 
There are not enough police, care workers or community nurses to look after everyone 
who needs shopping to be done, medicine to be delivered, or just checking in on to see if 
they are coping. We have already referred to the flowering of different forms of mutual 
aid which have emerged to fill the gap. But clearly this flowering is dependent on people 
thinking in communal rather than personal terms, and therefore being as concerned with 
the needs of other members of the community as with their own needs. To cite Anna 
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Vickerstaff, one of the founders of the U.K.’s mutual aid national network: “we set this 
network up because we want to make sure that no one in our communities is being left to 
face this crisis alone”. These questions of collective action and collective solidarity 
around COVID-19 — how it develops, how it can be nurtured, why it breaks down, and 
with what consequences are the focus of Section D. 
Yet while we see many examples of groups at their best in a crisis, as we will see 
in Section E, we equally see many examples of groups at their worst. This is no less true 
in pandemics. During the Black Death, for instance, over 500 Jewish communities were 
destroyed across Europe. In one single day, St. Valentine’s day 1349, some 2,000 Jews 
were burnt to death. In many other cities, including Frankfurt-am-Main and Cologne, the 
entire Jewish population was destroyed (Cohn, 2007). In the current crisis we are also 
witnessing outbreaks of collective hatred. In India, for instance, Muslims have been 
blamed for spreading the disease — so-called ‘coronajihadism’. The novelist Arundhati 
Roy (2020) has argued that “we are suffering, not just from COVID, but from a crisis of 
hatred, from a crisis of hunger”. Her words are of relevance to many countries. Indeed, 
the Head of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres described the pandemic as unleashing 
“a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, scapegoating and scaremongering” (Hudson, 2020). 
This raises two final questions. The first is what determines the passage from a 
community united in compassion to communities divided by hate? As the question 
implies, this is not a matter of groups or not groups, but rather of how we draw group 
boundaries and define group cultures. It is a question of whether the ‘we’ includes all 
sectors of the community — minorities and majorities alike — or whether our 
community is divided into a ‘we’ and a ‘they’, and also whether ‘they’ are represented as 
a threat to our very survival. Are ‘the Jews’ polluting ‘our’ wells? Are ‘the Muslims’ 
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using the infection as a weapon? And where, then, do these constructions of groups and 
intergroup relations come from?  
The second question is how do the faultlines in society — between rich and poor, 
between ethnic minorities and majorities, between the precarious and the comfortable — 
affect what happens in the pandemic, and how does the pandemic impact those faultlines? 
As well as what happens to individuals, a crucial issue concerning COVID-19 is what it 
will do to our society and to the relations between groups within it. This is a key topic 
that we address in Section E. 
Summing up 
By now, hopefully we have persuaded you of three things. First, that the COVID-
19 pandemic is as much about psychology as biology, and hence that if we are to deal 
with the pandemic effectively, it is as important for us to understand how people behave 
as it is to understand how the virus behaves. 
Second, the pandemic is about group psychology in particular. People are 
predominantly acting as members of a community and for the interests of their 
community; to the extent that they do so, we are likely to come out from these dark days 
in better shape. However, we must be particularly vigilant about the ways in which the 
group is defined. If we slip from ‘we-thinking’ to ‘we-and-they-thinking’ then all of us 
are in deep trouble. 
Third, we urgently need is a framework for understanding how people come to 
form groups, how they behave in groups, the consequences of being in groups, and the 
ways in which the boundaries of groups come to be drawn more or less conclusively. The 
social identity approach will help us to do all of these things. As such, the next chapter of 
this section will spell out some of its key principles. 
 
  
   




Plague was the concern of all of us…. Thus, for example, a feeling normally as individual as the 
ache of separation from those one loves suddenly became a feeling in which all shared 
alike and — together with fear — the greatest affliction of the long period of exile that 
lay ahead. (Camus, The Plague, 1947, p.61, emphasis added) 
As Albert Camus tells it in The Plague, as soon as contagious disease swept through the 
Algerian city of Oran and the city went into lockdown, the behaviour of the residents 
changed. Emotions that had previously been experienced individually became emotions 
shared by all. Likewise, if we are trying to understand responses to a challenge where (at 
least potentially) “we are all in this together”, we need a theoretical analysis that help us to 
get to grips with the nature of that shared and collective experience. Above all else, then, this 
is what this book seeks to provide.  
The social identity approach (consisting of social identity theory; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979, and its extension self-categorization theory; Turner et al., 1987, 1994) is well suited to 
this task. In particular, as we outline below, this theoretical framework provides a 
parsimonious explanation for many of the COVID-19 puzzles that we identified in Chapter 1: 
how the virus has changed the way we look at ourselves and others, as well as how it has 
changed our relationship to the world and our sense of what we value in it. Fundamentally, 
what we see here is that COVID-19 has changed our notions of ‘self’ and associated 
calculations of ‘interest’, so that these are more inclusive of others. More particularly, 
whether we define ourselves as ‘us’, and if so, who is included in that definition, becomes 
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critical to our social and health-related behaviour. But before delving into such matters, it 
will be helpful to consider where the social identity approach started and what exactly it is.  
Writing in the early 1970s, Henri Tajfel defined social identity as “the individual’s 
knowledge that he [or she] belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and 
value significance to him [or her] of this group membership” (1972, p.31). In other words, 
social identity refers to internalised group membership, that serves to define a person’s sense 
of ‘who they are’ in a particular social context. In contrast, personal identity refers to a 
person’s internalised sense of their individuality (e.g., their idiosyncratic abilities and tastes; 
Turner, 1982). Practically speaking, this means that when people see themselves in terms of 
their social identity, they self-define in terms of “we” than in terms of “I”. It also means that 
when people act in terms of their social identity they interact with others on the basis of an 
identity that they either share (as “us” ingroup members) or do not share (as “us” ingroup 
members versus “them” outgroup members).  
Why would this distinction between personal and social identity matter in the context 
of responses to COVID-19? As we noted in Chapter 1, one important reason is that during the 
pandemic many of the behaviours engaged in can be seen as motivated much more by their 
social identity than by their personal identity.   
To give an example, if a young woman, Sophie, were to assess her situation purely in 
terms of her personal identity, it would be hard to understand why she would engage in 
physical distancing and stop having face-to-face get-togethers with her friends. Why would 
she stay at home when she is personally in a very low-risk group? Indeed, even if she were to 
become infected, statistically speaking, her chance of survival would be very high. To 
understand Sophie’s behaviour, we need to look at the groups and categories to which she 
belongs. When we do, we can see that she stays at home because she identifies with her 
family, friendship groups, workplace, community, and country and these groups all endorse a 
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norm of “staying home”.  In other words, when we look at her social identities — the groups 
to which she belongs and identifies with and the groups whose destiny she shares — the 
reasons for Sophie’s choices become clearer. Indeed, this examination makes it clear that her 
behaviour is determined not by a concern about becoming personally infected with the virus 
but by a desire to protect other members of the groups to which she belongs. This sentiment 
is echoed by Camus in The Plague where he observes:  
No longer were there individual destinies; only a collective destiny, made of plague and 
emotions shared by all. (Camus, 1947, p.161) 
Moreover, it is not just that responses to COVID-19 typically involve considerations 
that are relevant to “us” rather than “me”; it is also clear that effectively combatting the virus 
(whether reducing its spread or mitigating its negative consequences) requires a focus on the 
group and not the individual. This is an observation that many leaders have made. For 
example, Magus Berntsson, the President of the Assembly of European Regions remarked: 
It is only through cooperation that we can successfully battle this virus and deal with its 
long-term societal and economic effects. Nationalist and protectionist strategies will not 
succeed against an ‘enemy’ that does not respect borders. Coordination, cooperation, 
sharing of best practices and solidarity are needed now more than ever. (Assembly of 
European Regions, 2020) 
The social identity approach is well placed to tackle the challenge of understanding 
how collective level solidarity and cooperation can be achieved. In the remainder of this 
chapter, we outline the key premises of the social identity approach that are relevant to the 
psychology of COVID-19. In this, our main objectives are (a) to map out the forces that 
determine how people are able to act as group members rather than as individuals, and (b) to 
understand what the distinctive psychological and behavioural consequences of acting in 
terms of social identity are. In other words, what leads us to see ourselves as members of a 
given community (e.g., as ‘Oranians under siege’) and how does this change what we think, 
feel, and do?     
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We know who we are (and what to do) by comparing ‘us’ with ‘them’ 
The above observations give an initial sense of why social identity — a sense of ‘us-
ness’ — is so important for the psychology of COVID-19. But when do we see ourselves as 
one ‘us’ rather than many ‘I’s? And how do we know exactly who and what ‘us’ is?  
Some initial answers to these questions were provided by a series of laboratory 
studies that Tajfel and colleagues conducted in the early 1970s — the so-called ‘minimal 
group’ studies (Tajfel et al., 1971). The participants in these were assigned to groups on the 
basis of ostensibly trivial criteria such as their preference for the abstract painters Klee or 
Kandinsky. After this, they had to award points (signifying small amounts of money) to an 
anonymous member of their own group and to an anonymous member of the other group. 
The participants were never able to allocate money to themselves and so this ruled out self-
interest and personal economic gain as determinants of their allocation behaviour. All they 
knew was that they were allocating money either to ‘us’ (without benefiting from that 
personally) or to ‘them’.  
The robust finding that emerged from these studies was that even these most minimal 
of conditions were sufficient to encourage group behaviour. In particular, participants tended 
to award more points to a person from their ingroup (‘us’) than to a member of the outgroup 
(‘them’). Tajfel and Turner (1979) explained these findings by arguing that acting as group 
members (i.e., in terms of a social identity as a member of the Klee group) helped to “create 
and define the individual’s place in society” (pp. 40-41). More generally, they argued that 
often we only know who ‘we’ are by knowing who we are not. As Tajfel put it:  
Distinction from the ‘other’ category [e.g., the Kandinsky group] provided an identity for 
their own group, and thus some kind of meaning to an otherwise empty situation. (1972, 
pp. 39-40, emphasis added) 
This observation provided a platform for two theoretical principles which form the 
core of social identity theory. First, groups define their place and standing in the social world 
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through comparisons with other relevant groups and, second, the outcome of that social 
comparison is important because group members strive for a sense of social identity that is 
positive, distinct and enduring (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In other words, we want ‘us’ to be 
better than, different from, and more durable than, ‘them’.   
There is plenty of evidence of these motivations at work in the context of COVID-19. 
In particular, in trying to determine an optimal response to the pandemic, many countries, 
communities and friendship groups compare their own group to other groups — most 
obviously by looking at tables of infection rates, deaths and testing numbers (e.g., those 
provided by Johns Hopkins University, 2020). The outcome of that comparison is important, 
because the sense that one’s group (e.g., one’s country or region) is doing poorly or well will 
dictate, among other things, whether a group feels it can relax restrictions on social gathering 
or else needs to tighten them.   
We also compare our ingroups to those outgroups that are seen to provide a relevant 
basis for social comparison. Indeed, because many countries did not see China as a relevant 
comparison group when the first outbreak of COVID-19 was reported from Wuhan, they did 
not take appropriate measures to stop the spread of the virus. For example, it has been argued 
that one reason why Italy was slow to respond to the outbreak was that its citizens did not 
compare themselves with China but instead with other European countries. As Italy’s 
Undersecretary of State for Health, Sandra Zampa, observed: 
Most importantly, Italy looked at the example of China, Ms. Zampa said, not as a practical 
warning, but as a “science fiction movie that had nothing to do with us.” And when the 
virus exploded, Europe, she said, “looked at us the same way we looked at China. 
(Horowitz et al., 2020)  
In the context of such comparisons, groups and their leaders want to establish a sense 
of positive social identity by making it clear that they have responded to the outbreak better 
than other groups. Accordingly, throughout the crisis, many national leaders have pointed to 
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ways in which their own country’s response has been superior to that of others. For instance, 
at a press briefing on April 2, Australia’s Prime Minister, Scott Morrison boasted that “we 
have mobilised a testing regime better than any in the world” (Rev, 2020). Similarly, Israel’s 
Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, tweeted that “Israel has been ranked first in the 
COVID-19 Health Safety Countries Ranking on the Deep Knowledge Group website” 
(Weinglas, 2020). The fact that no other leaders made reference to the work of the Deep 
Knowledge Group speaks too to the fact that in order to achieve a positive sense of social 
identity, we are often very selective both in the measures we use to compare ourselves to 
others, and in the groups we compare ourselves with (in ways that social identity theory 
predicts; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, on April 27 Donald Trump claimed that “the United 
States has produced dramatically better health outcomes than any other country, with the 
possible exception of Germany” — but this was true only because he compared the U.S. with 
a small number of countries that had been hit hard by the first wave of the virus (e.g., Italy, 
Spain, the UK; Mackey, 2020).   
While group members look to make intergroup comparisons which put their ingroup 
in a positive light, these efforts are also constrained by social reality. In particular, society is 
highly stratified — with some groups having a lot more status and power than others. Unlike 
their low-status counterparts, high-status groups by definition already compare favourably on 
key status-defining dimensions in ways that give them a positive social identity. It is 
therefore not surprising that the primary interest of advantaged groups is in maintaining and 
protecting their dominant position. In contrast, lower-status groups often struggle to achieve a 
positive identity because intergroup comparisons typically confirm their inferior status in 
ways that make the group unattractive and unviable. As we will see in the chapters that 
follow, group status is an important determinant of responses to COVID-19 — not least 
because this is something that the virus can threaten. In particular, groups that have a lot to 
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lose (e.g., retail businesses, sporting bodies) can be expected to press vigorously for actions 
that preserve their status (e.g., ending the lockdown, financial stimulus), while those that 
have little to lose (e.g., environmental groups) may see the virus as an important opportunity 
for social change.      
Social identities are shaped by history, context and influence 
Social comparisons with other groups help us to understand who ‘we’ are, but which 
social identities, out of myriad possible ones, do we use to define ourselves in any given 
context? Andrew may be an academic, an active member of his local community, a Liverpool 
fan, and Northern Irish, but which group membership will inform his sense of self — and 
hence his behaviour — in any given context? Indeed, if we assume that all of these social 
groups embrace different norms about how to respond to COVID-19 (e.g., so that his local 
community supports physical distancing but his soccer team does not), how do we know 
which norms Andrew will internalise and comply with?   
Broadly speaking, the social identity approach suggests that three sets of factors are at 
play here (Oakes et al., 1994). The first factor is a person’s social history. This means that 
Andrew is more likely to define himself in terms of a given social identity if the group 
membership that this relates to has been important for him and his fellow group members in 
the past (in self-categorization theory, this is referred to as the principle of perceiver 
readiness). The second factor is social context (Haslam & Turner, 1992). This means that the 
identities we use as a basis for self-definition need to be meaningful in the situation at hand. 
Andrew is more likely to define himself as a Liverpool fan when he is watching a football 
match (especially with other Liverpool fans) than when at an academic conference. In the 
context of COVID-19, he is also more likely to define himself as Irish if he sees the situation 
he confronts as one which other Irish people are confronting too, and as being different from 
that faced by members of other groups (e.g., Germans; the principle of fit). The third factor is 
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social influence (Reicher et al., 2005). This means that the way we define ourselves is also 
shaped by the ways that others — particularly other ingroup members — encourage us to 
define ourselves. For example, if other people that Andrew identifies with define themselves 
as British, rather than Northern Irish (and make this identity seem more fitting), then he is 
more likely to do so too.                     
Yet while these three factors interact to determine which social identities we use to 
define ourselves, features of the broader socio-structural context also determine whether we 
define ourselves primarily as group members or as individuals. Tajfel and Turner (1979) 
argued that people are more likely to define themselves as group members when they see this 
as the best way to achieve a positive sense of identity. At least three factors have a bearing on 
this: (1) the perceived status of the group, (2) the perceived permeability of group boundaries 
(i.e., opportunity to leave the group), and (3) the possibility of changing the group’s 
circumstances. These factors make people less likely to define themselves in terms of a given 
group membership if that group has low status, if it is possible to leave the group, or if the 
group’s status seems unlikely to change (Ellemers, 1993). 
This also means that if a group is unattractive (e.g., because it is stigmatised or 
disadvantaged) then its members are likely to try to ‘go it alone’ if they sense that this offers 
them the best pathway to self-advancement. Indeed, this way of thinking can be seen to 
underpin — and to have been reinforced by — individualistic ideologies of meritocracy and 
personal mobility that have come to the fore in recent decades (particularly in Western 
societies). These were famously embraced by the Conservative British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher in her observation that: 
There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are 
families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look 
to themselves first. It’s our duty to look after ourselves. (Evans, 2004, p.106)  
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Such a philosophy encourages people to act in terms of personal rather than social 
identity — and therefore to turn their back on their groups and the plight of fellow group 
members. If you are a woman or black and you experience sexism or racism, do not work 
with others to fight for social justice. Just lean in or walk on by.  
As we have already seen, in the face of a pandemic, such a mindset has the potential 
to be fatal. At the same time (and in many ways rather fortunately), in pandemics and other 
large-scale disasters the factors that we have discussed also serve to make people more likely 
to define themselves in terms of shared social identity (Drury, 2012). In particular, the 
context is one that makes shared group memberships (e.g., those based on nationality) both 
more meaningful and more inescapable. Moreover, because leaders recognise the value of 
social identity as a resource for bringing people together, this is something that they typically 
seek to cultivate. Thus it was no accident that early on in the pandemic, Boris Johnson chose 
to deliberately push back against his Conservative predecessor’s earlier pronouncement by 
declaring that, indeed, “there really is such a thing as society” (Braddock, 2020). In the 
process, he signalled a more inclusive approach to the COVID-19 crisis and opened the door 
to a broad set of positive social resources which flow from people seeing themselves — and 
acting — not as isolated individuals but as members of a collective who are ‘all in this 
together’. 
Social identity provides a platform for social influence, social connection, collective 
action and intergroup relations 
Having sketched out the processes that lead people to define themselves in terms of a 
particular group membership, the obvious question is why this matters — and in particular, why 
it helps us understand the psychology of COVID-19. In many ways, this is a question that the 
rest of this book seeks to answer. In particular, we seek to show how the social identity 
approach provides the conceptual tools to address each of the key issues that we raised at the 
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end the previous chapter.  In the sections that follow we will therefore show how an 
internalised sense of group membership (i.e., self-categorization in terms of social identity — 
or a sense of ‘us-ness’) is the basis for (a) social influence and effective leadership, (b) social 
connection and hence health, (c) solidarity and collective behaviour, and (d) long-term social 
relations between groups. These links are represented schematically in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Social identity as a basis for social influence, social connection, collective behaviour 
and intergroup relations. 
 
A first point to note is that social identity is a platform for social influence (Turner, 
1991). More specifically, as we explain in some detail in Section B, our willingness to listen 
to, and be guided by, another person (in particular, a leader) is contingent on us (a) defining 
ourselves in terms of social identity and then (b) believing that that person is representative of 
it (so that, in the language of categorization theory, they are prototypical of the group; Rosch, 
1978). In these terms, it is clear that effective leadership during the COVID-19 crisis has 
centred on leaders being able both to develop a sense of a shared identity (a sense that “we 
are in this together”) and to be seen as “one of us”. This is seen, for example, in the words 
and actions of Scandinavian Prime Ministers, Mette Frederiksen (Denmark), Sanna Marin 
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(Finland) and Erna Solberg (Norway) — all of whom went to great efforts both to bind their 
societies together and to be seen to stand with them (e.g., Tu, 2020). This in turn allowed 
them to enforce tough physical distancing measures because, for their citizens, compliance 
did not feel like a personal sacrifice but as the ‘right and proper thing to do to protect us’.  
As well as being the basis for influence, even more fundamentally, social identity is a 
basis for social connection. Indeed, while early social identity theorising (in the wake of the 
minimal groups studies) focused on explaining intergroup hostility and discrimination, it is 
increasingly recognised that the groups we identify with provide us with important psychological 
resources (Haslam et al., 2018; Jetten et al., 2012). In particular, they help us to ‘know who we 
are’ in ways that give our lives meaning and purpose, and a sense of self-worth and control. Our 
ingroups are also an important source of social support in times of stress, as we have seen 
throughout the COVID-19 crisis. However, in this context, we also see an important corollary of 
this — namely that when we are cut off from groups that are important to us (e.g., our extended 
family, friends, work teams, sports clubs), this can have negative consequences for our health 
and well-being. While COVID-19 clearly harms people’s health directly, so too can the social 
isolation that results from the measures used to deal with it. These are issues that we work 
through in Section C.  Here we also examine whether defining groups as ingroups or outgroups 
leads us to see them as either a source of safety and support, or of threat and harm — in ways 
that have profound implications for health-relevant behaviour.  
Will COVID-19 bring us closer together or pull us apart?  Speaking to the latter 
possibility, there has been widespread discussion of the ways in which fears of contamination 
can bring out the worst in us (e.g., Rathje, 2020). The media has also extensively reported on 
hoarding and panic buying in ways that sometimes give the impression that during this 
pandemic, everyone is out for themselves. However, in many ways the bigger picture is a 
much more positive one. So, despite the fact that every other human is a potential source of 
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infection (and hence a threat to life), during the pandemic we have witnessed a range of novel 
and powerful forms of solidarity and collective behaviour in communities and society more 
generally. In ways that we explain in Section D, all of these can be understood as 
manifestations of an emergent sense of shared social identity. This indeed, explains why 
panic and selfishness are the exception not the rule; and why 2020’s main stories have been 
instead of collective efficacy and resilience. 
Yet as we noted in Chapter 1, there is a dark side to COVID-19 too. Not least, this is 
because the virus has put a magnifying glass on social inequalities. Indeed, it is clear that the 
suffering brought about by the virus has fallen unfairly on the shoulders of lower-status groups 
in society and the lower-status countries. In ways that social identity theory would predict, this 
is a recipe for social unrest and challenges to the status quo. Some predict that social discontent 
will flare up as soon as bans are lifted and individuals are free to move again. As Kluth (2020) 
observes:  
It would be naive to think that, once this medical emergency is over, either individual 
countries or the world can carry on as before. Anger and bitterness will find new outlets. 
Early harbingers include millions of Brazilians banging pots and pans from their windows 
to protest against their government, or Lebanese prisoners rioting in their overcrowded jails.  
We put these possibilities under the microscope in Section E. In particular, we explore 
how COVID-19 is likely to impact intergroup relations by changing things that social identity 
research tells us are important: the permeability of group boundaries, the legitimacy of 
intergroup relations, and the nature of the social identities in terms of which define ourselves 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). These shifts, we suggest, will help us understand the long-term impact 
of COVID-19 — not only on the forces at play in society, but also on its very structure. 
 
  
Section B  
SOCIAL INFLUENCE 
 
Efforts to influence people loom large in a pandemic. In particular, there is a demand for 
effective leadership which explains what is going on and motivates people to contribute to 
the achievement of shared group goals. There are two key reasons why this has been critical 
for the management of COVID-19. The first is that the virus has created a pressing need for 
people to work together to achieve new collective goals. Medical staff need to attend to the 
unwell, workers in a range of sectors need to maintain stretched services, and the general 
public need to do what they can to minimise the burden on those services and to halt the 
spread of the virus. The second reason is that there is considerable uncertainty about the 
nature of the virus and how to respond to it. People therefore look to others — and to leaders 
in particular — to help them understand what they should be thinking and doing, as well as 
how their actions contribute to a concerted societal response. As well as wanting coherent 
and convincing explanations of these things, people also want leaders who inspire them and 
others to put their shoulders to the collective wheel, in order to ‘do whatever it takes’ to 
endure the crisis and come out in the best possible shape on the other side. 
In this section we look at multiple facets of the influence process that have been 
foregrounded during the COVID-19 pandemic, starting with an examination of psychology of 
effective leadership (Chapter 3). This is followed by an analysis of the dynamics of 
followership and compliance (Chapter 4), behaviour change (Chapter 5) and the spread of 
conspiracy theories (Chapter 6). The key message here is that all of these influence processes 
are grounded in a sense of shared social identity (‘us-ness’) within a community. 
Accordingly, in order to secure compliance and desired forms of influence, the first priority 
 33 
of would-be influencers (e.g., leaders) is to cultivate this feeling of ‘us-ness’. In short, they 
need to be entrepreneurs of identity who make sure there is an ‘us’ to rally behind.  
  
    
Leadership 
(S. Alexander Haslam) 
 
Since COVID-19 first began spreading around the world, there have been myriad examples 
of leadership that has not only motivated people to work for collective goals but also helped 
them understand how best they can do this. Two examples are Jürgen Klopp’s address to 
Liverpool fans early on in the crisis on March 13 and Queen Elizabeth II’s televised address 
to the British public and members of the Commonwealth on April 6. Klopp had the 
challenging task of letting fans know that their bid for a first Premiership in 30 years had 
been halted by COVID-19, but did so by pointing out that “if it’s a choice between football 
and the good of the wider society, it’s no contest” (Klopp, 2020). “First and foremost”, he 
observed, “all of us have to do whatever we can to protect one another. In society I mean. 
This should be the case all the time in life, but in this moment I think it matters more than 
ever”. Likewise, the Queen zeroed in on the need for solidarity and collective steadfastness in 
her address:     
Together we are tackling this disease, and I want to reassure you that if we remain united 
and resolute, then we will overcome it. I hope in the years to come everyone will be able 
to take pride in how they responded to this challenge. And those who come after us will 
say the Britons of this generation were as strong as any. That the attributes of self-
discipline, of quiet good-humoured resolve and of fellow-feeling still characterise this 
country. The pride in who we are is not a part of our past, it defines our present and our 
future. (Stubley, 2020) 
Nevertheless, in the first months of the COVID-19 crisis there were a great many 
occasions on which leaders’ efforts at influence and mobilization fell short. We will not dwell 
on these here, but in this chapter want to ask what precisely it is that makes leaders more or 
less successful in their attempts to recruit the energies of others to their cause. What is it, for 
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example, that led people (including Liverpool’s rivals and committed non-royalists) not just 
to applaud Klopp’s and the Queen’s leadership, but to engage in acts of followership that 
translated their calls for mutual care and compassion into action? This indeed, is the critical 
question — for the ultimate proof of leadership is not how impressive a leader looks or 
sounds, but what they lead others to do in the name of the group they lead (Bennis, 1999; 
Platow et al., 2015). 
As we foreshadowed in the opening section of this book, our answer to this question 
centres on the dynamics of social identity. More specifically, we argue that leaders’ capacity 
to motivate others is grounded in what we refer to as their identity leadership (Steffens et al., 
2014) — their ability to represent and advance the shared interests of group members and to 
create and embed a sense of shared social identity among them (a sense of “us-ness”; see 
Haslam et al., 2020). For leaders, then, this sense of us-ness is the key resource that they need 
to marshal in order to secure the support and toil of others. Accordingly, we see that this 
sense of shared social identity was pivotal to the communications of both Klopp and the 
Queen — with Klopp using the terms “we”, “us” and “our” 17 times in a text of 381 words 
and the Queen referring to these collective pronouns 27 times in a speech of 524 words (i.e., 
once every 22 words and once every 19 words respectively). Indeed, the power of such 
language is confirmed in previous research which found that politicians who win elections 
use collective pronouns once every 79 words while those who lose elections use them only 
once every 136 words (Steffens & Haslam, 2013).  
We can enlarge upon this analysis by outlining three key ways in which leaders need 
to manage social identity in order to be effective: (a) by representing us, (b) by doing it for 
us, and (c) by crafting and embedding a sense of us. These things have previously been 
shown to underpin effective leadership in a broad range of contexts — most notably, in a 
global study of effective organizational leadership conducted in 22 different countries and 
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covering all 6 inhabited continents (van Dick et al., 2018). They have also very much come to 
the fore in mobilizing responses to COVID-19. 
Leaders need to represent us, and in a crisis ‘us’ becomes more inclusive  
As noted above, one way that people have dealt with the uncertainty and fear created 
by COVID-19 is by turning to leaders for information and reassurance. But in a world where 
much is unproven and unknown, who do we perceive to be in a position to provide this? The 
answer is those with whom we share social identity and who are prototypical members of our 
ingroups who best represent our values, our interests, and our perspective on the world 
(Hogg, 2001; Turner & Haslam, 2001). This in turn means that those who are prototypical of 
‘us’ are in the best position to exert influence (i.e., leadership) over us.  
The significance of this point has been apparent since the start of the COVID-19 crisis 
— where it is clear that people’s responses to news of the virus were shaped by opinion 
leaders who reflected their political preferences. In particular, leading conservative platforms 
in Western countries (e.g., Fox News in the U.S., Sky News in Australia) argued that the virus 
was a hysterical left-wing hoax, and that there was no need for alarm (Gabbatt, 2020; Jones, 
2020). As a result, it was apparent that in the early weeks of COVID-19’s spread through 
many Western countries, conservatives were much less likely than liberals to take health 
warnings seriously and to make adjustments to their daily lives (Heath, 2020; see also 
Chapter 17). 
However, as the scale of the problem posed by the virus increased, it became clear 
that there was a requirement for national leaders to represent shared national identities rather 
than their narrower political allegiances. Accordingly, most leaders showed a marked 
increase in the inclusivity of their rhetoric (although there were notable exceptions; e.g., in 
Brazil, India, and the U.S.). As the Australian Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, put it “There 
are no blue teams or red teams. There are no more unions or bosses. There are just 
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Australians now” (Johnson, 2020). At the same time too, leaders’ status as prototypical 
representatives of a national ‘us’ was consolidated because a rising spirit of national unity 
made it harder for those leaders’ opponents either to criticise them or to gain the limelight 
themselves (Stewart, 2020). 
One important upshot of this embrace of inclusive national (vs. exclusive party 
political) identities was a sharp uplift in leaders’ popularity — a pattern seen previously in 
the wake of other national disasters (e.g., 9/11; Schubert et al., 2002). Whereas previously 
leaders’ support had come largely from their own political base, now their appeal extended 
beyond party lines. Indeed, in March 2020 the approval levels of leaders of 10 of the world’s 
biggest democracies rose by an average of 9% — with most of that rise attributable to an 
increase in support from non-aligned voters (Stacey & Pickard, 2020). Moreover, it appears 
that the extent of this rise was itself a reflection of leaders’ ability to embody the collective 
spirit of their nations — something that was appreciably more marked in countries like the 
U.K., Canada and New Zealand than it was in places like the United States, Japan and Brazil 
(Leaders League, 2020).                                    
Leaders need to be seen to do it for us, and there is no place for leader exceptionalism   
In a time of crisis, people not only want leaders who represent them and their shared 
concerns, but also leaders who do things to address those concerns. In particular, people look 
to leaders to take the initiative and develop policies that respond in meaningful ways to the 
crisis they collectively confront. To the extent that such actions are seen to be motivated by 
broad concern for the community, support for them often comes from unlikely quarters. In 
Australia, for example, the conservative Morrison government recruited former union leader 
Greg Combet to help develop its business strategy and manage employee relations — 
something neither party would have deemed conscionable prior to the crisis (McCulloch, 
2020).               
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A corollary of this is that if leaders are seen to be looking after their own personal 
interests (i.e., ‘doing it for me’) they will be a target of opprobrium. For this reason, there 
was widespread condemnation of U.S. Senators Burr, Loeffler, Inhofe, and Feinstein when 
reports emerged they had sold off shares after gaining privileged access to information about 
the likely impact of COVID-19 on the U.S. stockmarket (Zabollis-Roig, 2020). Indeed, where 
leaders appear to hold themselves above the group and its standards, this will often be the 
kiss of death. Thus Scotland’s Chief Medical Officer, Catherine Calderwood, was made to 
walk the plank after flouting her own Department’s advice to reduce unnecessary travel 
(Carrell, 2020), as was the New Zealand Health Minister, David Clark, after violating his 
own government’s lockdown by going mountain biking (McKay, 2020). 
So while leaders may be tempted to see themselves as exceptions to group rules, any 
such decoupling can be fatal for public trust. Moreover, the key problem with leader 
exceptionalism of this form is that by seeming to place the leader above the group it 
undermines the sense of shared identity that leaders depend on in order to lead successfully. 
As the Scottish Labour leader, Richard Leonard, said of Calderwood’s lapse: this “runs the 
serious risk of causing public confidence to collapse. This is in no-one’s interest at a time of 
national crisis” (Carrell, 2020). 
Leaders need to craft and embed a sense of us, and this creates a platform for 
citizenship    
A final point about the link between leadership and social identity is that both require 
hard work. Leadership proves appreciably easier if leaders have prepared for a crisis by 
developing a response capacity and appropriate contingency plans (Jetten et al., 2020). As we 
and others have previously observed, responses to natural disasters such as floods and 
earthquakes are also far more effective when the people they affect have a pre-existing sense 
of shared social identity (Muldoon et al., 2019; Williams & Drury, 2009). Nevertheless, this 
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sense of shared identity is never something that leaders can take for granted, and it always 
has to be worked on. More particularly, they need to be identity entrepreneurs and identity 
impresarios who strive to build and then embed a shared sense of ‘us’ within the groups they 
lead (Haslam et al., 2020).  
Clear examples of this were provided in the early COVID-related communications of 
the New Zealand Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern. In contrast to similar messages in other 
countries (see Figure 3), these went to great pains to explain not just what New Zealanders 
needed to do, but why this was essential for the country as a whole. As she put it:  
The Government will do all it can to protect you. Now I'm asking you to do everything 
you can to protect us all. None of us can do this alone. Your actions will be critical to our 
collective ability to stop the spread of COVID-19. Failure to play your part in the coming 
days will put the lives of others at risk. There will be no tolerance for that and we will not 
hesitate in using enforcement powers if needed. We’re in this together and must unite 
against COVID-19. (TVNZ, 2020) 
 
 
Figure 3. The importance of identity leadership 
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Such efforts of identity leadership are critical because the shared social identity that 
leaders cultivate provides the all-important psychological platform for the coordination of 
collective efforts to tackle the challenges that the group as a whole faces (Haslam & Reicher, 
2006). Indeed, without this platform of shared social identity, there is a risk that people will 
eschew acts of citizenship in which they look out for each other (e.g., by engaging in physical 
distancing or adhering to quarantine), and instead embrace a philosophy of “everyone for 
themselves” (see also Chapter 18). Effective identity leadership thus serves the dual function 
of (a) holding groups together through a crisis and (b) constructively channelling the energies 
of group members in ways that increase the likelihood of positive outcomes.   
The importance of identity leadership for the management of COVID-19 was 
highlighted by the Canadian Broadcasting Company’s Justin McElroy when he reflected on 
the success of British Columba in containing the spread of the virus. This, he argued, had 
much to do with the hard work the province’s Chief Medical Health Officer, Dr. Bonnie 
Henry, had done to build an open and inclusive relationship of mutual trust with her fellow 
British Columbians:  
Given that part of this response depends on being altruistic and doing the right thing to 
help other people who we will never meet, having a leader who can articulate how we're 
all in this together and make a convincing case for why you need to do your part … is 
very important. (McElroy, 2020). 
In short, the key to successful leadership is not simply to talk about everybody being ‘in this 
together’, but to do everything in one’s power to ensure that this is their lived experience — 
and that you are representative of it.    
 
  
 Compliance and Followership  
(Niklas K. Steffens) 
 
 
COVID-19 has posed a significant challenge, with whole nations striving to coordinate their 
activities in response to the pandemic. In the process, it has been critical for people to follow 
advice and comply with policies in an effort to solve problems through effective forms of 
coordination and cooperation. In this chapter, we define compliance as a person’s 
acquiescence with a request (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). The related, broader concept of 
followership (or following behaviour) refers to individuals’ actions in responding to leaders 
or to those in authority (Uhl-Bien et al., 2014). Here we explore a number of big questions 
about these processes. What drives compliance and followership? When do people choose 
not to comply with advice or regulations? What are helpful (and not so helpful) forms of 
followership?  
In the context of the COVID-19 response, our answers focus on three key factors that 
drive compliance and followership: (a) the internalisation of collective concerns, (2) the 
behaviour of other members of people’s groups and communities, and (3) trust in 
government and its leaders.  
Acts of followership are not individual in nature but result from the internalisation of 
collective concerns 
There are a range of traditional ways of thinking about why people follow the 
instructions of others. One of the most influential of these argues that people have a strong 
and inherent tendency to ‘blindly’ follow the orders of leaders, particularly when those 
leaders are in positions of power. This analysis, which was famously set out by Stanley 
Milgram (1974) following his research into “Obedience to Authority”, suggests that people 
4 
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don’t think too much about why they are following, but do so mindlessly and instinctively. 
Another influential model suggests that followership is a matter of being “cut out” for 
particular follower roles, such that some people are engaged followers but others merely 
sheep (e.g., Kelley, 1988).  
A problem with both these models, however, is that they fail to explain the 
importance of social context, and, in particular, the importance of the relationship between 
followers and leaders. If followership is a matter of being a particular type of person or of 
blindly following orders, why does one find the same person following some instructions 
vigilantly and ignoring others?  
Looking at the evidence, we discover that contrary to Milgram’s claims, ordering 
people to do something generally fosters disobedience rather than obedience (Haslam et al., 
2014). Indeed, unless people (a) see themselves as part of a larger collective ‘we’ (e.g., as ‘us 
New Yorkers’) and (b) identify with the cause of that collective, then they are unlikely to 
compromise on their personal self-interest (Haslam & Reicher, 2017). Accordingly, rather 
than ordering people to engage in particular behaviours (e.g., refraining from stock-piling 
scarce resources), it is generally more effective to request that they do so as part of an appeal 
to group-based sensibilities.            
These observations are backed by evidence which suggests that people want to be 
respected and treated fairly in terms of a group membership that they share with policy 
makers (e.g., as Canadians, as Scots), and that if they feel that they are disrespected or treated 
unfairly, they are unlikely to fall in line (Tyler & Blader, 2003). Consistent with this, social 
identification with the authority or institution that applies a policy has been shown to 
underpin compliance with that policy (Bradford et al., 2015). Similar patterns have also been 
found for compliance with tax law (Hartner et al., 2010) and adherence to mandatory and 
discretionary rules set out by one’s employer (Blader & Tyler, 2009).  
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Compliance is shaped by perceptions of the behaviour of other members of our 
communities 
People’s willingness to comply is also shaped by norms. These derive from our 
understandings of what other people — particularly those in the groups we identify with — 
think and do (Smith & Louis, 2008). Accordingly, communications about social norms can 
be used to influence and mobilise others (for good or bad; Cialdini et al., 2006; Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004; see Chapter 17). Indeed, there is evidence that perceptions of norms 
influence a range of citizenship behaviours including littering (Cialdini et al., 1990), 
recycling (Abbott et al., 2013), cooperation (Thøgersen, 2008) and compliance with tax law 
(Wenzel, 2004). 
As the COVID-19 pandemic has unfolded, people’s cooperation with directives has 
been affected by the degree to which the behaviour in question was seen as both acceptable 
and widespread. By extension, this suggests that news reports that single out infrequent non-
compliant behaviours can be problematic, because they suggest that non-compliant behaviour 
is prevalent and normative. For example, images of people apparently failing to practice 
physical distancing, or engaging in ‘panic buying’ can lead people to engage in these 
practices because they think that doing so is normative (see Figure 4). Ultimately, then, to 
foster compliance and followership it is useful for leaders to bolster their appeals to citizens 
by referring to other group members and invoking social norms, and, when they do, to craft 
these appeals in ways that foster cooperative forms of citizenship. 
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Figure 4  Evidence of other people apparently failing to comply encourages non-compliance  
Note: The people in this image were actually practicing physical distancing, but the 
perspective of the photograph suggests that they were not. This leads people to believe 
that distancing is non-normative, and hence may discourage them from engaging in this 
themselves. 
 
Trust in authorities can facilitate both healthy and fatal forms of followership 
When the path ahead is complex and highly uncertain, a core ingredient of people’s 
willingness to follow leaders is their faith in those leaders and their actions. Accordingly, 
evidence indicates that trust in leaders and authorities is critical for leaders’ capacity to 
secure compliance with their policies (Jimenez & Iyer, 2016) and for encouraging 
followership more generally (Dirks & Skarlicki, 2004). But where does this trust come from?  
The first thing to note is that the trust we have in leaders is not something that is fixed 
and immutable. Rather, like credit in the bank, it is something that is gained (or lost) over 
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time as a function of leaders’ perceived contribution and service (or lack thereof) to the group 
they lead. More specifically, we trust a given leader to the extent that we see him or her as 
‘one of us’ who is ‘doing it for us’ (Giessner & van Knippenberg, 2008; Platow et al., 2015).  
But when people see their leaders as being ‘one of us’, this comes with some level of 
risk because it licenses leaders to take the group into uncharted terrain (Abrams et al., 2013). 
In the case of COVID-19, this license has been used to encourage both health-promoting and 
health-debilitating forms of followership. For example, trust in President Trump’s suggestion 
that one might use malaria drugs (or even household disinfectants; Rogers et al., 2020) to 
combat COVID-19 proved fatal for some of those who followed his advice (Waldrop, 2020).  
On the other side of the ledger (and the planet), New Zealand’s Prime Minister, 
Jacinda Ardern, delivered personable messages from her living room that showed her to be 
very much a ‘regular’ New Zealander (Roy, 2020) and thereby helped secure a high level of 
compliance with an extreme lockdown. Moreover, her message highlighted that the sacrifice 
she was asking New Zealanders to make was not for her, nor for themselves as individuals, 
but for the nation as a whole: 
I have one final message. Be kind. I know people will want to act as enforcers. And I 
understand that, people are afraid and anxious. We will play that role for you. What we 
need from you, is support one another. Go home tonight and check in on your neighbours. 
Start a phone tree with your street. Plan how you'll keep in touch with one another. We 
will get through this together, but only if we stick together. (Ardern, 2020) 
In this message, Ardern distils the essence of a social identity perspective on followership: 
recognizing that this is grounded in the strength of group-based ties between the leader and 
their group. Accordingly, her message focuses followers’ attention not on herself, but on the 
group and her commitment to it. This then encourages followers to do the same.            
  
Behaviour Change 
 (Frank Mols) 
 
 
On March 11th 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued a statement confirming 
that COVID-19 was a pandemic. WHO experts advised that from this point onwards, 
governments’ main challenge would be to ‘bend the curve downwards’ as this would help to 
prevent a surge in infections and stop hospital Intensive Care Units (ICUs) becoming 
overwhelmed. What added weight to WHO’s calls were examples of countries that had 
already lost control of the virus, and were now facing large numbers of fatalities due to ICUs 
being overrun (e.g., Italy, Spain). Eager to avoid repeating this scenario, most other 
governments acted swiftly, urging their citizens to wash their hands more often, to keep their 
distance from each other, and to avoid crowds. Some countries went further and introduced 
forced lockdowns (e.g., France, South Korea). Nevertheless, other countries (e.g., the U.K., 
Netherlands, Sweden) initially deviated from WHO advice by pursuing an approach which 
sought to expose people to the novel coronavirus and thereby develop ‘herd immunity’ to it.  
This chapter critiques the model of human frailty on which this decision was based (a 
model that we first discussed in Chapter 1). As a counterpoint to this, it suggests that social 
identity processes are a key source of human strength, and that leaders who tap into these are 
best positioned to drive the forms of behaviour change required to defeat COVID-19.      
Government policy to address COVID-19 was initially dictated by concerns about 
human weakness      
In the case of the , there are several possible reasons why its leadership was initially 
reluctant to enact recommended physical distancing measures. First, the U.K. government 
was concerned that physical distancing measures would have to be sustained for a long 
period of time, placing a heavy burden on the U.K. economy and risking compliance ‘fatigue’ 
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(Hahn et al., 2020; Mills, 2020). A second, related reason was that successive Conservative 
governments in the U.K. had become enthralled with behavioural economics — a trend 
started by David Cameron’s government, which established the U.K. Behavioural Insights 
Team (BIT) in 2010. Several sources have suggested that it was BIT chief executive David 
Halpern who first floated the idea of going down the path of ‘herd-immunity’ (Boseley, 
2020), and who first warned that citizens could fall victim to physical distancing ‘fatigue’ 
(Sodha, 2020). This, however, is something he has consistently denied (Conn et al., 2020). 
Yet regardless of its precise source, an unintended consequence of this commitment to 
behavioural economics was that, in line with the core logic of this framework, key 
policymakers had come to see ordinary citizens as error-prone and weak.  
It seems likely that these twin factors explain why, when seeking to manage the 
COVID-19 crisis, the U.K. government relied for so long on relatively minimal behavioural 
interventions (e.g., amusing adverts to encourage people to wash their hands and keep their 
distance from each other), and why it took so long to embrace lockdown strategies. This was 
the thrust of an open letter signed by 681 social scientists expressing concern about the lack 
of an evidence to support the idea that a weak public would quickly become tired of 
complying with government directives (Mills, 2020).  
More generally, as several commentators noted, the U.K. Government’s initial policy 
settings reflected a bleak view of its citizens’ psychology and will power — seeing them as 
having limited capacity ‘to do the right thing’ and thereby making herd-contamination 
inevitable (Yates, 2020). Similar criticisms emerged in the Netherlands where the 
government’s commitment to behavioural economics had led it to underestimate citizens’ 
capacity to sustain physical distancing (Dujardin, 2020). 
 Governments increasingly seek to change social behaviour via ‘nudges’ 
They’re [the] rules that need to be in place, and everybody must follow them and 
stay at home wherever possible. […] we’ve set those rules, we’re enforcing against 
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those rules, and we reiterate those rules, because that is the best way to be able to 
bend the curve down and stop the spread of the virus. (Hancock, 2020) 
As this statement from the British Health Secretary Matt Hancock illustrates, 
governments facing crises often resort to the default strategy of seeking to secure policy 
compliance through top-down legislation and enforcement. However, in recent decades, they 
have increasingly experimented with new ‘modes of governance’. One such mode is liberal 
(or soft) paternalism (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003). This is informed by a belief that citizens 
should retain choice over their actions but nevertheless be given ‘steers’ — notably in the 
form of subtle behavioural ‘nudges’ — to encourage them to behave in particular ways that 
are ‘good’ for them and society. In this vein, governments around the Western world have 
resorted to a range of tried-and-tested nudges to encourage citizens to do such things as 
recycle, save for retirement, and sign up for organ donation. Evidence suggests that this 
approach can be quite effective when dealing with relatively uncomplicated policy issues 
(e.g., as documented in Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). However, this effectiveness is less proven 
when it comes to dealing with complex (a.k.a. ‘wicked’) policy issues.  
Liberal paternalism (and behavioural economics more generally) is underpinned by a 
notion that humans are imperfect information processors whose capacity to make sound 
decisions is compromised by a propensity to resort to cognitive shortcuts. This model has a 
long pedigree in social psychology (and social science more generally). It flows directly from 
the view that humans are ‘cognitive misers’ who generally process and respond to social 
information in a way that minimises intellectual demands but introduces error (after Fiske & 
Taylor, 1984; for critiques see Gigerenzer, 2018; Oakes et al., 1994).  
The core idea here is that there is too much information in the world for people to 
process it all. Instead, people ‘make do’ by relying on heuristics (i.e., cognitive rules of 
thumb) that provide an understanding which is generally ‘good enough’ for their purposes, 
but nevertheless susceptible to error and bias. One example of such a heuristic is the 
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availability bias — the tendency to attend and give more weight to information which is 
readily accessible than information which is not (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The logic 
behind nudges is that such biases can be reverse-engineered and exploited in ways that make 
particular “good” behaviours more likely. For example, policy makers might make use of the 
availability bias by providing people with a list of behavioural options where those 
behaviours that they want people to engage in are prominent, while those they seek to 
discourage are less prominent or absent.  
The idea that people can be nudged covertly in this way is not new. As Robert 
Cialdini (1984) showed in his book Influence, marketing experts have perennially resorted to 
various covert behaviour change techniques to increase sales. However, the idea that 
governments might encourage particular behaviours by changing the ‘choice architecture’ 
that surrounds them was popularized more recently through best-selling books like Nudge 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2009) and Thinking, Fast and Slow (Kahneman, 2011). Although 
sceptics continue to question whether nudging is ethical (Engelen & Schmidt, 2020) and best 
regarded as a passing fad (McDaid & Merkur, 2014), this has done nothing to hold back the 
rapid proliferation of Behavioural Insights Teams (or ‘nudge units’) advising governments 
around the world on how to best shape their citizens’ behaviour. 
Radical behaviour change requires identity-based norm internalisation  
There is growing consensus that, on their own, nudges have limited usefulness as 
tools for achieving radical forms of large-scale behaviour change. As we have argued 
elsewhere, the main problem here is that nudges fail to secure norm internalisation (Mols et 
al., 2015). While it is possible to use nudges to change behaviours that are passive and 
produce unthinking compliance, nudges are ineffective in securing behaviour changes that 
require deep commitment to a new course of collective action organised around a common 
cause. Of course, COVID-19 has required just such a course of action.  
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Without norm internalisation, ‘old habits’ would be expected to reappear as soon as 
the choice architecture is reversed. For example, while customers can be nudged into staying 
at least 1.5 metres away from one another by using floor marking — or into cleaning their 
hands by placing a hand-sanitizer next to a door — once the floor marking or hand-sanitizer 
are no longer present, people return to their former unsafe ways. Moreover, unless relevant 
norms are in place, they still may never ‘do the right thing’. So, while such interventions 
would go some way to reduce the short-term spread of the virus, what is required to secure 
lasting behaviour change (and avoid gradual fatigue) is a deep commitment to new ways of 
behaving, underpinned by a sense that this was the right thing for ‘us’ to do.   
The main way to achieve behaviour change of this form is through overt appeals to 
people’s memberships in valued groups — that is, those that define their group-based sense 
of self. Only when people have come to define themselves in terms of a given group 
membership (e.g., as German) and believe that certain forms of behaviour are normative for 
that group — and indeed required to secure its future — that they will be motivated to do the 
hard work that is needed for behaviour change. Moreover, as this belief is identity-enhancing 
it is inherently rewarding and it will seem less like hard work (Cruwys et al., 2020).  In 
contrast to the logic of nudge, this leadership casts and treats citizens not as sheep, but as 
lions whose strength emerges when they work in tandem to achieve shared goals (Steffens et 
al., 2018). 
Looking outside the U.K., it is clear that many leaders’ first instinct was to adopt 
precisely this model — engaging with citizens as active intelligent agents, rather than as 
passive cognitive misers, through appeals to shared social identity. For example, it was seen 
in addresses by Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau (Wherry, 2020) and Germany’s 
Chancellor Angela Merkel (Davidson, 2020). Furthermore, once it became clear that urgent 
action was needed to stop the spread of the COVID-19 virus, the British Prime Minister Boris 
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Johnson himself began to engage in identity entrepreneurship as a central part of his efforts to 
persuade citizens to follow government advice. In particular, this sense of ‘our’ collective 
potential was foregrounded in his address to the nation on March 23:      
Each and every one of us is now obliged to join together, to halt the spread of this 
disease, to protect our NHS, and to save many, many thousands of lives. … And I know 
that as they have in the past so many times, the people of this country will rise to that 
challenge. And we will come through it stronger than ever. We will beat the coronavirus 
and we will beat it together. (Johnson, 2020). 
Following this, the U.K. achieved a rapid ‘flattening of the curve’ that exceeded the 
expectations of even the most optimistic epidemiologists (Woodcock, 2020). Tragically, 
though, the damage of the earlier ‘herd immunity’ philosophy had been done, and it was too 
late to stop Britain recording the highest number of COVID-19 infections and deaths in 
Europe (Conn et al., 2020)       
As outlined in Section A of this book, these two competing models of human 
psychology, namely Behavioural Economics and Social Identity Theory (Reicher et al., 
2020), are of particular relevance to the COVID-19 crisis. The former focuses on individuals 
as individuals and views them pessimistically as ‘fragile rationalists’ who are prone to error 
(Reicher, 2020). The latter recognizes people’s capacity to act and behave as group members 
and offers a more optimistic model of people as collective meaning-makers who — if 
provided with the right leadership — are capable of exerting themselves for the greater good. 
The initial phases of responses to the COVID-19 crisis served to bring the differences 
between these approaches into stark relief, and to expose the inadequacies of a model framed 
around human deficiency. Certainly, when one is looking for people to behave like lions, it is 




 (Matthew J. Hornsey) 
 
It is to get rid of non-productive Chinese in the Chinese community, who are non-
productive and in the words of George Bernard Shaw should be eliminated so they don’t 
have to be fed. Secondly, it is either to export the virus into the United States or other 
parts of the world, or at least fear of the virus. Thirdly, to test whether or not it is possible, 
through this sort of action, to send the Western world into recession. 
Former Liberal Senator Bronwyn Bishop speaking on Sky News (see Baker, 2020)  
 
“Conspiracies” occur when groups of people coordinate secretly to do something 
unlawful or inappropriate. The difference between a “conspiracy” and a “conspiracy theory” 
is a matter of academic debate, in large part because these things are subjective. People have 
different standards of proof for deciding whether a conspiracy is real. So one person’s 
conspiracy is another person’s conspiracy theory. Given this, the emerging norm is to use the 
term “conspiracy” to refer to actual, substantiated events, and to reserve the term “conspiracy 
theory” for beliefs that seem, on face value, to be unreasonable or highly speculative 
(Uscinski et al., 2017). Given the number of converging, credible and independent reports to 
this effect, it seems reasonable to argue that there was a conspiracy within levels of Chinese 
government to cover up emerging medical advice of a strange new virus that was causing 
deaths in Wuhan in late 2019. But it would be a conspiracy theory to argue, like Bronwyn 
Bishop, that COVID-19 was part of a Chinese government plan to reduce the state’s burden 
of care by culling vulnerable people.  
Sometimes, individual conspiracy theories form part of a more general worldview: 
that it is commonplace for powerful groups with malevolent intentions to conduct elaborate 
hoaxes on the public, and to do so in near-perfect secrecy (Goertzel, 2010). This conspiracist 
worldview has also sometimes been called conspiracist ideation or the conspiracy mindset. 
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This worldview makes people open to any non-official account of reality, even when such 
accounts are inconsistent with each other. For example, survey research shows that the more 
people believe Princess Diana is still alive, the more they also believe that she was murdered 
(Wood et al., 2012). Accordingly, it would not be surprising if people were open to 
inconsistent conspiracy beliefs about COVID-19: for example, that it was invented by China 
as a biological weapon and that it is was developed by Western governments to excuse the 
introduction of martial law. 
Importantly, though, conspiracy theories do emerge neither spontaneously nor in a 
vacuum. More particularly, as we see in the case of Bronwyn Bishop, they are often peddled 
by leaders and people in positions of authority (e.g., ‘Shock Jocks’) with a view to shoring up 
support for a worldview which they represent and are seeking to advance. It is this point that 
ties this topic both to the concerns of this section and to the work of social identity theorists.  
Lack of social identification underpins conspiracist worldviews  
The term “conspiracy theorist” is typically used in a pejorative way, and has become 
shorthand for people who are prone to woolly thinking and logical fallacies. It is true that 
conspiracy theorists tend to have relatively low levels of formal education (van Prooijen, 
2017), and are prone to intuitive (rather than analytic) thinking (Swami et al., 2014). More 
than other people, conspiracy theorists tend to see patterns and agency in random events 
(Douglas et al., 2016) and show signs of a personality type known as schizotypy, 
characterized by unconventional beliefs, paranoia, and disordered thinking (March & 
Springer, 2019).  
However, focusing on these individual-level factors serves to obscure a more 
important pattern that emerges in the literature — namely that conspiracy theorists feel 
vulnerable. Relative to other people, they have low levels of trust in the community and in 
institutions (Goertzel, 1994). They feel powerless (van Prooijen, 2017) and report feeling low 
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levels of socio-political control (Bruder et al., 2013). In large part, this reflects the fact that 
people who endorse conspiracy theories — like those who are paranoid more generally 
(Greenaway et al., 2019) — tend to have low levels of identification with society and its 
institutions. In other words, they tend to be ‘outsiders’ and cast themselves as such. 
Related to this outsider status, conspiracy theorists are more likely to believe that 
positive societal norms and values are disintegrating. They have an abstract belief that the 
world is a dangerous place (Moulding et al., 2016). From this perspective, the emergence of a 
conspiracist worldview does not stem from poor mental health or illogical thinking (although 
these may also be present), but rather is a by-product of lack of identification that engenders 
feelings of alienation, mistrust, and social disconnection (see Haslam et al., 2018). For people 
who live in authoritarian regimes, the conspiracist worldview can also emerge in response to 
a history of propaganda, misinformation, and distortion of history from governments and 
other institutions. Indeed, where official versions of information are unreliable, conspiracist 
thinking can be a form of rational scepticism or sense-making (van Prooijen, 2019). 
To explore these issues in relation to COVID-19, in early March 2020 we collected 
data from 1700 people in Australia, the U.S., and the U.K. in order to gain insight into the 
psychology of those who mistrust the official government advice on COVID-19. We gave 
respondents this prompt:  
For some political and social events it is suggested that the “official version” of events 
could be an attempt to hide the truth from the public.…. When it comes to COVID, what 
do you think? Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statement: I think that the official version relating to COVID given by the authorities 
very often hides the truth.  
Nearly half of respondents indicated that they “somewhat agreed”, “agreed”, or 
“strongly agreed” with this statement. As suggested above, people who agreed were less 
educated than those who did not, but this effect was weak. More significant was the fact that 
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those who embraced conspiracy theories were more likely than other respondents to feel 
distressed, lonely, and out of control. In line with previous evidence that paranoia is highest 
in marginalized members of a community (van Prooijen et al., 2018), conspiracy theories 
were particularly prevalent among racial minorities (e.g., Asian-Australians, African-
Americans). Those who agreed with this statement also had higher estimates of the eventual 
death rate of COVID-19, suggesting that mistrust of government in this case manifested 
itself in a sense that the threat posed by COVID-19 was being downplayed.  
Conspiracy theories have a social identity dimension  
By definition, a conspiracy theory involves beliefs about the actions and agendas of 
coalitions of individuals. Thus, it is difficult to think of a conspiracy that does not have an 
intergroup element, one that crosses ideological, national, ethnic, religious, or political 
faultlines. For example, an ‘us–them’ dimension — in which China is understood as an 
enemy of the West — was clearly a backdrop to Bronwyn Bishop’s conspiracy theorizing. It 
is neither a surprise nor a coincidence, then, that Chinese people are more likely to believe 
that America invented COVID-19, and that Americans are more likely to believe the Chinese 
government invented it (Chik & Lew, 2020). Indeed, some scholars argue that the 
predisposition to believe conspiracy theories evolved as an adaptive tendency to be alert to — 
and to protect against — hostile outgroups (van Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018).  
As social identity theorizing would also suggest, there is emerging evidence that 
conspiracy theories can be triggered by intergroup threats and feelings of intergroup 
powerlessness. For example, anti-western conspiracy theories in Indonesia are correlated 
with perceptions of threat (Mashuri et al., 2016) and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in 
Poland are associated with victimhood-based social identities (Bilewicz et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, experimentally induced threats to the status quo in British society (Jolley et al., 
2018) and to Muslim identity in Indonesia (Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2015) led to increased 
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endorsement of conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories can also be used in a strategic and 
mindful way, as part of a broader war of disinformation designed to undermine political 
opponents, deflect scrutiny, promote racism, or recruit terrorists (e.g., Douglas & Sutton, 
2018; Jolley et al., 2020; see also Chapter 19).  
COVID-19 has all the hallmarks of an event that is ripe for the development of 
conspiracy theories: it is frightening, it is hard to understand, the causes are complex, and it 
has resulted in government curtailment of individual freedoms. In such contexts, a lack of 
identification with official sources of information makes their messages harder to process and 
to believe (Greenaway et al., 2015). And, as a corollary, those who do not identify with those 
official sources are much more likely to embrace non-official accounts of reality to help allay 
their anxiety and regain a sense of control. 
Conspiracies about COVID-19 can be grouped together into three broad categories, 
all of which have a social identity dimension. The first of these argues that the virus was 
invented by a powerful outgroup to advance a malevolent agenda. As noted above, in the case 
of COVID-19, this is typically claimed to be the American or Chinese governments. Also 
included in this category are variants of the myth that COVID-19 is caused by 5G 
technology, as part of a hidden agenda to (for example) reduce the population, force mass-
vaccination on the public, or facilitate a new world order.  
The second category of conspiracy theory argues that the crisis is being exaggerated 
in the interests of a powerful outgroup. In this vein, conspiracy theorists claimed that the 
threat posed by the virus was being deliberately amplified to give governments an excuse to 
control the population (e.g., through the imposition of martial law). At the same time, as we 
saw above, a third category of conspiracy theory uses precisely the opposite reasoning to 
claim that the crisis is being downplayed in the interests a powerful outgroup. In particular, 
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conspiracy theorists argue that governments and health officials have deliberately under-
reported the extent of the crisis in order to avoid panic or to shore up the economy.  
Responses to conspiracy theories need to address people’s vulnerability not alienate 
them further     
There are a number of reasons to believe that there is little value in trying to change 
the mind of a conspiracy theorist with facts alone. For example, research on misinformation 
and rumours suggests that people are remarkably slow to update their thinking in the face of 
correction. Indeed, denials and corrections reinforce the familiarity of the original myth over 
time, whereas the corrections fade from memory, sometimes leading to boomerang effects 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2015). For people who hold the conspiracist worldview, corrective 
information may be particularly ineffective. First, most conspiracy theorists already know 
the official version of events, so there is little point repeating it. Second, because the 
establishment is seen to be the source of misinformation and subterfuge, authorities’ 
messages of reassurance are likely to fall on deaf ears. Indeed, the usual rules of persuasion 
— pointing out official facts and noting that there is consensus around the official version — 
can be inverted to be seen as proof of the conspiracy (e.g., an example of vested interests 
controlling the narrative). Third, many conspiracy theorists are psychologically wedded to 
the notion that something sinister is afoot, and fall prey to motivated reasoning and 
confirmation biases (Hornsey & Fielding, 2017). Conspiracy theorists refute disconfirming 
evidence or generate new theories to take the place of discredited ones, shifting goalposts in 
ways that seem fantastical, frustrating and hard to follow. Because of this, you can never 
really disprove a conspiracy theory.  
So what advice might we have for leaders who want to respond to conspiracy 
theories? Well, first, resist the temptation to use conspiracist language oneself. If leaders fall 
into the habit of using conspiracy theories to wage intergroup battles, then they may find it 
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hard to put that genie back in the bottle when the conspiracy theories turn on them. Beyond 
that, leaders need to communicate through both words and action that they are operating 
with integrity, and doing their best to assuage feelings of mistrust, powerlessness and 
alienation that provide the breeding ground for conspiracist thinking. Indeed, there is 
evidence that priming feelings of control in the laboratory can reduce people’s belief in 
conspiracy theories (van Prooijen & Acker, 2015). Responding to these feelings of 
vulnerability might be a more effective way of defeating conspiracy theories than repeating 
evidence alone.  
This is an essential “long-game” that leaders need to play in winning the 
psychological battle over COVID-19. Although a degree of healthy scepticism about official 
accounts of events is to be encouraged, chronic scepticism becomes a problem, as people 
ignore facts and resist advice. Now is a time to be listening to our scientists and to our 
government officials; not to be casting them as colluders, manipulators and liars. And for 
leaders, now is the time to build social identification, not to undermine it. 
 
  
Section C  
SOCIAL (DIS)CONNECTEDNESS 
 
A disaster (which originally meant “ill-starred”, or “under a bad star”) changes the 
world and our view of it. Our focus shifts, and what matters shifts. What is weak breaks 
under new pressure, what is strong holds, and what was hidden emerges. Change is not 
only possible, we are swept away by it. We ourselves change as our priorities shift, as 
intensified awareness of mortality makes us wake up to our own lives and the 
preciousness of life. Even our definition of “we” might change as we are separated 
from schoolmates or co-workers, sharing this new reality with strangers. Our sense of 
self generally comes from the world around us, and right now, we are finding another 
version of who we are. (Solnit, 2020) 
 
As Rebecca Solnit eloquently observes, COVID-19 has changed our lives in profound ways. 
We outlined in Section A how our identities are defined in substantial part by the groups to 
which we belong. It follows that if we are separated from these groups, then our sense of self 
can be profoundly shaken. In this section, we turn our attention to some of the precursors and 
consequences of social disconnection.  
The section opens with an examination of COVID-19’s capacity to threaten not just 
us personally but also our group memberships, and hence our social identities (Chapter 7). 
This is followed by a discussion of the ways in which risk is perceived through the lens of 
group membership (Chapter 8). Our focus then pivots to exploring the consequences of 
COVID-19 for mental health and well-being. We start by examining how the social isolation 
that results from quarantine policies can lead to loneliness (Chapter 9) before zeroing in on 
ageing and connectedness (Chapter 10). The section concludes by looking at COVID-19 as a 
form of collective trauma, and considering how group processes affect people’s resilience in 
the face of the virus (Chapter 11). Together, these considerations serve to highlight two key 
points. First, apart from the physical effects of the virus itself, COVID-19 is also a hazard to 
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health by virtue of the threat it poses to people’s social identities. Second, these social 
identities and those that emerge in the context of a pandemic are a key resource which is 
critical to the protection and promotion of health.  
  
Group Threat 
(Katharine H. Greenaway) 
 
The biggest threat to the Territory is clear. It is not us, it’s them. 
(Western Australian Premier, Mark McGowan) 
 
We live in a dangerous world. In addition to threats from terrorism, climate change and 
natural disasters, our sense of danger has become particularly acute as the globe reels in the 
face of a once-in-a-century pandemic. While the threat may feel unprecedented, people’s 
reactions to it are not. Indeed, there are remarkable similarities between the ways that people 
react to threats of various forms and the ways that our group memberships affect our 
experiences of those threats.  
A crisis has a profound effect on the ways in which we draw lines between ourselves 
and others: between strangers and family, between rivals and allies, and between foreigners 
and fellow citizens. Whether we draw these lines inclusively or exclusively, one feature of 
the COVID-19 crisis is that it has brought into sharp focus the groups we belong to: our 
families, our local community, our country. As we noted in Section A, this means that such 
threats are generally associated with a heightened sense of shared social identity such that 
our sense of self is defined to a greater extent by those group memberships. In these times of 
uncertainty, there is also an enhanced need to understand what being a member of these 
groups entails and how we should act. How best can I look after my family? What is an 
appropriate community response? What should ‘we’ (‘we parents’, ‘we practitioners’, ‘we 
progressives’) be doing?  
This chapter addresses these questions and explores how the threat posed by COVID-
19 affects our sense of connection to groups, with a focus on how different framings of this 
threat have different consequences for the group. In particular, research points to important 
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differences between threats that originate from outside one’s own ingroup (i.e., a between-
group, or intergroup threat) and threats that originate from within one’s own ingroup (a 
within-group, or intragroup threat). While intergroup threats tend to increase solidarity, trust 
and cooperation, intragroup threats tend to undermine such responses (Greenaway & Cruwys, 
2019). Though threat has the potential to undermine a collective response to the pandemic, it 
can also be shaped in ways that promote social solidarity during this tumultuous time. These 
are issues this chapter explores in the context of COVID-19.  
Threats from within an ingroup can undermine solidarity, trust and cooperation 
The nature of an infectious disease, especially one that can spread from asymptomatic 
carriers, is that it is often our close contacts and loved ones who are the source of the threat 
— meaning that the virus can be understood as an intragroup threat. In the case of COVID-
19, it is apparent that some public health messages inadvertently encourage us to be 
suspicious of our friends, neighbours, and fellow citizens, calling on us to assume they have 
the disease and are spreading it among us. This has the effect of undermining group ties, as 
evidenced by a study which investigated threat in the context of Ebola infection (Greenaway 
& Cruwys, 2015). The study found that U.S. citizens who read about a case of Ebola on U.S. 
soil identified less strongly as Americans when the case was described as a U.S. citizen than 
when it was described as a Sierra Leone citizen. Such de-identification can be understood to 
reflect people’s inclination to ‘psychologically exit’ a group that is under threat, and is 
especially common among group members who were not strongly committed to the group in 
the first place (Spears et al., 1997). If this inclination toward ‘psychological exit’ becomes a 
dominant response, this can lead the group to fracture (Sani, 2008). 
Such processes are undoubtedly a barrier to effectively combatting the threats posed by 
COVID-19. In fighting the virus, people around the world are required to embark upon 
unprecedented levels of behaviour change that most view as unpleasant. If they do not 
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identify with others, they are unlikely to embark on such change. Furthermore, if an 
intragroup threat weakens the social fabric of groups, this prevents people from accessing the 
psychological resources associated with group membership (of a form set out in Chapter 2). 
For example, if a person does not identify with their neighbours, they are unlikely to go to 
them for support — even if they are in dire need of it.  
Threats from outside the group can bolster solidarity, trust and cooperation 
Given the potential divisiveness that can ensue when COVID-19 is framed as an 
intragroup threat, it is perhaps not surprising that many world leaders have instead sought to 
frame COVID-19 as an intergroup threat: as a ‘foreign’ disease spread by outsiders. 
Intergroup threats tend to strengthen people’s commitment to their ingroup (e.g., Castano et 
al., 2002; Ellemers et al., 1997). For instance, following the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers, 
American university students’ identification with their country increased relative to a baseline 
taken six months prior (Moskalenko et al.2006). This in turn makes a difference to people’s 
behaviour. For instance, social identification enhances people’s trust in fellow group 
members (Cruwys et al., 2020) as well as their willingness to cooperate in working towards 
group goals (Haslam, 2001). We have witnessed this in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. 
As the emergency developed, there was an outpouring of collective solidarity in all parts of 
the world, as evidenced by the Adopt a Healthcare Worker campaign and a surge in 
volunteerism (United Nations, 2020). In many parts of the world this elevated concern for the 
wellbeing of one’s fellow citizens has also been reflected in expanded government welfare 
policies, with even conservative governments introducing income guarantees that would have 
been considered radically progressive in previous years (van Leeuwen, 2020).  
While leaders may frame COVID-19 as an intergroup threat in order to encourage 
citizens to respond collectively, this can also have negative consequences for intergroup 
relations. Indeed, a large body of work has found that the perception of intergroup threat 
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increases intolerance, prejudice, and punishment of outgroup members (e.g., McCann, 2008, 
Skitka et al., 2006). Unfortunately, intergroup threat can also inspire hostile and punitive 
reactions, even towards targets that have no objective link with the threat in question. For 
example, acts of racism towards people of Asian appearance spread across the world even 
faster than COVID-19 itself (Shimizu, 2020; see Chapter 19).  
Inclusive social identities can attenuate perceived threats to an ingroup 
It is clear that both intragroup and intergroup threats have unique downsides. While 
intergroup threat can increase feelings of ingroup identification and ingroup solidarity, it also 
sharpens the boundaries of who is inside — and who is outside — the group, triggering 
greater prejudice towards the latter. Conversely, intragroup threat may not directly cause 
outgroup hostility, but it can undermine ingroup solidarity and cohesion. In turn, this can lead 
people not only to seek out less group-based social support but also to provide less support to 
other ingroup members who are in need.     
How, then, can we frame a threat like COVID-19 to harness the benefits of intergroup 
threat without also suffering the negative consequences? There are several approaches to 
mitigating the downsides of group threat. One that is particularly promising involves framing 
COVID-19 as an intergroup threat in which the outgroup is not another nation or community 
of people but rather the virus itself (see Figure 5, and also Section D). Such an approach 
seeks to emphasise our common humanity as an expanded shared ingroup and has been found 
to improve intergroup attitudes (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005; see also Chapter 20).  
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Figure 5. Pathogen resistance.  
 
Note: This comic is an example of how COVID-19 can be framed as an ‘outgroup’ threat. 
This may be a promising strategy to unite groups in a collective response against the 
virus. (Source: XKCD Creative Commons License: https://xkcd.com/2287/) 
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Another approach to preventing the downsides of group threat involves helping 
people to feel more secure while being buffeted by the winds of fate. More specifically, 
people need to feel in control (Gerber & Wheeler, 2009). If people feel that they have the 
capacity to control important outcomes in the face of a threat to their group, they are less 
likely to react with hostility and outgroup prejudice (Greenaway et al., 2014).  
This sense of control can also be collective in nature. Indeed, research suggests that 
when we believe that our group has control of a situation this can contribute to a sense of 
personal control, and also help to promote effective responses to threat (Fritsche et al., 2013). 
In the context of group threats such as COVID-19, messages by governments and health 
organisations are therefore critical in reassuring individuals that the situation is generally 
under control. Here, the most effective messages are those that not only provide people with 
ways to gain control but also tie this to important group goals. The slogan ‘Stay Home. Save 
Lives’ is a good example of this (Otago Daily Times, 2020).  
However, if governments and authorities fail to provide clear messages, they can 
exacerbate people’s sense that they lack control, and this in turn can intensify negative group-
based reactions to the threat. Indeed, poor (or mixed) messaging of this form has been 
identified as a persistent problem in both the United States (Bennett, 2020) and Brazil 
(Phillips, 2020). As New York’s governor, Andrew Cuomo, observed “That confusion … 
adds to the fear and the frustration of people because if [the] government doesn’t know what 
it’s doing, then people feel they’re really alone and this is really a problem” (Bennett, 2020).     
In summary, it is clear that authorities’ messaging is critical in guiding people’s 
reactions to group threat. Governments and global health organisations have a vitally 
important role to play in crafting messages that will determine how people perceive and react 
to the threat posed by COVID-19. The tone they set has the potential to bring people together 
in a common spirit to respond collectively and effectively (in ways we discussed in Section 
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B). However, if misjudged, these messages have the potential to unleash a wave of distrust 
directed towards other ingroup members or outgroup members. As we highlight in various 
chapters in this book, getting this right requires leadership that engenders a sense of common 
fate and encourages people to join in cooperative efforts to defeat the virus both locally and 
globally. Indeed, as Figure 5 suggests, this is COVID-19’s worst nightmare.          
 Risk Perception  
(Tegan Cruwys) 
 
Patient A1.1, who was then still experiencing mild respiratory symptoms, attended a 
birthday party with nine other people. They hugged and shared food at the three-hour 
party. Seven of the attendees soon became ill. Within about a week of the onset of 
symptoms, the condition of [patient A1.1] deteriorated. The person was hospitalized, 
put on a ventilator and subsequently died… Meanwhile, two of the birthday party 
attendees became critically ill and were put on ventilators. Both died. (Cha, 2020) 
 
 
The behaviours which cause — or prevent — the spread of COVID-19 are ‘micro’ 
behaviours that people engage in dozens of times every day: touching one’s face, shaking 
hands, physically distancing from other customers in the supermarket, or visiting an ageing 
relative. These behaviours ultimately determined whether a community managed to ‘flatten 
the curve’ and become one of the success stories in the initial COVID-19 response, or 
alternatively, experienced uncontrolled spread and ensuing tragedy. However, there is rarely 
complete alignment between the perceived risk of these behaviours and their actual risk. This 
complicates the goal of minimising those interactions that are high risk for transmission (e.g., 
large intergenerational family gatherings with shared food) without banning those activities 
that are unlikely to pose a risk (e.g., going for a solo run on a quiet beach).  
Shared group membership attenuates risk perception and increases health risk taking 
As outlined in Section A, when people see themselves and others through the lens of 
social identities, their behaviour, emotions, and thoughts are fundamentally shaped by these 
social identities. It should come as no surprise that one of the things affected by shared group 
membership is our perception of risk. The first evidence that social relationships affect health 
risk taking was documented by public health campaigners attempting to slow the spread of 
sexually transmitted diseases, particularly HIV. Researchers found that people were far less 
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likely to take precautions (and were therefore far more likely to contract STDs) when their 
sexual partner was someone they trusted and had a close relationship with (Hammer et al., 
1996). Similarly, needle sharing is not a behaviour that occurs in a vacuum — instead it is 
most likely to occur in small, tight-knit groups of users among whom there is reciprocal trust 
(Unger et al., 2006).  
The evidence that these processes are driven by social identity has been gathered 
primarily in the context of mass gatherings. For decades, mass gatherings have been seen as 
major sites for the spread of contagious disease (Tam et al., 2012). Indeed, pilgrimages to 
Qom in Iran have been implicated in the global spread of COVID-19 (Memish et al., 2020). 
Mass gatherings also present heightened health risks associated with poor sanitation, 
hardships such as extreme weather and noise, and limited capacity for help in emergencies, 
because emergency services often have great difficulty accessing crowded areas (Ranse et al., 
2017). However, attendees typically do not perceive mass gatherings as risky places. This is 
because people use shared group membership with others as a heuristic, or proxy indicator, 
for safety. Social identity researchers have found that the more strongly people identify with 
fellow attendees at a mass gathering, the more likely they are to report comfort and well-
being in these environments (Cruwys et al., 2019; Novelli et al., 2010) and the less likely 
they are to be disturbed by the risks posed by the crowd (Pandey et al., 2013).  
Experimental evidence also speaks to the capacity for shared group membership to 
attenuate perceptions of disease risk. In one ‘minimal group’ study, 123 participants were 
randomly assigned to a red group or a green group, and asked to finish building a Lego model 
commenced by a previous participant. They encountered dirty tissues in the shared 
workspace that were attributed to a previous participant with a cold. Participants showed 
greater concern about the risk to their own health when the previous participant was 
identified as an outgroup member than when they were an ingroup member (Cruwys et al., 
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2020). Critically for the COVID-19 context, these findings are not specific to perception but 
also extend to actual behaviour. For example, Firing and Laberg (2012) found that military 
officers were more likely to participate in a collective and risky leap into ocean waters when 
they identified strongly with their fellow officers. Indeed, social factors more strongly 
predicted this behaviour than officers’ personal characteristics (e.g., their impulsivity).  
In summary, social identity processes will have a dual role in shaping risk perception 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. On the one hand, they can support accurate assessment of 
risk (e.g., leading people to not sit near a stranger on public transport). On the other, they can 
also compromise them (e.g., so that people share a meal with friends or hug a relative).   
Shared group membership facilitates trust and attenuates disgust  
Why do we see this link between shared group membership and willingness to engage 
in risky health behaviours? Studies have found evidence for two pathways: a cognitive 
pathway related to trust and an emotional pathway related to disgust. Let us look at these in 
turn.  
The link between trust and risk taking is well-established. For example, a series of 
experimental studies using investment and gambling games found that people will take more 
risks (in this case, invest more money) when the outcomes of a game are controlled by 
someone they trust (e.g., Cook et al., 2014). Indeed, even when group membership was 
randomly determined on the basis of arbitrary criteria, people were still more likely to trust 
ingroup members than outgroup members to take care of their interests (Tanis & Postmes, 
2005). These processes also play a role in risk taking that can lead to disease transmission. In 
one study with over 350 participants, people were asked to consider a scenario in which their 
work colleague, without asking permission, took a sip from the participant’s own cup of 
coffee (Cruwys et al., 2020). The work colleague was described as either sharing nationality 
with the participant or as being a foreigner. Participants trusted the colleague less in the latter 
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case — perceiving there to be a greater risk to their health after sharing drinks. Consistent 
with a social identity interpretation of these effects, this effect was most pronounced among 
people who strongly identified with their nation.  
Disgust constitutes a second pathway through which shared group membership can 
affect health-risk perceptions and behaviour. Although disgust might be unpleasant, it is an 
adaptive emotion that specifically evolved to motivate us to avoid things likely to pose a risk 
of disease: spoiled food, waste products, and bodily secretions (Curtis et al., 2011). 
Extending this to group contexts, on evolutionary grounds, one can predict that such disgust 
response extends towards outgroup members to protect us from new diseases (Murray & 
Schaller, 2016). That is, for much of human history, different groups interacted rarely and 
contact with new groups was sometimes devastating, as infectious diseases spread rapidly 
among immunologically naïve populations. For example, the colonisation of the Americas 
likely enabled the spread of syphilis through Europe and even more devastatingly, the spread 
of smallpox through North America (Ramenofsky et al., 2003).  
While disgust is heightened for outgroup members, there is evidence that it is lower 
for those who we see as ingroup members. Returning to the context of mass gatherings, two 
studies by Hult Khazaie and Khan (2019) found that people who felt a sense of shared 
identity with fellow attendees felt less disgust towards these ingroup members, and less 
vulnerable to the risk of disease. These findings have been corroborated by experimental 
evidence. For instance, one study found that participants who were asked to handle a sweaty 
t-shirt felt more disgust and walked faster to clean their hands when the t-shirt belonged to an 
outgroup member than when it belonged to an ingroup member (Reicher et al., 2016).  
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Integrating group processes into public health messaging will improve their 
effectiveness 
In a COVID-19 context, these various processes can have ironic effects. Because 
distrust and disgust are lower for ingroup than outgroup members, people might be more 
likely to engage in behaviours that risk disease transmission specifically when interacting 
with people who they perceive to be ingroup members. It has been clear from the beginning 
of the COVID-19 outbreak that most transmission occurs within the context of families or 
other communal gatherings (e.g., birthday parties; weddings), rather than through contact 
with strangers or foreigners (Cha, 2020). For this reason, ‘othering’ the disease, as a problem 
caused or experienced by outgroups (see also Chapters 7 and 19) misrepresents who the most 
likely vectors are — those with whom we feel safe. This also leads us to take risks that we 
otherwise would not. Stark evidence for this is provided by Australian data on people’s 
compliance with recommended physical distancing measures (collected in April 2020; Liddy 
et al., 2020). While an impressive 84% of people avoided strangers on public transport, only 
54% of people avoided colleagues or their workplace. A mere 13% of people reduced 
physical contact with those in their home. 
Public health messaging needs to take account of these social identity dynamics. In 
particular, it needs to engage with the fact that people’s desire to keep ingroup members safe 
is at odds with the fact that they are slow to recognise the risks that ingroup members pose to 
health. A key way to do this is by emphasising that physical distance is an act of care towards 
other group members, not a sign of mistrust.  
 Social Isolation 
(Sarah. V. Bentley) 
 
They had been sentenced, for an unknown crime, to an indeterminate period of 
punishment. (Camus, 1947) 
  
As Albert Camus observed in The Plague, quarantine is more than just ‘staying home’ — it 
feels like a punishment, and can take a significant toll on people’s health. The impact of 
social disconnection on both quality of life and lifespan has long been known. In particular, 
pioneering research by Berkman and Syme (1979) found that people who lacked social 
contact lived far shorter lives than those who were well connected — even when controlling 
for other obvious determinants of longevity, such as physical health, health behaviours (e.g., 
smoking), and use of health services.  
In less morbid epidemiological research, Cohen and colleagues found that people with 
more diverse social networks were in fact significantly less susceptible to the common cold 
(Cohen et al., 2003). Indeed, among people exposed to the common cold, the least sociable 
were twice as likely to become ill as the most sociable. More recently still, a meta-analysis of 
studies including more than 350,000 people (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010) found that the effect 
of social isolation on life expectancy was comparable with the effects of smoking. But it is 
not only physical health that is impacted by a lack of social connection. Research has also 
shown that the association between social isolation and health is particularly strong for 
mental health, with robust associations with depression, anxiety, and substance use (e.g., 
Ingram et al., 2020). 
Though many people may have previously been unaware of social isolation’s adverse 
effects (Haslam, McMahon, et al., 2018), these may now have been brought home by their 
personal experiences of living under lockdown conditions. Moreover, as isolation became the 
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norm rather than the exception, so too do did its health consequences. Indeed, Google 
registered a global spike in searches for ‘isolation’ and ‘loneliness’ beginning in mid-
February 2020 (Google Trends, 2020). At the same time, suicide-crisis phone lines around 
the world reached their highest ever demand (Neal, 2020).  In the face of COVID-19, many 
people who had never experienced significant mental health difficulties before found 
themselves struggling with insomnia, anxiety, and emotion dysregulation for the first time.   
In this context, one important question to ask is whether the link between social 
isolation and ill-health is merely an association, or whether feeling isolated causes poor 
health. This issue was explored in a series of studies prior to the COVID-19 outbreak. For 
example, one study followed a large and representative sample of over 21,000 New 
Zealanders across a five-year period, tracking changes in their social connectedness and 
mental health (Saeri et al., 2018). People who experienced a drop in their degree of social 
connectedness were at elevated risk of a decline in their mental health one year later. The 
relationship also went the other way: people who experienced a decline in their mental health 
tended to become more isolated one year later. Importantly, though, the former relationship 
was about three times stronger than the latter. This suggests that people are more likely to 
lose social connections prior to mental health decline, rather than the other way around.  
Interestingly, we are better able to respond to the challenges that life throws our way 
when we simply reflect on our social connections — in particular, on the social groups that 
we belong to. In one experiment, prior to completing an unsolvable problem-solving task, 
half of the participants were asked to reflect on the many groups to which they belonged 
while the other half were not. When faced with failure on the task, the former participants 
were subsequently less distressed — pointing to the capacity for valued group memberships 
to protect mental health in trying circumstances (Cruwys et al., 2015).  
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Critically, what this large body of evidence indicates is that the extended and 
widespread period of social isolation brought about by the COVID-19 lockdown is likely to 
have significant and serious impact on health — especially mental health. Our goal here is 
not to question the medical necessity of stay-at-home orders, or their role in reducing demand 
on hospitals. Instead, we seek to highlight that there are also public health costs of such 
policy, particularly for mental health. Crucially, we also illustrate how the negative effects of 
social isolation might be mitigated, which is of enduring relevance not only during the 
COVID-19 crisis but also in building an inclusive and healthy society in its aftermath.  
Isolation will hit some harder than others  
A large body of research has examined people’s capacity to navigate significant life 
changes — for example, those associated with parenthood, retirement, and entry into higher 
education. In every case, findings suggest that positive connections to others are a source of 
psychological resilience that helps people negotiate the transition successfully (Haslam et al., 
2020). However, unlike most life changes, COVID-19 has required people to drastically 
reduce social contact to combat the pandemic. This is likely to have been particularly 
disruptive to people’s capacity to maintain social connections and hence their ability to cope 
with the challenges the virus presents. One particular group at elevated risk is older people ( 
the focus of Chapter 10). More worryingly still, those whose level of social connection was 
already low are at a heightened risk of severe isolation, and its negative health consequences. 
Indeed, it is clear that the pandemic has disrupted the fragile circumstances of millions of 
people already living with challenges such as mental illness, domestic violence, or 
homelessness. For example, within a month of physical distancing measures being put in 
place, countries around the world saw a spike in demand for social services such as domestic 
violence support (Taub, 2020).  
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Data collected in late March 2020 with 536 U.K. residents shows that the pandemic 
situation is much more difficult for those already at risk (Bentley et al., 2020). At this time, 
people in the U.K. were experiencing the phased introduction of physical distancing, but had 
not yet gone into full lockdown. The survey focused on key outcomes that are essential not 
only to the people experiencing the challenges of COVID-19, but also to those trying to lead 
them through it: access to knowledge, preparedness for self-isolation, feelings of trust, and a 
sense of community cohesion. The findings suggest that people with the lowest levels of 
social support were those least likely to rate their access to information as adequate, to feel 
that others were behaving responsibly, or to feel that their community was cohesive. They 
were also more likely to express concern about their capacity to cope with self-isolation. By 
contrast, those who reported feeling more connected to others consistently reported having 
more trust, better access to relevant information, and felt their community was more 
cohesive. Most dramatically, those who were in the loneliest 10% of the sample were eight 
times more likely to report clinical levels of psychological distress than those in the least 
lonely 10% of the sample. 
We can only be ‘together apart’ by building community and belonging 
To understand how people can stay together while apart, it is important to consider 
why social isolation proves to be such a powerful trigger for ill health. The answer lies in the 
key insight that humans are fundamentally social beings who derive a sense of self (and 
everything that goes with it — e.g., self-worth, self-efficacy) from their group memberships. 
The social identities we derive from our group memberships allow us to leverage social 
support and furnish us with a sense of purpose and control — all critical resources of our 
health (Jetten et al., 2014). This means that social activities are not simply an ‘optional extra’. 
Rather, in allowing us to live out our social identities, groups are crucial to healthy 
psychological functioning. For example, it is not enough to merely attend a choir rehearsal to 
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reap the benefits of being a chorister. Instead, you need to feel a sense of belonging to your 
choir. Many recommendations for how to stay connected miss the mark because they do not 
focus on the central role of social identities. Some are preoccupied with the medium of social 
contact, for instance, in emphasising the need for face-to-face or video contact, rather than 
phone or message-based contact. Other misguided advice risks a preoccupation with the 
amount of social contact, imploring people to have daily contact or else risk a decline in well-
being. What both such recommendations miss is an understanding of the psychology of 
isolation. A social identity perspective instead reveals that the crucial ‘ingredient’ in social 
relationships that makes them so beneficial for health resides is neither the format nor dosage. 
Instead, it is the subjective sense of belonging to some greater collective that is crucial. To 
the extent that people feel that they remain connected to meaningful communities during 
lockdown — either through virtual or other means — they will be relatively protected (see 
also Chapter 10).  
Given what we know about the risks of isolation and who will be most affected, the 
critical question is therefore what can be done to reduce the impact of stay-at-home orders, 
especially for those who are most vulnerable. The most important principle is that physical 
distance does not preclude social connection. Modern technology enables people to stay 
connected without risking infection in ways that would have been impossible even 10 years 
ago. Indeed, this insight contributed to the World Health Organisation’s decision to drop the 
term “social distancing” (Greenaway, Cruwys, & Saeri, 2020).  
Structured interventions may also be able to help people stay connected. Prior to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, social identity researchers had developed an intervention known as 
GROUPS 4 HEALTH (G4H) to address social isolation. Importantly, G4H has been evaluated in 
randomised controlled trials and shown to reduce loneliness, depression and anxiety (Haslam, 
Cruwys et al., 2019). However, G4H is a face-to-face program, and in the world of COVID-
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19 this makes it hard to implement. Interventions such as this must therefore be adapted to 
suit a remote context. GROUPS 2 CONNECT is an online adaptation of G4H that raises 
awareness of the impact of connectedness, and focuses realistically on what people can do 
within physical distancing requirements to maintain a sense of connection to others. Initial 
evidence suggests that, like G4H, this is beneficial for connectedness and well-being.  
More generally, the pandemic has produced some heart-warming examples of people 
maintaining community despite isolation. People singing together from their apartment 
balconies in densely populated areas of both Wuhan and Milan (Taylor, 2020); online 
cooking classes connecting people to their cultural heritage; orchestras and bands co-
producing rousing anthems from separated sites (Asprou, 2020; Lam, 2020). There are also 
reports of a huge growth in neighbourhood-based social media groups, as well as a global rise 
in cooperative online gaming (Moody, 2020). Each of these examples showcases innovative 
solutions to the problem of remaining connected. They also speak to the fact that while 
groups have historically been portrayed as toxic, the data actually suggest the opposite is true. 
It would seem that protecting people against the toxic effects of isolation needs to centre on 
the key thing that they are being denied — meaningful group-based connection. Indeed, 
finding ways to be together apart needs to be a core part of the COVID-19 response.  
 Ageing and Connectedness 
(Catherine Haslam) 
 
In order to reduce the spread of the virus and to protect vulnerable persons, it is 
strongly advised to reduce physical contact, not to visit older persons, not to go to care 
homes and nursing homes. (European Federation of Psychologists’ Associations 
[EFPA], 2020) 
 
This statement by EFPA is one of many recommendations that emerged in March 2020 as the 
health consequences of COVID-19 were being recognised internationally. In many countries, 
the restrictions imposed to limit the spread of the virus have seemed particularly severe for 
older people, due to concerns about their greater vulnerability and risk of serious illness and 
death. Let us be in no doubt — the advice to physically distance from one another has been 
an essential public health policy for protecting older people from COVID-19. But, as the 
previous chapter outlined, its unintentional consequence — of increasing social disconnection 
and loneliness — is a recognised health hazard that itself requires careful management. This 
chapter focuses on the particular challenges of isolation for older people as well as potential 
solutions.  
Older people are at particular risk of poor health due to isolation 
Perhaps counterintuitively, recent national surveys indicated that prior to COVID-19, 
older people were some of the least lonely in society (Haslam, Haslam, & Cruwys, 2019). At 
first sight, we might imagine this would be advantageous when it comes to combating the 
threat of social disconnection posed by the pandemic. However, things are not that simple. 
For social connections can only act as resources to bolster health and well-being when they 
are accessible and when they provide a vehicle to maintain and extend meaningful ties. 
Under conditions of lockdown, the primary means through which people connect are virtual 
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and hence rely on technology, which is often less accessible to older people because it is 
unfamiliar or unaffordable. If this is the case, then older people stand to lose their social 
connection ‘advantage’. Furthermore, some countries have proposed ‘shielding’ older people 
by imposing lockdown measures only for these people — meaning their isolation is likely to 
be longer and more extreme than that of other groups.  
This is all the more concerning because, if they become disconnected and more 
lonely, older people are more susceptible to the health risks associated with loneliness. 
Indeed, evidence shows that older people living with chronic loneliness visit their physician 
more often, are more likely to require rehospitalisation, and more often develop multiple 
chronic illnesses than their more connected counterparts (Gerst-Ermon & Jayawardhana, 
2015). They also experience greater and more rapid decline in cognitive health, mobility, and 
mental health than those who do not feel lonely (Kuiper et al., 2015). These widespread 
effects across all domains of health have been attributed to the ways in which chronic 
loneliness compromises the immune system over time (Hawkley & Cacioppo, 2003) — 
predisposing lonely people to new illnesses as well as intensifying any pre-existing 
conditions.  
From this substantial evidence base, we can predict that a major ‘shock’ to the social 
support system such as the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to have more serious consequences 
for the mental, physical and cognitive health of older adults. Moreover, where chronic 
loneliness emerges as a consequence of physical distancing restrictions, this will increase the 
likelihood of negative health outcomes (e.g., increased falls, more rapid cognitive decline) 
that limit a person’s capacity to live independently.  
Gaining group ties mitigates the health costs of loneliness for older people 
The obvious way to counteract these adverse health consequences is by striving to 
sustain, or if possible build, social connection. The science is also clear about the form that 
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these connections should take — they must be meaningful, preferably multiple, and include 
social groups (Haslam, Jetten et al, 2018).  This is evidenced by three studies which draw on 
the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing — a population survey with multiple waves of data 
from more than 18,000 people aged 50+ living in the community. The first showed that older 
adults who lost two social group memberships following retirement had a 12% risk of 
mortality over the next six years (Steffens et al., 2016). However, this risk fell to just 2% if 
people were able to maintain their group memberships, and to less than 1% if people gained 
groups in the post-retirement period.  
The second study compared the effects of different forms of social engagement on 
cognitive integrity over three time points each separated by two years (Haslam, Cruwys, & 
Haslam, 2014). This found that group-based ties offer benefits for cognitive health, even after 
one-on-one social ties were accounted for. Furthermore, as Figure 6 shows, the group ties 
became even more important for cognitive health as people got older.   
 
Figure 6. Cognitive age as a function of chronological age and extent of social group ties 
Note: This graph shows that as people get older, group ties become much more important for 
the preservation of their cognitive health (from Haslam, Cruwys, & Haslam, 2014). 
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The third study looked at the benefits of group memberships for mental health among 
people with a history of depression (Cruwys et al., 2013). On average, people who have 
experienced depression will go on to have between five and nine separate depressive episodes 
in their lifetime (Burcusa & Iacono, 2007), which points to the difficulty of achieving stable 
long-term recovery. However, Cruwys and colleagues (2013) show that joining groups can 
play a critical role in protecting people against relapse. In particular, they found that people 
with depression who joined three or more groups within two years had only a 15% risk of 
depression relapse six years later. This compared to a 41% risk of relapse for those who 
joined no groups over this period. 
These population studies are backed up by evidence from experimental and 
intervention studies among older people living in care, which illustrate that acquiring positive 
group memberships (e.g., through a social club or reminiscence group) is causally linked to 
better mental, cognitive and physical health (Gleibs et al., 2011; Knight et al.,2010). 
Importantly, these effects do not arise from joining just any group. Rather, the data shows 
that it is only those groups that get ‘under a person’s skin’ and become internalised as an 
important part of their sense of self that have this power. In other words, groups are only 
beneficial when people identify strongly with them (Haslam, Haslam et al., 2014).  
Nonetheless, like most other research in this area, this evidence of the benefits of 
group connectedness has been collected in contexts where people have been able to interact 
in close proximity. This therefore raises a key question in the COVID-19 era — can the 
health-related benefits of social connection still be harnessed when people are required to be 
physically separated from each other?        
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Technology can keep older people connected 
More than ever, and particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, social 
interactions are increasingly dependent on technology. However, this shift to technology has 
been most prevalent in younger people. Evidencing this ‘digital divide’, prior to COVID-19 
people under the age of 40 used social media platforms more than face-to-face meetings to 
support social interaction, whereas the opposite was true for those over 40 (Hall, 2018). With 
this in mind, a large number of studies have sought to investigate older people’s use of 
technology, with many showing that this can have benefits for well-being — not least by 
increasing their sense of connection to other individuals and to society more broadly.  
Unsurprisingly, these efforts are more successful when older people are trained to use 
technology (Delello & McWhorter, 2018) or technology is adapted to make it more user-
friendly (Morton et al., 2018). Even more important is investment in making virtual 
connection meaningful: interventions are most successful when older adults are supported to 
pursue their interests, such as lifelong learning, through live webcasting (Botner, 2018) and 
videoconferencing (Hilton et al., 2019).  
However, social connection proves more challenging when people have neither the 
resources nor the confidence to use technology. While this can be ameliorated with resources 
and time, the speed with which COVID-19 restrictions were implemented allowed little time 
to address accessibility barriers for older people. Of course, there are other ways to connect 
with family and friends (e.g., through regular phone calls) and with neighbours (e.g., by 
interacting at a safe distance) but these often require resourcefulness, initiative, and 
confidence — traits often compromised by the very fact of isolation. It is for precisely this 
reason that working with older adults to help them retain group-based connections is so 
important. Finding the best way to do this is a challenge in a pandemic, but it needs to be a 
priority.  
 Collective Trauma 
(Orla Muldoon) 
 
A traumatic event is one in which a person experiences a genuine fear of death or 
injury for themselves or others. However, psychological symptoms in response to extreme 
and traumatic experiences are not unusual, and are captured under the umbrella term of post-
traumatic stress (PTS). These can include disturbing thoughts and feelings long after the 
traumatic event has ended, feelings of detachment from others, hypervigilance to threat, and 
avoidance of reminders of the traumatic event. If symptoms are sufficiently intense and long-
lasting, this may warrant a clinical diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  
While a substantial minority of people experience intense post-traumatic symptoms, 
what is sometimes overlooked is that most people are robust in the face of traumatic 
experiences and display psychological resilience. Though COVID-19 is a traumatic event 
likely to cause widespread PTS, group-based processes can play a key role in mitigating the 
severity of this and ensuring a more resilient response. This is particularly likely to be the 
case when the traumatic experience that people face is a collective experience such as 
COVID-19. Unlike a traumatic event such as assault, with COVID-19 the threat to life and 
safety is common to us all. Indeed, it is precisely because ‘we are all in this together’ that the 
collective curse of the virus could potentially pave the way to a collective cure — notably 
through people overcoming challenge by banding together. 
The trauma of COVID-19 is amplified by social disconnection 
It is clear that a pandemic fits the definition of a traumatic event, in so far as it 
threatens people’s lives and the lives of others they care about. Furthermore, there is evidence 
from previous disease outbreaks that such crises are widely perceived as traumatic. For 
instance, a review of the psychological impact of the 2003 SARS outbreak found consistent 
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evidence that those affected experienced high levels of distress, and that this persisted for 
many years afterwards (Gardner & Moallef, 2015).  
The requirement for people to self-isolate during the COVID-19 crisis is also likely to 
make it more traumatic. As discussed in previous chapters, this is because isolation 
disconnects people from each other and from meaningful groups that are a source of key 
social resources (e.g., social support; Haslam, Jetten et al., 2018). There is evidence that 
quarantine measures amplify people’s distress and compound the traumatic effects of an 
epidemic. For example, one study examined hospital employees in Beijing who were 
quarantined in 2003 due to SARS (Bai et al., 2004). It found that having been quarantined 
was the most important predictor of PTS symptoms. Similarly, adults and children who were 
quarantined due to SARS or the H1N1 outbreak in 2009 subsequently showed amplified 
levels of PTS symptoms (Braunack-Mayer et al., 2013). Another study indicated that the 
length of quarantine during the SARS outbreak also mattered. Specifically, those who were 
quarantined for more than 10 days were more likely to show PTSD symptoms than those 
quarantined for shorter periods (Hawryluck et al., 2004). 
Group membership affects who is most vulnerable to traumatic stress in a pandemic 
COVID-19 has connected the global community in an unprecedented fashion. While 
it is true that we are all in this together, the reality of the pandemic is that some groups are far 
more vulnerable than others. Indeed, group membership is a critical determinant of people's 
experience of the COVID-19 crisis — not only psychologically, as has been the focus of this 
volume, but also structurally. For instance, life in 2020 will be vastly different if you are a 
nurse rather than an academic, a New Yorker rather than a New Zealander, or aged 80 rather 
20. Moreover, those who cannot afford the luxuries of physical distancing, self-isolation or 
even running water and soap are made infinitely more vulnerable (Chung et al., 2020).  
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In many regards, these group-based realities mean that preventive actions are luxuries 
only those who live in more privileged circumstances can afford (in ways that we unpack 
further in Chapter 17). So, while the relatively well-off ‘romanticise’ the experience of 
quarantine (joking about their progress in learning to bake bread), others have to work in 
unsafe conditions where they cannot engage in physical-distancing behaviours, or are in 
forced detainment where they cannot escape others. For the latter groups, not being able to 
self-isolate during a global pandemic may be especially traumatizing. For those who cannot 
enact recommended safety behaviours or who are wilfully prevented from enacting them, 
advice to do so is alienating (see also Chapter 16 for how such experiences can lead to social 
disorder). Indeed, instructions to act in a way that is not feasible can increase anger and 
shatter a person’s faith and trust in the world — experiences that are known to exacerbate 
PTS. Likewise, feelings of betrayal by the health and political system (that a person may have 
previously trusted), strongly predict more severe and lasting PTS symptoms (Muldoon et al., 
2019).  
However, psychological group memberships, both existing and emerging in the face 
of COVID-19, also affect people’s vulnerabilities to traumatic stress. Indeed, when a person 
encounters a traumatic event they are not a “blank slate” but instead their response and ability 
to cope are shaped by their group memberships and the psychological resources that these 
provide. In this context, evidence suggests that the nature and number of a person’s prior 
group memberships are important for at least two key reasons. First, pre-existing group 
memberships offer a platform for developing new connections that are likely to be crucial in 
helping them negotiate trauma and traumatic situations (Kinsella et al., 2018). Second, those 
group memberships also provide group members with ongoing social connections that are the 
basis for social support as people negotiate trauma (Walsh et al., 2015). For example, people 
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are more likely to find formal support services, such as counselling, more helpful when they 
are provided by others who are seen as ingroup members (Muldoon et al., 2019).  
The collective nature of traumatic experience can support people’s resilience  
Although the scale and severity of COVID-related trauma will vary along group-
based lines, many aspects of the experience are shared among members of the groups to 
which people belong. As a result, many people will have a sense that this major upheaval is a 
collective one, to be tackled collectively.  
This is important because research suggests that the sharedness of traumatic 
experience is an important factor in mitigating the distress and anxiety that these events 
create (Kearns et al., 2017). In particular, a sense of shared experience can contribute to 
feelings of collective efficacy (e.g., a shared perception that a community’s collective efforts 
to flatten the curve are working). This in turn is likely to contribute to psychological 
resilience. Support for this hypothesis emerges from several lines of research. For example, 
in survey work among Nepalese survivors of a major earthquake, an emergent sense of 
identity with the devastated community was the basis for an enhanced sense of collective 
efficacy that predicted increased resilience (Muldoon et al., 2017). Furthermore, experimental 
work confirms that responses to a stressful situation are often driven by a shared 
understanding of the situation, and that this understanding has the power to suppress a 
physiological stress response in the face of challenge (Haslam & Reicher 2006). Similarly, 
shared understandings of a traumatic situation have also been shown to attenuate its 
perceived stressfulness (Gallagher et al., 2014).   
In short, a wealth of previous work suggests that there are likely to be multiple 
pathways through which group memberships will support people’s resilience in the face of 
COVID-19. In particular, there is reason to believe that groups and associated social 
identities — both those which existed before the virus and those which have arisen as a result 
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of the virus — will prove to be a key resource in mitigating the impact of traumatic stress. As 
Rebecca Solnit (2020) suggests in the article we quoted at the start of this section, one of the 
significant consequences of the pandemic has been the ability to appreciate anew not only the 
strength of our collective ties, but also their capacity to help us transform catastrophe into 
courage.  
 
 Section D 
COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR 
 
We are frequently told that COVID-19 is the greatest challenge of our generation, and 
perhaps the largest global crisis since World War II. So, what do we know about how people 
behave in crises? And how can we apply that understanding to manage the current pandemic? 
The traditional answer draws on the notion that people are psychologically fragile at the best 
of times, and so threat and fear make things worse. This reasoning suggests that when you 
add collective psychology into the mix (either because we are actually in a crowd or because 
we see each other as all in the same boat) we simply fall apart. Panic turns a crisis into a 
disaster. 
Despite the continuing popularity of this ‘panic perspective’, the evidence shows that, 
while people certainly can act selfishly and dysfunctionally in crises, more often they come 
together and support each other. An emergent collective psychology, far from being the 
villain of the piece, is what makes this possible. Living through the COVID-19 crisis is an 
experience we all have in common, and this has the potential to create a sense of shared 
identity which is the basis for mutual concern, mutual support, and resilience. In many ways, 
collective psychology is our greatest asset for dealing with a crisis. 
It is critical for those dealing with the pandemic to appreciate the importance of this 
and to understand how to harness the benefits of collective psychology. This is true when it 
comes to fostering shared identity and solidarity not only amongst the public, but also 
between the public and authorities. Get it right and the rewards are considerable; not least 
because those authorities who treat the public as part of a common group are better able to 
guide the public to safety in a crisis. Get it wrong, however, and the costs are momentous. 
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Error in this area not only creates tension between the public and the authorities, but also 
opens up divisions within communities and creates collective disorder. 
In order to address these issues, this section starts with an outline of both traditional 
and contemporary models of collective behaviour (Chapter 12). Chapter 13 then outlines how 
people behave in crises, mapping the emergence of widespread solidarity. Chapter 14 
explores the psychological underpinning of such solidarity, providing evidence for the critical 
role of shared social identity. Finally, the ways that different authorities can affect the 
development of shared identity is discussed in the final two chapters. Chapter 15 focuses on 
the emergency services and their relation with the public. Chapter 16 looks at the nature of 
police–public encounters in determining whether the public stay united and orderly. Overall, 
this section contains critical lessons for those managing the pandemic, because these factors 
determine not only how well we will deal with the crisis, but also what sort of society will 




  (Fergus Neville & Stephen D. Reicher) 
 
 
Crowds do not have a good reputation. They are associated with violence and excess, 
emotionality and irrationality — all summed up in the derisive word ‘mob’. When people 
refer to ‘mob psychology’ the implications are always negative. The term is rooted in a 
contrast with refined, reasonable, and civilized behaviour. Above all, it implies a litany of 
loss: loss of reason, loss of restraint, loss of morality. In the mob, decent people become like 
beasts. It is therefore not surprising that in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis, aside from 
infection fears, gatherings of people on beaches, public transport and in parks were met with 
concern and even alarm. Crowds are associated with trouble.  
People have been taught to fear the masses as destructive forces  
Crowd psychology emerged from concerns about the formation of a mass society in 
the era of industrialisation (Giner, 1976) and about the preservation of social order. At the 
root of such concerns lies a belief that in the absence of clear hierarchies to guide them, 
people are unable to think for themselves. This model holds that, given the psychological 
fragility of people and the futility of trying to reason with them, there is a need to shepherd 
them (see also Chapters 1 and 5). 
If the masses were an imminent threat, the “crowd” represented the moment at which 
they would rise up to batter down the social order. Hence the crowd has become a dense 
symbol of all that the elites feared in the mass: in the crowd, people were thought to be 
quintessentially destructive (Barrows, 1981). All these ideas were central in the writings of 
the early crowd psychologists: predominantly gentlemen scholars, particularly from France 
which, in the Paris Commune of 1871, had witnessed the uprising and temporary victory of 
the masses. They had seen the crowd in action. They were terrified and haunted by it.  
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 The most famous of those scholars was Gustave Le Bon. In his 1895 book on The 
Crowd, Le Bon argues that the self is lost as one becomes submerged in the crowd. Loss of 
self means loss of standards, and so one has no means of evaluating and resisting the ideas 
and emotions to which one is exposed. These ideas therefore become “contagious”, spreading 
without check. Where do these ideas come from? Le Bon saw them as emerging from an 
atavistic collective unconscious which is exposed once the rational individual self has been 
stripped away. As a consequence, Le Bon asserted, crowd members are barbarians: fickle, 
emotional, unable to reason, sometimes heroic, but always destructive. It is not a pretty 
portrait. But it is an influential portrait, which continues to colour both popular views and the 
practices of agencies such as the police and emergency services (Drury et al., 2013) — 
including those who report on and deal with mass behaviour in the COVID-19 crisis.   
Crowd behaviour is shaped by shared notions of morality  
Le Bon’s portrait may be influential, but it is far from accurate. This is hardly 
surprising. He and his contemporaries viewed the crowd as horrified outsiders. Early crowd 
‘science’ was a discipline rooted in fantasy and fear more than evidence (McPhail, 2017; 
Reicher, 2001). On closer and more systematic inspection a very different image emerges. 
Crowd events are not random explosions of rage. Indeed, violence and conflict are very much 
the exception rather than the rule (Barrows, 1981). But even in the most violent of crowds, 
behaviour remains orderly and patterned, and these patterns are socially meaningful (Davis, 
1973).  
Take food riots as an example (which many fear as a possible outcome of the 
COVID-19 pandemic; Paine, 2020; Thapar, 2020). One might think these to be the simplest 
of events: people get hungry, people see food, people get together and break down the doors 
to the stores, grab the food and run away. Yet, as Thompson (1971) shows in his analysis of 
nearly 700 such riots in England during the 18th century, the reality was very different. Riots 
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typically happened when grain was being transported out of a locality. Crowds would 
‘confiscate’ the sacks, sell them amongst themselves, return the money — and often the sacks 
as well — to the merchants. Not only was there a clear order to these ‘riots’, but people’s 
behaviour also reflected what Thompson called a ‘moral economy’ amongst the peasant 
rioters. This refers to a collective understanding of rights and wrongs: that available resources 
should be distributed locally rather than being sent to market, and that they should be sold at 
a fair price. 
Thompson’s analysis also begins to explain what lies behind and produces crowd 
behaviour. The core of his argument is that people do not act, as Le Bon suggested, without 
standards and hence without constraint. Rather they act in terms of collective standards and 
shared notions of morality, which shape their actions. The key question for psychologists is 
how it is possible for collective beliefs to shape the behaviour of individuals in the crowd. 
The answer takes us back to the tenets of social identity theorising. 
A social identity model of crowd action focuses on the shift from personal to social 
identity 
We have seen how traditional crowd psychology views the crowd in entirely negative 
terms. And we have seen how, for Le Bon, this all starts in the loss of selfhood. For him the 
individual self is the sole (valid) source of standards to guide our everyday behaviour. Loss 
of self therefore means the loss of any standards. It is here that the radical implications of the 
concept of social identity, as discussed in Chapter 2, become evident. The starting point of a 
social identity model of crowd action (Reicher, 1984, 1987) is that we do not lose identity, 
but rather shift from personal to social identity. Correspondingly, we do not lose standards 
but rather the basis of our behaviour shifts from individual standards to collective norms, 
values and beliefs. As with Thompson’s food rioters, crowd action has social shape to the 
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extent that crowd members are acting in terms of a common social identity characterised by a 
shared collective understanding. 
In making this argument, we are not suggesting that any and every gathering of 
people develops a shared identity of this form. Shopping, commuting, sunbathing: there are 
many occasions where we may be physically crowded with others without having any sense 
of psychological connection to them. However, it is precisely by considering what happens 
when such a connection does emerge that we can begin to appreciate the implications of 
shared social identity in a crowd. We call this a psychological (as opposed to a physical) 
crowd. 
Imagine yourself aboard a train crowded with strangers. You are psychologically 
distant from other individuals. Their chatter, their smell, and their touch as they press up 
against you are all odious. But then the train grinds to a halt. A loudspeaker announcement 
informs you, without much detail, that there is a problem. At this point, you begin to 
transition from separate individuals to a group of passengers bound together by common 
resentment against the rail company. As ‘I’ turns to ‘we’, the physical crowd transitions to a 
psychological crowd, and a series of other transitions occur (Neville et al., in press). 
First, there is the cognitive shift we have already described: people start to think in 
group terms. They relate to others as fellow group members rather than as strangers, and are 
motivated by their shared understanding of passenger rights. Second, there is a relational 
shift: people develop a greater intimacy with others, they start to turn and talk to each other, 
share revealing stories, and share their sandwiches. Such sharing and social support is vital in 
crises, as we outline in Chapters 13 to 15, and it generates a sense of empowerment, of 
mastery, and of resilience (see Section C). This is particularly important when people have to 
endure difficult circumstances. Third, there is an affective shift. Intimacy, support and the 
sense of mastery are all pleasurable experiences. Together they mitigate the negatives of 
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crisis situations, and perhaps explain why people can experience objectively trying conditions 
with a sense of subjective positivity (Hopkins et al., 2019).  
Intergroup dynamics determine crowd behaviour  
Thus far, we have concentrated mainly on the psychological transformation that 
occurs within a psychological crowd — the intra-group dynamics. But crowd events are not 
just about the crowd. Typically, they involve more than one group — for example, fans of 
two rival sports teams, or protestors and counter-protestors, or — perhaps most frequently — 
the crowd and the police. No analysis of crowds is complete, therefore, without examining 
the processes that occur between groups — the inter-group dynamics. This is particularly 
important if we want to understand how crowd conflict emerges (the topic of Chapters 16 and 
18). 
The key point is that violence and conflict do not inhere in the crowd in general, or 
even in the norms, values and beliefs of particular crowds (although some may be more or 
less opposed to the use of violence). Generally, it arises out of the interaction between 
multiple parties (Neville & Reicher, 2018). If one group is seen to be acting in ways that 
appear to threaten the other or else to violate its sense of rights (either forcing them to do 
something they consider illegitimate or preventing them from doing something they consider 
legitimate), then this is likely to be contested, resulting in a spiral of tension that can 
culminate in violent conflict (Reicher, 1996). There are, of course, many different forms this 
can take. Where a community is divided amongst itself and particular minorities are accused 
of threatening the majority it can lead to the type of pogroms described in Chapter 1 (see 
Reicher et al., 2008, also Chapters 19 & 20). Indeed, given that stigmatised groups are often 
considered dirty and diseased, this is particularly potent in a pandemic. 
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Crowds can be both destructive and constructive forces 
It also follows that classic crowd theory is not just wrong about the nature of crowd 
action — it is actively misleading. In seeing crowds simply as a problem that must be 
eliminated, traditional thinking ignores the positive aspects of collective psychology — the 
solidarity and resilience that arise when people act with and for each other, and which are 
such an important resource in getting us through a crisis — and magnifies its negative 
aspects. The COVID-19 emergency has made it even more important to understand the 
constructive and avoid the destructive sides of crowds in a crisis. In the next chapter, we 
examine more closely exactly how people behave in an emergency. 
 
  Emergencies and Disasters 
(John Drury & Selin Tekin Guven)  
 
Over the last 50 years, we have come to know quite a lot about how people behave in 
emergencies and disasters. Using a variety of methods, research by sociologists and 
psychologists has identified a number of consistent features. This research has explored 
behaviour in diverse crises such as fires, earthquakes, floods, storms and other natural 
disasters, as well as terrorist attacks. The COVID-19 crisis is different from these events in 
important ways. It comprises multiple incidents spread out over several months; and its 
effects are dispersed across the world rather than concentrated on a single group of people. 
Nevertheless, there are important similarities: there is a mortal threat which can create fear; 
there is not enough protection for everyone under threat; and human action can mitigate (or 
exacerbate) that threat.  
Understanding human behaviour in emergency events can therefore provide insights 
into behaviour during the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, some might ask why we need 
all that research? Don’t we already know how people behave under conditions of mortal 
threat, inadequate protection, and extreme fear? They panic!  
What exactly do people mean by the term panic? There are various definitions, but one 
thing that reliably distinguishes the concept of ‘panic’ from related constructs such as fear 
and flight is the notion of over-reaction. It implies that the things people feel and the ways 
they act are excessive. A person suffering from panic has anxiety and fear reactions that are 
out of proportion with reality. So, to claim that people panic in an emergency is to claim that 
they over-react to the threat posed by the emergency.  
What is more, the concept of panic incorporates an explanation for why people over-
react. It is down to being in a crowd. Drawing on Le Bonian ideas (see Chapter 12), the 
supposition is that people have lost their minds, and the fear of each person ‘infects’ others 
13 
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through the process of contagion, heightening fear levels until they bear little relation to the 
original stimulus. But in an emergency, how do we establish whether fear is ‘excessive’? At 
the time, there is generally so much uncertainty it is impossible to know how significant the 
danger is. In retrospect it is easier to judge — because one can then sift the evidence to 
determine what was not known at the time. Precisely because of this, after the event it is no 
longer possible to judge if people acted reasonably. 
For example, in the early days of the COVID-19 crisis, was the extra shopping that 
some people engaged in (so called ‘panic buying’) necessarily excessive? By what criteria? If 
someone believes (a) that they may be forced to stay at home for an extended period in the 
near future, and/or (b) that other people will soon clear the shelves, then it makes perfect 
sense to buy extra oneself. It may be excessive from the perspective of the community, but 
not necessarily from the perspective of the actor (Luscombe, 2020). Most disaster researchers 
have therefore abandoned trying to judge whether behaviour in such events is rational or 
irrational, and have recommended focusing instead on what people do and why they do it.  
Responses to danger are largely sensible 
In most emergencies, people need to respond urgently — usually by fleeing as quickly 
as possible. But instead, their response is often delayed. This is most evident in research on 
fires, but the same is also true for bombings and various natural hazards such as earthquakes, 
hurricane and floods. In fact, it is this under-reaction, rather than ‘panicked’, over-reaction 
that is the major cause of fatalities in a crisis. In line with the general conception of 
psychological frailty (see Chapter 1 and 5), this tendency has sometimes been put down to a 
generalised ‘optimistic bias’ in human judgement (e.g., Kinsey et al., 2019).  
Once again, such accusations rest on the benefit of hindsight. After all, emergency 
events are exceedingly rare, and if one fled at every sign of possible danger one would waste 
an awful amount of time and energy. At the time, it is often reasonable to interpret such signs 
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in more mundane terms. Moreover, one is highly dependent upon the interpretation provided 
by others. Often, the problem lies less with the psychology of the public than with the failure 
of authorities to identify danger signs and give clear guidance as to how to respond. In the 
present pandemic, many would argue that fault lies in the hands of those governments which 
were slow to identify the risks posed by COVID-19 and to introduce appropriate responses 
such as physical distancing and lockdown (e.g., Mason, 2020, see also Chapter 18). 
A further problem with the notion of ‘optimistic bias’ is that, in cases where threat 
becomes more frequent, the notion that “this can’t be happening to us” quickly starts to 
reverse. For example, in 2017, after a series of terrorist attacks in London, hundreds of people 
in Oxford Street fled from a noise that turned out to be harmless.  
Solidarity is the rule, not the exception 
On the whole, the most striking feature of emergencies is the emergence of social 
support and cooperation. This is true not in every emergency and not for every person in 
every emergency, but often enough to be mentioned again and again in studies of specific 
events (Solnit, 2009). Importantly, in a disaster, solidarity goes beyond those who are directly 
affected. Strangers stop to offer help to those they witness in difficulty (Levine & Manning, 
2013). People tend to “converge” to the location of disasters — some simply to look, but 
many to help, even if they do not have specialist skills. Indeed, more lives are saved by the 
“average” citizen, whether “bystander” or fellow survivor, than by professionals (Helsloot & 
Ruitenberg, 2004).  
Solidarity also outlasts the emergency itself. Many emergencies and disasters involve 
inequality and injustice — the disaster itself is often a result of inequality, and those already 
disadvantaged suffer disproportionately (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 
2015; see Chapter 17). Accordingly, survivors and bereaved often seek redress, and the 
‘disaster communities’ that arise in the immediate aftermath of crises can evolve to try to 
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meet people’s needs for justice. This has been observed after disasters as diverse as the 1985 
Mexico City earthquake (Solnit, 2009), the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan 
(Aldrich, 2013) and the 2017 Grenfell fire in London (Charles, 2019; Tekin Guven & Drury, 
2020). As the Grenfell United campaign shows, such justice campaigns create yet further 
solidarities, receiving support from other campaigns and broadening their remit to address 
other injustices (Renwick, 2019).  
The story of COVID-19 is much like the story of disasters in general. Certainly one 
can find examples of selfishness: people stockpiling scarce resources like toilet paper, 
profiteering from hand sanitizer, or ignoring lockdown to drink with their friends. But the 
frequency of such behaviour was greatly exaggerated by a media which loves nothing more 
than a story of transgression (D’Urso, 2020; Reicher et al., 2020). 
However, as indicated in Chapter 1, the real headline of the pandemic — at least in its 
first phases — has been the extent of adherence to unprecedented restrictions, notably 
lockdown (e.g. ONS, 30th April 2020). This in itself is an indication of solidarity, because 
most people stayed at home less to protect their own health than to minimise the risk of 
spreading the disease and harming those who were vulnerable (Jackson et al., 2020). 
Additionally, virtually everyone has been involved in some informal act of solidarity — 
knocking on a neighbour’s door to see if they need anything, helping with shopping, setting 
up WhatsApp groups for one’s street, or simply being friendly to others (Monbiot, 2020; see 
also Chapter 7). There has also been a remarkable flowering of more formal forms of 
solidarity. In the U.K. alone, some one million people volunteered to help the NHS and over 
four thousand mutual aid groups have been formed, involving over three million people. 
There have been so many offers of solidarity that there has sometimes not been enough for 
people to do (Butler, 2020). 
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Solidarity trumps selfishness 
As psychologists, when we are asked how people behave in emergencies and disasters, 
the hope and expectation is often that there is a simple answer reflecting a general human 
nature. The ‘panic’ narrative persists partly because it satisfies that desire. We have argued in 
this chapter that things are more complicated than this perspective suggests. People can react 
selfishly, but — as we have shown here — they often respond with solidarity. We have seen 
in this in the wake of COVID-19. Most importantly, though, as psychologists, our aim is not 
to speculate about how people will act; rather, we seek to identify the factors and understand 
the processes which determine whether selfishness will trump solidarity or vice-versa. In this 
way, we are more able to shape what will happen. So, what are these processes? That is the 
subject of the next chapter. 
 
 Solidarity 
(Evangelos Ntontis & Carolina Rocha)  
 
Pandemics inspire the most remarkable acts of unity and compassion (Solnit, 2009). They 
also lead to appalling acts of division and brutality (Cohn, 2018). The question for this 
chapter is why and when we come together, rather than fall apart, in crises such as the 
COVID-19 pandemic. As with all human behaviour, multiple processes at multiple levels are 
involved. Some involve individual characteristics such as personal sensitivity towards justice 
and individual orientations towards prosocial values, or demographic characteristics such as 
gender, age and income — all of which have been found to be associated with the likelihood 
of people exhibiting prosocial behaviours (e.g., Zagefka & James, 2015).  
However, the problem with trying to explain behaviour in terms of relatively stable 
individual differences is that these cannot explain the rapid surge of solidarity (and 
sometimes, hatred) in a crisis. It is here that group-level explanations come into their own. 
Research shows that people are more prone to help and empathise with individuals who are 
perceived as members of the same group than those who are perceived as outgroup members. 
For instance, Levine and colleagues (2005) took fans of Manchester United and emphasised 
their club allegiance. These fans then witnessed someone falling over and hurting themselves. 
This person was either wearing a Manchester United shirt, a Liverpool shirt (both red) or a 
plain red t-shirt. Participants tended to help the first of these — their fellow Manchester 
United fan — much more often than the other two.  
Collective solidarity is rooted in shared social identity 
The fans behaved as they did due to the relational shift that occurs when we have a 
sense of shared identity with others (a point first discussed in Chapter 2). This flows from the 
core premise of the social identity approach: that the self is not just about ‘me’ (and what 
14 
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makes me distinctive) but about ‘we’ (and what makes my group distinctive). At the group 
level, this means that what happens to other group members literally happens to my 
(extended) self. Their fate is my fate. Their sorrows are my sorrows. An insult to one is an 
injury to all. Hence, I help them in the same way that, as an individual, I help myself. In 
short, whether I show solidarity to others or not turns on whether I share social identity with 
them (Yzerbyt & Phalet, 2020). 
But we have only told half the story of Levine’s Manchester United study. A second 
condition was run, identical to the first in every respect bar one. The difference was that this 
time, stress was not on participants’ specific fan identity (as supporters of Manchester 
United), but on the fact that they were football fans. Again, Manchester United fans 
witnessed someone wearing a Manchester United, Liverpool, or plain red shirt fall down and 
hurt themselves. However, in this condition, they helped the injured individual wearing either 
the Manchester United or the Liverpool shirt, but not the person in the plain red t-shirt. While 
they were still just helping ingroup members, here their identity was more inclusive (as 
football fans rather than fan of a specific football team), so their solidarity was extended to 
more people. Those who might otherwise have been seen as rivals to oppose became 
comrades to whom succour was given (a point we return to in Chapter 20). 
The critical point here is that group membership is not a given. It is dynamic and 
subjective. In different situations, we may see ourselves as individuals or as group members; 
we may adopt different group memberships in which we share identity with more or less 
people; and we may define the same group (e.g., the nation) more or less inclusively (see 
Chapter 2). We can now take a further step in our quest to understand why and when people 
behave selfishly, or else cooperatively, in a crisis. If solidarity depends upon shared identity 
in a group, and group membership is variably defined, our task becomes one of 
understanding how these definitions come about when disaster strikes. 
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Solidarity is a function of history, context and leadership 
Our discussion of how groups are defined in a disaster links up with general discussions 
we have had about the nature of social identity processes throughout the book thus far — 
notably in Chapter 2 where we discussed the social identity approach, and in Chapter 3 where 
we discussed leadership. Consistent with those discussions, when it comes to understanding 
solidarity, we propose three broad determinants of category definitions: history, 
contemporary context, and leadership. 
In terms of history, communities that prove to be resilient in the face of disasters are 
those characterised by strong and dense pre-existing networks, as well as norms of trust and 
reciprocity. Such networks are related to increased preparedness before disasters (Reininger 
et al., 2013), greater solidarity during disasters (Aldrich, 2017), and improved recovery after 
disasters (Aldrich, 2012). 
However, community and communal solidarity can also emerge spontaneously in the 
immediate context of a crisis, and combine to mobilise solidarity and social support. This can 
be put down to the experience of ‘common fate’ in the face of mortal danger. To some extent, 
everyone faces the same problems both during a disaster and in its aftermath (Ntontis, 2018). 
Survival depends upon everyone pulling together and so the disaster becomes about the 
group, not the individual (Ntontis et al., 2019). Evidence from a range of different disasters in 
different countries (Drury et al., 2018) confirms the link between a sense of shared fate and 
shared social identity, and also between emergent social identity and solidarity. 
The third factor that determines shared identity and solidarity, as discussed in Chapter 
3, is leadership and the language that leaders use. Within this pandemic, we have seen a 
broad range of leadership performance from those (such as Jacinda Ardern in New Zealand 
and Nicola Sturgeon in Scotland) who consistently framed COVID-19 as affecting a broad 
and inclusive national community. In contrast, others (such as Narendra Modi in India and 
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Donald Trump in the U.S.) divided the community, and blamed segments of their country for 
both the disease itself and for their response to it. 
However, good leadership is about more than rhetorical inclusion. It is also about 
implementing the policies which unify people in practice. It involves addressing the huge 
inequalities which mean that we are not all in this together. The destitute, the marginal, and 
the oppressed are far less able to protect themselves from COVID-19, and are consequently 
getting infected and dying at far higher rates. In more affluent countries, wealthier people are 
better able to stay at home than poorer people who need to go out and work (Valentino-
DeVries et al., 2020) — that is if you have a home in the first place. Homeless people cannot 
self-isolate (see also Chapter 17). Maintaining a sense of common cause, of shared identity 
and of solidarity at national and international levels is severely compromised unless leaders 
address these issues.  
Group membership and solidarity are fragile and require long-term investment 
Just like journalists, who descend on a disaster at its height and then generally ignore 
what happens in the aftermath, so researchers tend to concentrate on what happens in 
disasters, not after disasters. But some researchers have taken a longer-term perspective and 
asked the question ‘does the sense of togetherness and solidarity endure over time’? This 
question is critical because often the greatest problems (such as loss of social networks and 
livelihoods) are those that emerge long after the immediate drama of a fire or a flood (or a 
pandemic) has ebbed away (Schonfeld & Demaria, 2015). It is in response to these many 
problems that groups and solidarity are most important — both for practical reasons and also 
to maintain the mental and physical well-being of the community (as discussed in Section C). 
Common fate and leadership are critical in determining solidarity in a disaster, and 
are equally critical in ensuring the persistence of solidarity in its aftermath. Research on a 
flood-hit area 18 months after the disaster showed that inequalities in the post-disaster 
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treatment of different groups and the return of pre-disaster group boundaries undermined any 
sense of common fate (Ntontis et al., 2020; see also Chapter 17). However, this decline is not 
inevitable. The persistence of secondary stressors (to the extent that they are perceived in 
collective terms) and of equitable social support can help maintain shared social identity. 
This can also be actively sustained by regular collective rituals such as commemorative 
events (Norris & Kaniasty, 1996). 
In summary, we have sought to make two main points in this chapter. First, solidarity 
in a crisis like COVID-19 is a function of shared social identity. Second, shared social 
identity is a function of the creation of inclusive social categories — and whether this 
happens depends on history, contemporary context and leadership. But what should those 
tasked with responding to crises — and specifically to pandemics and other health crises — 
actually do? That is what we discuss in Chapter 15. 
 
 Managing Crowds in Crises 
(Holly Carter, Dale Weston & Richard Amlôt) 
 
 
In this chapter, we build upon the general theme of the last — that is, the importance and the 
potential of shared social identity to support the COVID-19 response. However, where 
previously the emphasis was on unity and solidarity between members of the public (e.g., to 
explain helping), here we address relations between the public and authorities or leaders (e.g., 
those seeking to increase compliance with physical distance measures). We argue that the 
consequences of shared identity, which have been shown to be so important in building an 
effective community response to the pandemic — the mutual trust, influence and support — 
are equally important when it comes to community–authority relations. 
Shared social identity between authorities and the public is the key to an effective 
pandemic response 
At one level, shared identity is necessary if people are to trust government and hence 
adhere to the restrictions it puts in place (such as lockdown). At another level, people must be 
willing to listen to officials, to accept the information they provide, and to cooperate with 
them (Carter et al., 2018). For instance, the success of contact tracing relies on people’s 
willingness to reveal their contacts if they test positive for COVID-19. However, shared 
identity between public and authorities is about more than the public obeying instructions 
from authorities and leaders. Compliance will only ensue when authorities respect and trust 
the public. Indeed, as we discussed in Chapter 4, it is only when trust is mutual that it 
becomes possible to formulate, internalise and unite around shared norms concerning health 
protective behaviours (e.g. Carter et al., 2014; 2015).  
Interestingly, these norms are about behaviours that protect the community more than 
the individual. Hence, if successfully implemented, they create a virtuous cascade of effects. 
15 
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When we see others abide by these norms (e.g., staying home despite the temptation to go 
out) we grow in trust for others and our sense of shared identity within our communities is 
strengthened. Moreover, we gain the confidence to challenge those few who violate the 
norms, secure in the belief that we are acting with the support of others. In this way, 
communities self-regulate rather than needing the police to intervene and enforce regulations 
(Drury et al., 2015). 
This means that shared identity between authorities and the public has consequences 
that mirror, and are every bit as important and consequential for the response to COVID-19, 
as shared identity amongst the public itself. However, when we turn from the consequences 
to the antecedents of shared identity we begin to see key difference between community–
community and community–authority relations. While we showed in Chapter 14 that shared 
identification between members of the public can arise spontaneously due to a sense of 
shared fate, the relationship between emergency responders and members of the public is 
more complex. The authorities and the community are self-evidently not in the same boat in a 
disaster. Those in a fire engine and those in a fire have very different experiences, as do those 
deciding on lockdown and those being locked down in this pandemic. As a consequence, the 
relationship between authorities and the public can never be taken for granted. It must always 
be worked on and actively nurtured. A central element in that work has to do with what is 
referred to as procedural justice (Tyler, 2006). 
If authorities treat us with fairness, if their encounters with us display trust and 
respect, and if they listen to us and explain to us how lockdown restrictions are in our 
interests, then they convey to us that — rather than being an alien force imposed upon us — 
we are jointly bound together in partnership. In other words, procedural justice promotes 
shared identity, and therefore all the positive effects described above (Carter et al., 2015). 
Moreover, as our description suggests, one cannot create a sense of procedural justice and 
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hence of partnership without effective communication (e.g., Carter et al., 2018). Accordingly, 
in what follows, we suggest five general principles for interacting with the public during 
major incidents and disasters in order to create shared identity and ensure trust and 
adherence. These principles can also be used to evaluate the performance of authorities in 
crises — such as presented by the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Research supports five key principles for interacting with the public in a crisis 
1. Understand that the way in which responders perceive and manage an incident will affect 
the way in which members of the public behave — and plan accordingly 
Guidance and training for responders and authorities often describes public behaviour 
during mass emergencies in terms of the ‘panic’ perspective described in Chapter 13 (Carter 
& Amlôt, 2016). This can lead responders to view the public with hostility, which alienates 
them, undermines compliance, and produces the very behaviours one is seeking to avoid 
(Carter et al., 2014; 2018). However, as we noted, behaviour in emergencies is often orderly, 
cooperative and constructive. This leads to a very different approach which seeks to support 
and ‘scaffold’ activity rather than to control the public. It is essential that authorities 
understand this and plan accordingly, consulting with behavioural science and 
communication experts throughout the incident.  
Accordingly, the key question to be asked of the COVID-19 response is whether, 
when infection hit, the authorities treated the population as a problem, prone to panic and 
needing to be controlled? Alternatively, did they treat members of the public as partners, 
acknowledging, supporting, and harnessing the multiple forms of mutual aid which 
developed in local communities? In short, did the authorities trust the people?  
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2. Communicate openly and honestly about the nature of an incident, explaining why certain 
actions are (or are not) being taken 
It is vital that authorities communicate openly and honestly with members of the 
public about what actions they are taking to manage an incident, and why they are taking 
those actions (Carter et al., 2018). Openness is another key dimension of procedural justice 
and of building shared identity between responders and the public that encourages adherence 
(Carter et al., 2015b). Conversely, being seen to withhold information (which can result from 
a fear that people will panic if told about the dangers they face) can destroy any sense of 
togetherness and create suspicion between responders and the public. 
Were the authorities open with the public? Did they explain the measures they took to 
control the spread of COVID-19 in the community and make available the scientific advice 
that lay behind them?  If we look at the U.K., the Government has taken the unprecedented 
steps of naming their advisory committees and allowing access to some of the papers which 
describe scientific advice they have received (U.K. Government, 2020). This has won them 
support, but for some people it has not gone far enough (The Guardian, 2020). 
3. Communicate in a timely way 
The way in which the first minutes or hours of an incident are managed will be crucial 
for shaping the subsequent nature of the relationship between authorities and members of the 
public. Authorities should therefore begin communicating immediately and should not wait 
until all information is known before initiating communication. Where information is not yet 
available, this should be explained, and updates should be provided as soon as further 
information becomes available. Regular updates should be provided, even if no new 
information is known. In all these ways, trust is created and maintained. As we saw from 
Chapter 13, timely information about dangers — and hence timely reaction — is critical to 
avoiding fatalities. 
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Did the authorities communicate and respond to the dangers of COVID-19 early 
enough? In a number of countries, the issue of whether governments reacted too slowly has 
been a subject of heated debate. For example, despite officials’ fears that conditions would be 
conducive to COVID-19’s spread, thousands of Valencia soccer supporters were allowed to 
travel to Milan in February 2020 to watch their team play in the Champions League. It is 
highly likely that, after having been in the stadium with 40,000 fans from the Italian city 
Bergamo (a city at the epicentre of Italy’s COVID-19 outbreak), the virus travelled home to 
Spain with the Valencia fans. This at least partly explains the high infection rate in Valencia 
in subsequent weeks (Hawley, 2020). 
4. Explain how taking recommended protective actions will promote public health 
Advice in an emergency must always be concise and precise so that people know 
exactly what behaviours are required of them (Michie et al., 2011). But it is not enough to tell 
people what to do (indeed that can provoke resistance). It is also essential to take people into 
one’s trust and explain to them why these behaviours are necessary and in their own interests 
— or, to be more exact, why they are in the interests of their community (see Chapter 14). 
Accordingly, to bring people on board in a pandemic it is important to provide health-
focussed information which explains how desired actions will reduce risks to health so that 
their loved ones and other members of their community are protected. Conversely, it is 
necessary to explain how proscribed actions will increase risks to loved ones and community 
members (Carter et al., 2015; 2018).  
In the COVID-19 context, was messaging on protective measures sufficiently clear, 
and did it explain the basis for these measures? In Britain, many have argued that the earlier 
advice ‘Stay Home, Protect the NHS, Save Lives’ was clear about what was required and 
clear about the reasons why: to ‘flatten the curve’ of infection and ensure that the health 
service was not overwhelmed. Indeed, in a poll of 6,500 people, 91% reported that they felt 
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the slogan made it clear what they had to do (YouGov, 2020). By contrast, an updated slogan, 
‘Stay Alert, Control the Virus, Save Lives’, unveiled as lockdown measures began to be 
lifted, saw only 30% of respondents in the same survey reporting that they were clear about 
what they were meant to do. 
5. Ensure that members of the public are able to undertake recommended actions 
Motivation may be important, but it is not sufficient to get people to act on advice. 
People must also have the opportunity to do what is asked of them (Michie et al., 2011). 
Telling people to physically distance at work when they are employed in sites where 
distancing is impossible, or to avoid crowding in public transport when they have no other 
means of travel, is likely only to create resentment. This means that authorities must identify 
potential barriers to adherence and empower people to overcome them — through enhanced 
communication, increased physical support, financial measures and so on (Bonell et al., 
2020; see also Chapter 17).  
How such questions are dealt with in different countries is central to whether the 
authorities are seen as guardians or as oppressors in the fight against COVID-19. Indeed, it is 
central to whether societies work together to contain the virus or turn on each other. This is 
an issue we unpack further in the section’s next and final chapter. 
 
 Social Order and Disorder 
(Clifford Stott & Matt Radburn) 
 
 
So far, the chapters in this section have concentrated primarily on the positive side of 
collective behaviour: solidarity with others in the community, and identification with and 
adherence to authority. A sense that ‘we are all in this together’ has led people in many 
countries to accept — even to embrace — a level of surveillance and restriction on personal 
freedom that might ordinarily lead to fury (see also Chapter 4). However, acceptance has not 
been universal. For example, in early April 2020 in Mumbai, migrant workers fought with 
police outside Bandra railway station during a protest against a COVID-19 lockdown 
(Kaonga, 2020). In Chile, conflict developed in protests against lockdown-induced food 
shortages for the poor (Fuentes, 2020). So when and why does such disorder arise, and how 
can governments and police forces act to prevent it? 
Understanding disorder requires an understanding of collective history and culture 
Our first point should be self-evident by now: disorder is not inevitable, even in hard 
times, or when people are deprived of the things which they normally take for granted (such 
as the right to go out for a walk). Nor is disorder a ‘natural’ consequence of collective 
psychology. What we see in this pandemic is what we always see: crowds are rarely violent. 
As we touched on in Chapter 12, when violence does occur, we need to look to the 
interaction between collective conceptions of rights and the nature of government 
interventions: where the former is seen to be trampled by the latter, trouble ensues. 
Studies show that state interventions to control outbreaks of disease can violate 
collective conceptions of rights by being too harsh or poorly targeted (Harrison, 2020). They 
can also do so by being weak, tardy or just plain absent, in ways that indicate a lack of 
concern for whether people live or die. Indeed, a CIA analysis claims that the inability of 
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some nations to provide adequate health care for their population has fuelled insurgencies 
against them (CIA, 2000). 
Looking closer, the specific interventions that provoke conflict are those which 
display insensitivity to specific collective beliefs and cultural norms — often those 
surrounding death. In the 1890s, riots occurred in Egypt and Tashkent due to interference in 
Muslim burial rites (Sahadeo, 2005). During a cholera epidemic in Italy 1910, restrictions on 
traditional modes of burial sparked attacks on health-workers, police and hospitals (Snowden, 
1995).  
Looking closer still, another factor emerges. In these various cases, it was not simply 
that cherished customs were restricted, it was that state intervention was selectively applied. 
The poor were targeted while powerful elites found ways to circumvent restrictions. When 
conflict occurs, the issue of fairness is never far away. And if conflict occurs in a particular 
site (say around burial practices) it is generally because this can be harnessed to highlight a 
range of underlying inequities and grievances (see Chapter 2).  
Taken together, the historical evidence suggests that social disorder arises through the 
relationship between social structural inequalities, collective beliefs and forms of state 
intervention. The lesson for today, as nation states struggle to curtail the spread of COVID-
19, is that any intervention needs to be carefully planned in acknowledgment of underlying 
structural issues, so that these issues are attenuated rather than exacerbated. What then are the 
implications of this for what governments and police should actually do? 
Effective policing requires dialogue, respect, trust and neutrality 
The previous chapter introduced the concept of procedural justice as a central element 
in obedience to authority (Tyler, 2006). The central issue was whether people will listen to 
their authorities and responders. In this chapter, we are primarily interested in how people 
respond to the police. Here, procedural justice is, if anything, even more critical (Maguire et 
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al., 2020) — especially the core proposition that people comply less through fear of 
punishment (‘instrumental compliance’) than because they are convinced that what they are 
being asked to do is the right thing to do (‘normative compliance’, Turner, 1991; see Chapter 
4). In short, the most effective tool the police can have is legitimacy: the sense that they are 
doing the right thing for us. 
Meares (2013) has translated this idea into four general rules that the police should 
observe in all their dealings with the public.  The first is that in their encounters with police 
officers, people value having an opportunity to have ‘voice’ — that is, to put across their own 
view. The second is that people expect police officers to treat them with dignity and respect. 
The third principle is trust: people want the police to display benevolence and be well-
intentioned. The fourth is that people value police neutrality: they want police officers to 
make their decisions based on the ‘facts’ of the situation rather than on the basis of prejudices 
or personal ‘biases’. 
More concretely, during the COVID-19 pandemic the general principles of procedural 
justice and Meares’ four rules have been translated into the ‘Four ‘E’s’ guidance issued by 
the U.K. College of Policing to all U.K. local police forces (College of Policing, 2020). This 
advises police officers that their starting point should be to ‘Engage’ with the public. Then, 
rather than simply issuing instructions, they should ‘Explain’ what they want people to do 
and why. The next step is to ‘Encourage’ people to comply. Only if these dialogue-based 
approaches have been thoroughly tried and have failed should officers even consider turning 
to the more coercive fourth E: ‘Enforce’. 
But on what basis should the police explain their actions and hence encourage (or 
ultimately enforce) compliance? The College of Policing document is explicit on this matter. 
It recommends that people are asked to observe restrictions in order to protect the National 
Health Service and save lives. In other words, the police are to explain that they are acting to 
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protect the health of the public. In this way, policing takes us beyond Meares’ rules and the 
notion of procedural justice as simply about fairness in the abstract and the process of 
interaction. Rather, the key thing is to persuade the people that the police are serving the 
public interest (Reicher & Stott, 2020).  
Taking this argument a step further, the important thing is that the effectiveness of the 
police depends upon being seen by the community as being of the community and acting for 
the community (Radburn & Stott, 2019), both in their style of interaction with the public and 
in the substantive content of what they do and say. It is this combination of being seen as 
both ‘of’ and ‘for’ a community that is critical. One cannot persuasively claim to be acting in 
the interests of the community while treating community members in a way that one would 
not treat ‘us’. Equally, one will gain little credibility by treating community members as ‘us’ 
if most of one’s actions go against community interests (Trinkner et al., 2018).  
Ineffective policing ignores and exacerbates social inequalities 
If policing by consent derives from the police being seen as ‘of us and for us’, the 
corollary is that dissent arises when the police are seen as ‘not of us and against us’. The 
potential for this is ever-present in deeply divided societies, especially given that the 
pandemic, far from being a great leveller, exacerbates those divides (see Chapters 17 andll 
18). As has been stressed throughout this book, lockdown is a very different experience for 
those whose lives are more or less precarious. The same restrictions on going out have very 
unequal impact on people who live in crowded flats or spacious houses with gardens. 
Whether or not the police treat you with respect and with understanding of your situation 
when outdoors can make all the difference in terms of whether or not the incipient divide 
comes out into the open.  
As Tyler has argued, every encounter between a police officer and a member of the 
public is a teachable moment in which whole communities “learn about the law and legal 
15. Managing crowds  117 
authorities” (Tyler, 2012, p. 12). But this moment is not divorced from the wider experience 
of these communities. If it aligns with the sense that ‘we are all in this together’ then it can 
contribute to the preservation of order. If, however, it aligns with the sense that ‘my group 
gets a raw deal’ then it can be the beginnings of social disorder. In short, whether at the 
theoretical level or at the level of the participants’ experience, it is critical to relate what goes 
on in an encounter between the police and a member of the public (especially minority group 
members) to social structural realities and the formation of social identities (Stott & Radburn, 
2020). 
Moreover, every encounter matters because it does not just affect those directly 
involved. A whole community can draw lessons from a single incident. As discussed in 
Chapter 12, an insult to one group member can be experienced as an injury by all and evoke 
anger in all. Characteristically, riots start from an iconic event which is seen to encapsulate 
the various inequalities, indignities and oppressions suffered by the group: the shooting of 
Michael Brown in Ferguson (Lowery, 2016) or of Michael Duggan in Tottenham (Reicher & 
Stott, 2011). Moreover, riots often occur in waves. As the first incident hits the headlines, it 
serves to emphasise collective antagonisms and grievances. Divides that may not previously 
have been at the forefront of consciousness can no longer be ignored. But it is not just that a 
riot can lead members of a common group in different locations to feel a common resentment 
at the police. Also, they often feel more empowered to act, having seen their peers take on the 
police (Stott et al., 2018).  
The lessons here for the current COVID-19 crisis are clear — that there is a real risk 
of sustained social disorder if the policing of the pandemic is insensitive to the structural 
inequalities that divide us.  This is a point that will be explored further in the next chapter. 
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Beware of complacency 
In many ways, this chapter serves as a warning against complacency. In this book we 
have emphasised and celebrated the many positives of group psychology. But even in those 
societies which have been most successful in creating an inclusive sense of shared social 
identity, that accomplishment is fragile. There remain deep divisions in all our societies. The 
potential for those divisions to open up and shatter our hard-won unity against COVID-19 is 
always there. The way the pandemic is policed is critical to that potential and determines 
whether it becomes a reality. For the way we encounter ‘the state’ is generally through our 
encounters with the police. The way we are treated by the police tells us where we stand in 
society; If this treatment confirms the broader injustices to which our group has been 
subjected, then everything falls apart.  
 
 Section E 
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 
 
Hopefully, one day soon we will live in a world where COVID-19 does not dominate every 
aspect of our lives. It is nonetheless clear that when this day comes, the world will have been 
changed dramatically. To understand these changes, we need to explore the role of collective 
processes in determining both how the COVID-19 story unfolds, and the ways the virus is 
contained and responded to. Viruses do not discriminate, but just about every other aspect of 
society does. Everything from a person’s capacity to avoid infection to their likelihood of 
avoiding financial hardship is determined by group-level status and power inequalities, many 
of which are determined by pre-COVID-19 intergroup relations. It is an understanding of 
these power and status dynamics at the collective level that will help us understand the long-
term impact of this pandemic on society and, by extension, the individuals in it. This 
knowledge is also necessary for us to work collectively to craft the best possible future.  
In this final section of the book, we focus first on the effect of pre-existing group-
based inequalities on the COVID-19 response — those between the poor and the wealthy, 
between minorities and majorities, and between the disadvantaged and advantaged (Chapter 
17). We also consider how COVID-19 is likely to shape those relationships. We then outline 
how polarisation and division along ideological lines determine the way that groups respond 
to the immediate challenges that the COVID crisis poses, and how the crisis will impact those 
political rifts (Chapter 18). After this, we explore how COVID-19 has coloured (and will 
continue to colour) our perceptions of specific groups in society (e.g., Asians), triggering new 
forms of intergroup hostility and exacerbating and legitimising some old forms of prejudice 
and stereotyping (Chapter 19). Clearly, solidarity and a sense of shared identity will be 




consequences of the virus. We draw the book to a close with a discussion of how this might 





Social distancing is a privilege. It means you live in a house large enough to practice it. 
Hand washing is a privilege too. It means you have access to running water. Hand 
sanitisers are a privilege. It means you have money to buy them. Lockdowns are a 
privilege. It means you can afford to be at home. Most of the ways to ward the Corona off 
are accessible only to the affluent. In essence, a disease that was spread by the rich as 
they flew around the globe will now kill millions of the poor. (Anonymous Indian doctor, 
cited by Tomazin, 2020) 
 
The poor and the stigmatised in society are more vulnerable to disasters than the affluent and 
privileged. This is not a new observation. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina 
in New Orleans, it became clear that poor and black residents were disproportionately 
affected by the floodwaters. The sociologist Erikson captured this well, observing “The 
portion of the New Orleans population that lives below sea level and the portion that lived 
below the poverty line turned out to be largely the same” (Erikson, 1976, Prologue). 
Accordingly, as the opening quote to this chapter suggests, when it comes to understanding 
whose health and financial situation has been most negatively affected by COVID-19, we 
need to focus on the disadvantaged in society, not the advantaged.  
COVID-19 targets and exacerbates group-based disadvantage  
One powerful explanation of the unequal impact of the virus relates to the resources 
available to the “haves” and the “have-nots”. For example, those on lower wages are less 
likely   to engage in physical distancing, for the simple reason that they are unlikely to be 
able to work from home and unable to avoid crowded public transport when getting to work 





limiting movement was a luxury low-income people were less likely to be able to afford. 
While everyone moved around less once physical distancing measures were introduced, 
wealthier people were more likely to stay at home sooner and more often. This effect was 
most pronounced during the work week, which suggests that this difference was due 
primarily to the fact that people with higher incomes tended to have greater flexibility to 
work from home. More affluent people had a physical distancing “head start” — reducing 
their exposure to the virus at a crucial point in time and hence diminishing their risk of falling 
ill (Valentino-De Vries et al., 2020).  
Moreover, low-income employees are less likely to be in secure employment than 
their high-income counterparts, and less likely to benefit from protective equipment and 
measures that allow them to do their work safely (Scheiber & Conger, 2020). Even if a 
person’s job can hypothetically be done remotely, to work effectively from home one needs 
to have high-speed internet and an appropriate office space. Again, this is more likely to be 
true the more affluent one is (Reeves & Rothwell, 2020). At the household level, a person’s 
wealth determines the extent to which they can stockpile food and other necessities, and 
therefore the frequency with which they need to leave their houses and be exposed to the 
virus (Reeves & Rothwell, 2020). 
In summary, like any disaster, COVID-19 has hit the most vulnerable the hardest. As 
Erikson (1976) notes, simple geography partly explains why the vulnerable end up bearing 
the brunt of natural or human-made disasters:  
Tsunamis do not seek out the poor; the poor are shoved out to those low-lying areas 
where the land meets the sea. Earthquakes do not seek out the ill-housed; they strike 
evenly at all of the structures in their way, but do the most damage to the frailest and 
most shoddily built of them, the ones in which the needy have been invited to live. 
Toxic waters do not seek out the least protected; they are deposited on the same 
parcels of land where the poorly protected, in their turn, have been deposited. 





While this is true, it is important to add that those who are vulnerable do not “find 
themselves” in those vulnerable places by accident. Indeed, the poor have not been 
‘deposited’ on dangerous dumping grounds through sheer back luck. To understand what put 
and kept them there, we need to understand the dynamics of intergroup power and status that 
legitimise and consolidate their disadvantage (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As Ashwin Vasan, a 
public-health professor at Columbia University observed about COVID-19, “People want to 
talk about this virus as an equal opportunity pathogen, but it’s really not … It’s going right to 
the fissures in our society” (cited in Valentino-De Vries et al., 2020).  
In short, the harm caused by COVID-19 differs as a function of status and power 
inequalities in any given society. The more division there is, the more harm it does.  
Group-level disadvantage compromises health and hence resistance to COVID-19 
While economic inequality limits the ability of those at the bottom of a status 
hierarchy to materially protect themselves against COVID-19, there is another reason why it 
is the poor, the stigmatised and minorities who are most vulnerable to the virus. This relates 
to the oft-observed social gradient in health whereby people are more likely to be healthy and 
less likely to have underlying health conditions if they are more affluent, white, and living in 
a Western country (Haslam et al., 2018; Marmot, 2015). In the context of COVID-19, this 
means, for example, that because pre-existing health conditions such as diabetes, respiratory 
conditions and heart disease are more prevalent in disadvantaged groups, it is more likely that 
members of those groups will be harmed (and killed) by the virus (Reeves & Rothwell, 
2020).  
Why do the disadvantaged have chronically poorer health than the advantaged? There 
are a number of reasons, the most obvious being that poverty reduces people’s access to 




discussion). From a social identity perspective, what is particularly relevant is that 
disadvantage typically goes hand in hand with being the target of stigma (Jetten et al., 2017). 
This means that the negative effects of disadvantage on health are partly grounded in group-
based discrimination and exclusion on the basis of group membership (Paradies et al., 2015; 
Schmitt et al., 2014). Because of this, we expect that membership of stigmatized groups (e.g., 
those centring on ethnicity and social class), will have its own independent negative impact 
on people’s ability to cope with COVID-19. For example, it is clear that in the U.S. a 
combination of poverty, discrimination, and low-quality care serves to create ‘a perfect 
storm’ for African-Americans following COVID-19 infection. In the state of Louisiana this 
has meant that while African-Americans constitute just a third of the general population they 
have suffered more than 70 per cent of COVID-related deaths (ABC News, 2020).  
Inequality will almost certainly increase in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis 
It is not just that infection rates differ for the haves and the have-nots. The longer-
term economic consequences of COVID-19 will also vary widely for those in different socio-
economic groups. As Torsten Bell of the Resolution Foundation noted, “the virus doesn’t 
discriminate between people but the accompanying economic shock certainly does” (The 
Economist, 2020). 
 There is good evidence that, in the aftermath of most disasters, inequality (i.e., the 
gap between the poorest and the wealthiest in society; Jetten et al., 2017) increases and 
deepens. For example, research showed that in the years following the disastrous flooding of 
the Brisbane River in 2011, the difference in annual income between those on low and 
middle incomes increased by AU$7,000 a year (Ulubasoglu, 2020). The reasons for this 
intensification of inequality are complex; one is that lower-income workers are most likely to 
be temporarily unemployed because of a disaster (e.g., in the case of COVID-19 those in the 




this time. Furthermore, employees on casual contracts and with little job security are more 
likely to be without income for a considerable period. Lower-income earners are also less 
likely to be insured for disasters and, consistent with Erikson’s (1976) reasoning, are more 
likely to live in hazard-prone areas. This means that they are not only more likely to be 
harder hit by a disaster but also likelier to have limited means to recover from it. In contrast, 
those on full-time contracts and with higher incomes are likely to be less affected. Indeed, 
sometimes they may even benefit financially from disaster (e.g., because lobbying enhances 
the likelihood that financial support systems will be developed with them in mind; Beaini & 
Ulubasoglu, 2019). 
Group-based inequality undermines social solidarity 
The foregoing discussion suggests that economic dynamics are often a key cause of 
deepened income inequality following disasters. In the case of COVID-19, for example, it 
seems likely the businesses and communities that benefit most from financial recovery 
packages will be those that are most prosperous (Kristof, 2020; Ulubasoglu, 2020). 
Importantly, these dynamics are also partly psychological; social identity theorising suggests 
that they will often be grounded in collective-level processes and intergroup relations. This is 
because some of the key defining features of communities and countries experiencing high 
levels of economic inequality are low in cohesiveness and characterised by strong ‘us-versus-
them’ dynamics (Jetten et al., 2017; Jetten & Peters, 2019; see also Chapter 18). Furthermore, 
with high inequality comes low trust and high competitiveness — both ingredients that 
undermine a coordinated response to a disaster.  
As we saw in Section C, whether a community bands together or falls apart in the face 
of a disaster depends very much on whether people have a strong sense of shared identity 
before the disaster (Muldoon et al., 2019). In the context of a contagious virus where the 




likely to be especially important (Rao & Greve Insead, 2018). Given its capacity to 
undermine trust, pre-existing inequality will be one of the key determinants of whether chaos 
or solidarity prevails in the wake of disaster.  
Practically speaking, does this mean that communities and societies with high levels 
of inequality are doomed and that, by definition, they will be more harmed by COVID-19 
both in the immediate and the longer term? No. High inequality does not determine 
outcomes, but is instead an obstacle in the path to recovery. Accordingly, even though 
inequality is often deeply embedded in societal structures and therefore not easily reduced, it 
is instructive to consider ways in which its negative effects on solidarity, trust, and 
community cohesion can be countered.  The lessons of previous sections on how building 
shared social identity can enhance effective leadership, social connectedness, and solidarity 
in the face of the pandemic are critical when developing policy around these issues.  
This recommendation to focus on building group-based ties sits well with the 
conclusions of Rao and Greve Insead (2018). In their analysis of community resilience in the 
aftermath of the Spanish flu, they conclude that, because contagious diseases undermine 
cooperation in society, rebuilding needs to focus on boosting community cooperation and 
identification:  
The typical response to pandemics includes isolation and treatment, home quarantines, 
closure of schools, cancellation of large-scale public meetings, and other steps to reduce 
social density. While these immediate responses are entirely practical, policy planners 
should also consider how a pandemic impairs the social infrastructure of a community 
over the long term, and undertake initiatives to foster the building of community 
organizations. After all, if it is sociable communities that survive disasters by helping 
themselves, investments in enhancing the social infrastructure of communities too merit 
consideration.  
(Rao & Greve Insead, 2018, p. 21)  
We could not agree more. 
 Polarisation 
Charlie R. Crimston & Hema Preya Selvanathan  
 
 
This virus is dangerous. It exploits cracks between us. … Take as an example, ideology, 
or in one country it could be the differences along party lines. It exploits that. That’s why 
I said we need national unity and whoever has whatever ideology — whether that person 
is from left or right or centre — they should work together to fight this virus to save these 
real people. If we don’t do that, this virus will stay longer with us to kill more people and 
we will lose more precious lives. (Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General 
of the World Health Organization; World Health Organization, 2020) 
 
On the surface, a global pandemic is not an ideological issue. However, in many parts of the 
world, political ideology was key to how individuals and nations viewed, discussed, and 
responded to COVID-19. There are at least two ways in which political division and 
polarisation might shape our individual and collective responses to the COVID-19 crisis. 
First, partisan differences might slow a society’s response to COVID-19. Second, perceived 
political polarisation can contribute to a breakdown in the fabric of society. This may shape 
not only individual protective behaviours, but also the nature of post-COVID-19 society. We 
will unpack these two points in turn.  
Partisan differences create us-versus-them dynamics which undermine effective 
responses to disaster  
As COVID-19 began to spread across the globe, political ideology and partisan splits 
influenced the way that many world leaders responded to the crisis, and the extent to which 
ordinary citizens viewed the virus as a real and present threat. For example, at a political rally 
in February, U.S. President Donald Trump declared: “The Democrats are politicizing the 
coronavirus. You know that, right? Coronavirus. They're politicizing it” (Bump, 2020). In 





isolation guidelines, President Jair Bolsonaro downplayed the threat of the virus and 
threatened to fire members of his cabinet who dissented (leading two of his health ministers 
to resign; Sandy & Milhorance, 2020).  
As the pandemic unfolded, the fact that leaders in some countries blamed political 
rivals for using alarmist language served to accentuate pre-existing ‘us-versus-them’ 
dynamics. This was perhaps most obvious in the U.S., where political polarisation was 
already on the rise, and where the looming Presidential election was a focus for divergent 
party interests (Schaeffer, 2020). As a result, a threat that was initially not political became 
political.  
The dynamic can be understood in terms of the fit principle articulated within self-
categorisation theory (Oakes et al., 1994; see Chapter 2). More specifically, framing the 
threat of COVID-19 as an ‘us-versus-them’ issue increased the likelihood that people would 
perceive the virus through the lens of their political affiliation. In the U.S., Democrats and 
Republicans thus came to view the threat very differently as they converged on attitudes and 
beliefs that were (seen to be) consistent with divergent ingroup norms. In particular, 
Democrats prioritised health and well-being, whereas Republicans prioritised individual 
freedom and economic growth. Amongst other things, this meant that Democrats were more 
concerned about the virus (Butchireddygari, 2020). For example, data collected by the Pew 
Research Center in March indicated that while 59% of Democrat voters viewed COVID-19 
as a major threat to the U.S. population, the same was true for only 33% of Republicans 
(Scanlan, 2020). 
Such polarisation is consequential because it fuels intergroup tensions and conflict; in 
countries like the U.S., an issue which arguably should not have been viewed through an 
ideological lens came to divide people along political lines — precisely at a time they 




Problems were compounded by the fact that partisan perceptions of the virus also 
affected people’s health-related behaviour. In the U.S., this is demonstrated by smartphone 
location data which showed that people in Republican-dominated regions were much less 
likely to practice physical distancing than those in Democrat regions, even after controlling 
for state policies, population density, and local COVID-19 cases and deaths (Allcott et al., 
2020).  
In these different ways, it is apparent that polarisation and partisan bickering 
contributed to a slowed response to COVID-19 in countries like the U.S. (Van Bavel, 2020). 
As well as leading some people not to take adequate precautions, this also led others to 
campaign actively against preventative measures (e.g., in demonstrations to end the 
lockdown). These campaigns not only took a toll on social cohesion but also cost lives.  
Polarisation promotes the breakdown of social fabric  
While partisan differences no doubt slowed COVID-19 responses in a number of 
countries, the actual levels of polarisation in society are only half the story. The extent to 
which people perceive there to be polarisation in their society is also important. Indeed, there 
is evidence that the perceived level of polarisation is a stronger predictor of negative 
outcomes than actual polarisation (Enders & Armaly, 2019). More specifically, higher 
perceived polarisation in society has been linked to reduced intergroup trust, efficacy, and 
altruism, as well as to increased outgroup hostility, selfishness, and competition (Arvan, 
2019; Enders & Armaly, 2019). This negative impact on societal trust is robust across 
cultures (Rapp, 2016) and seems to increase in times of uncertainty (Sherman et al., 2009).   
In times of crisis, the effects of polarisation can create a tipping point for societies 
whose cohesion is chronically damaged. If people perceive their society to be polarised, they 
are more likely to think that it is breaking down (i.e., so that they are in a state of anomie; 




or their fellow citizens to do the right thing. Social identity theorising suggests that this in 
turn will make them less likely to want to do the right thing by their community. So at a time 
when what is really needed is social solidarity, one is likely instead to see a society where 
“everyone is out for themselves” (see also Section C). 
We tested this prediction in the context of COVID-19. In line with the social identity 
analysis outlined above, we expected that higher perceived polarisation might lead 
individuals to engage in personally self-protective behaviours — that is, behaviours intended 
to minimise their own risk of being infected with the virus (e.g., avoiding crowds and public 
spaces, washing hands more frequently; see Figure 7). At the end of March 2020, we 
surveyed 1000 adults across the U.S. and the U.K. to gauge their sense of the level of 
political polarisation in their society and their attitudes towards the COVID-19 crisis. We 
found that people who perceived there to have been political polarisation within their country 
over the past 10 years were more likely to believe that their government had responded in a 
chaotic and disorganised manner to the COVID-19 crisis. In other words, perceived 
polarisation predicted a sense of COVID-related anomie. As predicted, this anomie was 
associated with an increase in self-protective behaviour. Essentially, people who recalled a 
history of political division in their society were more likely to see a society in chaos during 
the pandemic, and to believe that to survive this pandemic, they needed to assume an 
individualistic stance in which they took responsibility for protection from the virus into their 






Figure 7. The effects of perceived polarisation  
Note: Perceived political polarisation enhances the perception that the government’s response 
to COVID-19 was chaotic and disorganized (i.e., anomie). In turn, this is associated with 
(a) an increase in self-protective behaviours (that may slow the spread of the virus) and 
(b) more negative expectations about the future of society. 
 
Engaging in more self-protective behaviours in the face of COVID-19 may have been 
a good thing in so far as it served to reduce the spread of the virus. However, perceived 
political polarisation and anomie are likely to have other more negative long-term 
consequences. If people feel that their country has been politically divided, this does not bode 
well for their collective future (Liu & Hilton, 2005). Consistent with this supposition, we 
found that our respondents’ perceptions of political polarisation prior to COVID-19 were 
indirectly associated with them having more negative expectations about the post-COVID-19 
future. As with self-protective behaviours, this was driven by a heightened sense of anomie. 
More specifically, respondents’ negative expectations included doubts about the future 
vitality of their country and its economy, and increased pessimism about the future of 
humanity as a whole. So not only does seeing one’s country as politically divided in the past 
make you feel that society is breaking down in the present but it also makes you concerned 




Political polarisation can be overcome by building a strong sense of “us” 
The foregoing analysis suggests that COVID-19 represents not only a health crisis, 
but also a political one — at least in those societies where it serves to accentuate pre-existing 
divisions. What, then, can societies do to overcome political polarisation? While political 
division and polarisation are not new, to overcome a crisis of this scale it is essential for 
groups to unite at a superordinate level. As discussed in Section B, when making crucial 
decisions, leaders need to fix their eyes firmly on the well-being of their citizens, not their 
own political survival. Saving lives depends on political leaders and authorities taking quick 
and coordinated action, but this is only possible if partisan differences are put to one side (a 
conclusion also endorsed by The Lancet, 2020). As we saw in Chapter 3, this means that 
leaders need to engage in effective identity leadership by emphasising that they speak for, 
and act on behalf of, all citizens regardless of their political loyalties (see also Chapters 7 & 
20).  
Fortunately, in the context of the COVID-19 crisis there were many instances of 
effective identity leadership that were not hampered by ideological squabbles or fractured 
politics. For example, Singapore has long been ruled by a single political party that maintains 
tight control over citizens and mass media (Barron, 2020). This fact (and the associated 
absence of partisan divisions) appears to have helped Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 
immediately set in motion a coordinated and effective government response (albeit one 
whose focus on the Singaporean ingroup neglected the circumstances of migrant workers, 
whose poor living conditions later became a site for major outbreaks of infection; Yea, 2020).  
However, effective responses to COVID-19 have not been confined to authoritarian 
and one-party states. There have also been clear demonstrations of bipartisan unity in strong 
democracies with multiple major political parties. This was seen when the Dutch Prime 




the sitting health minister collapsed from exhaustion and later resigned (Holroyd, 2020). It 
was also seen in South Africa, where all 14 political parliamentary parties worked together to 
develop measures aimed at mitigating the spread of the virus. According to President Cyril 
Ramaphosa, they “agreed that regardless of our political persuasions, our political 
differences, all of us share a common desire to keep our people safe” (Powell, 2020). 
Likewise, New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, reacted quickly to curb the spread 
of the virus, repeatedly calling for cross-party unity to defeat COVID-19 (Duncan, 2020). 
This call for unity was reflected in the words of her primary political opponent, the leader of 
New Zealand’s National Party:  
Today we could look backward at what's been done well and perhaps not so well. It is 
not a time for that. We are where we are and we are all in this together. And today on 
the big questions, in this House and in New Zealand we agree, there’s no National or 
Labour, or Green or ACT or New Zealand First, just New Zealanders. (Bridges, 2020) 
This is a model that other nations would have been wise to follow. Certainly, we imagine it is 
the preferred model for the many thousands of New Zealanders who might otherwise have 
lost their lives in the pandemic.      
 
 
 Prejudice and Discrimination 
 
(Yuen J. Huo) 
 
 
For the people that are now out of work because of the important and necessary 
containment policies, for instance the shutting down of hotels, bars and restaurants, 
money will soon be coming to you! The onslaught of the Chinese Virus is not your fault! 
Will be stronger than ever! (Donald J. Trump on Twitter; Coleman, 2020) 
 
It’s not racist at all. No, not at all. It comes from China, that’s why. It comes from China. 
I want to be accurate. (Donald J. Trump, White House Coronavirus Task Force News 
Briefing; Forgey, 2020) 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought about profound changes in the way individuals around 
the world conduct themselves in their daily lives. One of the more marked changes is the 
sudden spike in overt hostility toward those perceived as “outsiders”. In particular, because 
the spread of COVID-19 started in central China, much of that prejudice has been directed 
towards the Chinese and, by association, Asians. Indeed, this prejudice has itself spread like a 
virus around the globe and is particularly evident in the United States. Prior to 2020, 
President Donald Trump directed his virulent form of nativist politics toward the most 
vulnerable immigrant group at the time, the Latinx community, calling for a border wall 
along the U.S.-Mexico border and seeking to deport undocumented migrants from Mexico 
and other nations in Latin America. However, as the above quotes attest, the COVID-19 
pandemic has redirected Trump’s antipathy (and that of his supporters) toward a different 
racial minority group — Asians. 
COVID-19 awakened dormant group-based prejudices   
 Historically, concerns about contagion have enhanced xenophobia toward foreigners 
(Rao & Greve Insead, 2018). More generally, fear of the unknown has the capacity not only 
19 
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to inspire new forms of bigotry, but also to foment prejudices that have lain dormant for some 
time. Especially in times of national distress and uncertainty, outgroups that in better times 
were viewed in largely positive (albeit rather stereotypical) ways can come to be portrayed in 
decidedly negative and indeed, sinister terms. In 14th century Europe, Jews were treated as 
scapegoats for supposedly carrying the black plague that raced from Asia through the Middle 
East and Europe. Even after the pandemic was over, they were still persecuted on the basis of 
false claims that they had helped to spread the illness. Consistent with this reasoning, studies 
have demonstrated that when dominant groups (e.g., white Canadians, men in STEM) are 
exposed to demographic projections which suggest that they will become a numerical 
minority, they feel angrier and more fearful of racial minorities (Outten et al., 2012) and less 
tolerant of these groups (Danbold & Huo, 2017).  
The response to COVID-19 in the U.S. provides a clear example of how the sudden 
onset of acute threat can unleash latent feelings of prejudice. For Asian-Americans, there had 
been numerous examples of such “prejudice following crisis” in the country’s past. In 
particular, during World War II, Japanese Americans were forcibly relocated to internment 
camps by the U.S. government. In recent decades, such blatant discrimination had abated — 
with attitudes shifting so that Asian-Americans were seen less as threatening outsiders, and 
instead as a model minority (Takaki, 2012). Yet despite these developmental shifts in 
sentiment, it took just a few weeks for anti-Asian sentiment to be revived during the COVID-
19 crisis.  
Similar dynamics can be observed in India. Even though Indian minorities played no 
part in the spread of the virus into the country, here too minorities have found themselves 
increasingly under attack. In the context of long-standing conflict between Hindus and 
Muslims, the majority group Hindus have used the COVID-19 crisis to legitimise prejudice 
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and hostility towards the Muslim minority. For example, Ellis-Petersen and Rahman (2020) 
report that:  
In Mangalore this week, posters started appearing that said Muslims were no longer 
allowed in certain neighbourhoods. “No Muslim trader will be allowed access to our 
hometown until the coronavirus is completely gone,” read a sign in Alape. In the Hindu-
dominated village of Ankanahalli, a video … shows Mahesh, the village panchayat 
president, issuing a warning that if any Hindu in the village is caught fraternising with a 
Muslim “you will be fined 500 to 1,000 rupees”. 
 The speed with which blatant expressions of prejudice against minorities have 
resurged in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic has taken many by surprise. However, 
closer analysis suggests that the ingredients for hostility were always present. In the case of 
Asians, the rise in overt prejudice piggy-backed on the myth of the model minority, which 
was rooted in the view that Asians are high-achieving, hardworking, and accommodating 
(Fiske et al., 2002). While these attributes are positive, they nevertheless represent 
stereotypes that overlook individual and subgroup differences within the group (Chao et al., 
2013). Moreover, the meaning of these stereotypes can be reshaped in ways that construe 
them as threats to “ordinary” Americans or Europeans (Oakes et al., 1994). For example, in 
the context of the massive job losses that have resulted from COVID-19, “high-achieving” 
and “hardworking” may be framed as a manifestation of Asian-Americans’ desire to 
outcompete white Americans or Europeans for the limited jobs that remain. 
As a result of these resurgent attitudes, the COVID-19 pandemic has separated those 
with Asian backgrounds from their fellow nationals along a dormant fault-line — this mental 
division implies that the Asian minority is foreign, or at least less American or European, 
than whites (Zou & Cheryan, 2017). Indeed, in the U.S., assessments of both explicit and 
implicit attitudes show that Asian-Americans are viewed not only as less American than other 
racial groups, but also as less American than whites from other nations (Devos & Banaji, 
2005).  
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 This activation of longstanding foreigner stereotypes is consequential. Shortly after 
President Trump repeatedly referred to COVID-19 as the “Chinese” virus, there was a sudden 
rise in anti-Asian prejudice and hostility. In the first two weeks of launching a website to 
track anti-Asian discrimination on March 19, 2020, Asian and Pacific Islander advocacy 
coalition A3PCON documented over 1000 incidents (Jeung, 2020). These incidents ranged 
from verbal and physical attacks to subtler bias, such as an emergency physician’s account of 
noticing people covering their nose and mouth when they passed him in the hospital hallways 
(Tavernise & Oppel, 2020). Significantly, reports indicate that this hostility was largely 
directed toward non-Chinese people — highlighting the tendency for people to view Asian-
Americans of different ethnicities as interchangeable (Flores & Huo, 2013), which leaves a 
much larger group vulnerable to race-based attack. In a context that was framed as “them” 
threatening “us”, the outgroup was large and undifferentiated.          
Deviation from a group prototype explains prejudice 
 To understand these patterns of growing intolerance towards minorities, it is useful to 
consider how COVID-19 has triggered social identity concerns specific to the dominant 
groups in society.  It is important to consider that, in nations that are diverse in dimensions of 
race, ethnicity, religion, or language, the dominant group holds not just disproportionate 
power and status, but also defines the norms of the shared identity against which all members 
are evaluated. According to the Ingroup Projection Model, all subgroups (including 
minorities) are evaluated against this norm, and the extent to which they fit the normative 
expectations of the group (and are thus prototypical of the group) determines their acceptance 
by the dominant group (Wenzel et al., 2007). The more that a subgroup deviates from the 
norms of the shared social category, the more negatively they are evaluated. Members of 
these groups are also denied access to resources, rights, and respectful treatment (Huo, 2002). 
In contrast, when a group is, in essence, the prototype of the shared social category, its 
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members are evaluated positively. For example, as the most powerful racial group in the 
U.S., whites are widely regarded as fitting the prototype of Americans (Devos & Banaji, 
2005), and they are therefore judged more positively than other racial groups.  
 Second, in response to perceived threat, the desire among dominant groups to draw 
the line between who is normative and who is divergent is intensified. The pretext of “being 
different” from the larger group’s prototype (and thus the norms that the group holds dear) is 
used as justification for enhanced group-based discrimination and exclusion. Accordingly, in 
the U.S., when primed with information about their group’s numerical decline, whites report 
higher levels of prototypicality threat. That is, they become anxious that the association 
between being white and being American is unravelling (Danbold & Huo, 2015). There is 
evidence that this threat is experienced by dominant group members as a challenge to their 
social identity. Specifically, a number of studies demonstrate that a cultural change toward a 
more complex and inclusive national identity (which potentially challenges the prototype of 
the group and associated group norms) drives a rise in prejudice and hostility toward 
immigrants and racial minorities (Danbold & Huo, 2015).  
There are reasons to believe that these dynamics have intensified in the face of 
COVID-19. Here, the resurgence of the “Asians as foreign” stereotype has amplified 
delineations of who is a “true” American or European (whites) and who is not (Asians). In 
short, because this minority is seen as falling short of the prototype that characterizes ingroup 
identity, it becomes easier for members of the dominant group to justify not just feeling 
negative about its members, but also acting aggressively toward them. “They” are no longer 
part of “us”. Perhaps “they” never were. 
 It is a mistake, however, to assume that there is anything natural or inevitable about 
this process. In particular, as we saw in Section B, leaders play an active and critical role in 
defining the contours and norms of ingroup identity (Reicher et al., 2019). This means leaders 
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can either legitimise prejudice against groups they define as threats to the ingroup, or else 
take steps to discredit any such prejudice. During the COVID-19 crisis the former process has 
been prominent in the U.S., where President Trump provided a lightning rod for the negative 
feelings that some of his supporters already held toward Asian-Americans. 
Nevertheless, other country’s leaders went out of their way to model inclusion. For 
example, in Australia, Prime Minister Scott Morrison reacted angrily to reports of anti-
Chinese hostility by pointing to ways in which Chinese-Australians had been exemplary 
members of the larger Australian community: 
The Chinese-Australian community did an amazing job in those early days of the spread 
of the coronavirus. They have been an early example to the rest of the country…. They 
showed all Australians back then how to do this. I want to thank them very, very much 
for the example they set in those early phases. (Fang et al., 2020) 
Rather, then, than portraying minority ingroup members as a prototypicality threat, Morrison 
portrayed them instead as prototypicality models.  
Prejudice harms its targets  
 The immediate outcomes of enhanced prejudice and discrimination are clear. The 
experiences of Asians, long stereotyped as “foreign” (at least in Western nations), have 
shifted from simply being reduced to a model minority to becoming the target of escalating 
micro-aggressions and even outright hostility. This stigma and discrimination inevitably takes 
its toll on individuals. Experiences with group-based discrimination are reliably associated 
with a heightened stress response, both physical and psychological (Haslam et al., 2018; 
Matheson & Anisman, 2012). This can lead to a cascade of adverse health outcomes, from 
depression to obesity and cardiovascular disease (Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2009; see also 
Chapter 17).  
The COVID-19 pandemic has enhanced not only xenophobia toward foreigners but 
also prejudice and hostility toward fellow citizens. It is clear that if this goes unchecked, 
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prejudice and intergroup hostility will ultimately have a corrosive effect on the fabric of 
society. While there is widespread consensus that we must do everything we can to counter 
attempts to associate COVID-19 with particular groups of people or places, the key question 
that remain are not just how to reduce prejudice, but how to work together to build a better 
society. This is the question that our next, and final, chapter focusses on. 
 Common Identity and Humanity 
 (John F. Dovidio, Elif G. Ikizer, Jonas R. Kunst, & Aharon Levy) 
 
 
Wearing a mask is a sign of respect (New York Governor Andrew Cuomo, May 12th 
2020) 
 
In the first chapter of this book, we discussed the importance of groups with a quote from 
Andrew Cuomo: “It's not about me it's about we. Get your head around the we concept”. 
Now, in this final chapter, we start with another quotation from the New York Governor 
illustrating why the ‘we concept’ (what we would call social identity) is so important.  
Responding to COVID-19 is about harnessing the positive side of group psychology 
If you make wearing masks a sign of concern for others in the group (a ‘we’ thing), it 
becomes a symbol of mutual care and brings people together. However, if you make it about 
individual beliefs and preferences (an ‘I’ thing), the mask becomes a symbol of division and 
a site of conflict. That has been happening across the U.S., as those who insist on their right 
to wear masks clash with those who insist on their right not to wear masks (Noor, 2020). It is 
what led Cuomo to make his remarks. It is also what led another Governor — the Republican 
Governor of North Dakota, Doug Burgum — to implore citizens not to make masks “a 
senseless dividing line” between people. He continued: “We’re all in this together and there’s 
only one battle we’re fighting, and that’s the battle of the virus” (cited by Pengelly, 2020). 
But this issue of mask wearing is not simply a matter of ‘we’ good, ‘I’ bad. It is also 
an issue of how we define the ‘we’ — or to put it more formally, an issue of how we define 
the groups to which we belong. Instead of the ‘we’ referencing all citizens, it can become a 
matter of ‘freedom-loving Conservatives’ versus ‘public health-concerned Liberals’, in which 
case there is no unity and consensus. Rather, all that one has achieved is collectivised 
20 
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division, rooted in a set of entrenched differences, and hence made more bitter and 
intractable. 
This encapsulates a tension that has run throughout this book. How can we harness 
the positives of group psychology — solidarity, social support, psychological resilience — 
without invoking the negatives — division, hatred, conflict? We will start by summarising 
what has been learnt thus far about these issues before offering a way forward based on what 
we know about the creation of common identity. 
Three lessons emerge from research on intergroup relations  
Lesson 1: Threat makes social identity salient and so increases solidarity, cooperation and 
norm compliance within the group. 
Whatever else people might differ on, few would disagree that we face a life and 
death struggle against COVID-19. In the first paragraph of Chapter 1, the figures quoted were 
some 4 million infections and a quarter of a million deaths. That was when the writing 
started. In the few weeks during which this book has been written, the figure of infections has 
risen by one and a half million, the figure of deaths by one hundred thousand. Whoever we 
are and wherever we are, COVID-19 represents an existential threat to us all.  
If there one thing that psychologists agree on, even if they sometimes differ on why, it 
is that threats from outside the group strengthen the salience of social identity (Chapter 7). 
Within the group, increased social identity salience leads to increased social support, 
solidarity and adherence to group norms. As we saw in Chapter 11, threatened groups that 
were already highly cohesive become even more cohesive and, even where there was no 
previous sense of community, it can often emerge as, “together, we face up to a common 
threat”. Such loyalty, altruism, community organisation and conformity are crucial in helping 
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us to surmount the psychological and practical problems of a dangerous and uncertain world 
(Hogg et al., 2017; Kunst et al., 2019). This is group psychology at its best. 
Lesson 2: Threat consolidates group boundaries and so increases exclusion between groups 
A fundamental premise of the social identity approach is that you cannot have an ‘us’ 
without a ‘them’ — for (as we outlined in Chapter 2) how can we have a sense of who we are 
without contrasting it to those we are not? So, if one strengthens group boundaries, one 
increases the exclusion of outgroup members as surely as one increases the inclusion of 
ingroup members.  
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that one is always negative towards the 
outgroup (Jetten et al., 2004). For example, scientists may not be poets but that does not 
mean that they hate, or are in conflict with poets. But it does mean that scientists are less 
likely to offer poets the positives (e.g., solidarity and cooperation) which they extend to 
fellow ingroup members (Reicher et al., 2008). 
However, if we see others as a part of the threat to us — especially when it is an existential 
threat — then the withdrawal of kindness to outgroups can quickly escalate to active cruelty 
(Reicher et al., 2008; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). When Jewish people were defined as the 
source of the plague, where Muslims are seen as the source of COVID-19 in India or Asian-
Americans were blamed in the U.S., then ‘their’ destruction can be justified in the name of 
‘our’ preservation (see Chapter 19). This is group psychology at its worst. 
Lesson 3: Whether we see the best of the worst of group psychology depends upon how 
inclusively or exclusively we define our ingroups and outgroups 
If group threat leads both to solidarity within the group and to exclusion — or even 
conflict — between groups, then whether we see the best or the worst of group psychology 
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turns on the question of how broadly or narrowly the ingroup is defined. That, in turn, is 
dependent on how the threat is defined.  
If threat is seen to stem from groups within the nation, then national unity will be 
impossible to achieve and domestic conflict will prevail instead. This could be because a 
particular national minority is accused of being responsible for the disease (as with the notion 
of ‘Corona-jihadism’ in India which puts blame on Muslims). However, it could also be 
because the threat is understood to be not the virus itself or but rather the response to the 
virus — and that is blamed on political opponents (as in President Trump’s call to ‘liberate’ 
states from lockdown by Democratic Governors). 
If threat is seen to stem from other nations, then international unity will be impossible 
to achieve and it will be much harder to overcome the pandemic. As Salisbury and Patel 
(2020) argue: “responding to Coronavirus needs clarity of global leadership that arches over 
national interests and is capable of mobilizing resources at a time when economies are facing 
painful recessions”. 
If, however, the threat is defined as the virus itself, and as pitting a non-human source 
against all of humanity, then there is the possibility of developing what Tajfel and Turner 
(1979) called the ‘superordinate level of categorisation’. That is, instead of dividing people 
into different social categories, humanity as a whole can be constituted as a single category 
(see also Chapter 7). If that happens, then anyone’s suffering becomes my own and we have 
the prospect of harnessing the best without risking the worst of group psychology.  
Overcoming COVID-19 depends on developing a sense of common identity  
The crux of our argument is that the best way of harnessing intra-group solidarity 
without incurring inter-group conflict is to create the broadest and most inclusive ingroups. 
This idea aligns very much with Gaertner and Dovidio’s common ingroup identity model. A 
central premise of this model is that intergroup hostility can be reduced if group members 
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recategorise those who would otherwise be seen as outgroup members as ingroup members 
within an inclusive superordinate category (Gaertner et al., 2016). This can happen, for 
example, when people who are seen as outgroups on the basis of race or ethnicity are re-
categorised in terms of a shared national identity.  
Moreover, research within the common ingroup identity perspective confirms and 
extends many of the other core points made in this book. When members of previously 
divided groups come to see themselves as members of a common superordinate category, 
then erstwhile foes can become fellows. We feel closer to those we once excluded, 
experience greater empathy for them, engage in greater self-disclosure, and are more 
accepting and charitable (Dovidio & Banfield, 2015; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; Levine & 
Thompson, 2004). For example, increasing the salience of Jewish students’ “human identity,” 
in contrast to their “Jewish identity,” has been found to enhance their perceptions of 
similarity between Jews and Germans, as well as their willingness to work constructively 
with German students (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). 
The critical question, of course, is how this sense of common ingroup identity can be 
achieved. This again is a question we have discussed throughout the book, and again the 
common ingroup identity model provides answers that both confirm and extend previous 
arguments. On the one hand, it is possible to draw on historically established superordinate 
memberships (e.g., as members of the same local community, organization, nation or indeed 
as global citizens confronting shared global challenges such as climate change and the fires, 
floods and droughts it brings across the globe). On the other hand, it is possible to create new 
inclusive identities forged by common fate or by interdependence in the face of a shared loss 
or a mutual enemy. 
What is more, as argued in Chapter 3, the role of leadership is critical. Whether it be a 
matter of invoking the relevance of pre-existing categories or of highlighting our 
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interdependence in a dangerous world, leaders mediate between the nature of the world we 
live in and our understanding of who we are within it. Consider, for instance, the words of 
European Council President, Charles Michel (cited in Barry, 2020): “This pandemic is 
putting our societies under serious strain. The well-being of each E.U. member state depends 
on the well-being of the whole of the E.U.. We are all in this together”. His argument centres 
on the economic interdependence of the individual member states in the E.U.: one fails, all 
are in danger. This was a logic picked up by the President of the European Monetary Fund, 
Ursula von der Leyen when she presented common European identity as the key mechanism 
through which Europe could overcome early setbacks in responding to the pandemic 
— setbacks associated with the fact that “When Europe really needed an ‘all for one’ spirit, 
too many initially gave an ‘only for me’ response” (Wheaton & de la Baume, 2020).  
Effective responses to COVID-19 require forging an “all for one” spirit 
Our only qualification to von der Leyens’ words is that they do not just apply to 
Europe. The toll from COVID-19 is too high already, aided and abetted by an ‘only for me’ 
(or, rather, ‘only for my narrow ingroup’) spirit. How much further it will rise is highly 
dependent on our ability to forge an ‘all for one” spirit, rooted in the creation of a fully 
inclusive common group identity.  
 EPILOGUE 
 
The themes in this book have been all about the power of the social group. We have shown 
how we can harness this power to bring us together, to help us work together, to support each 
other and to remain practically, psychologically, and physically strong in the face of COVID-
19. At the same time, we have also focused on the need to avoid the dangers of division, 
hostility and violence. How we move forward is not inscribed in our nature, it is down to the 
way that we and our leaders construct the boundaries of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Our fate lies in our 
own hands.  
In the previous pages we have outlined the science of social identity. Our hope is that 
the understandings that this science provides — concerning both the antecedents and 
consequences of group formation — can guide us toward a better future. But the take-home 
message can perhaps be expressed more powerfully in poetry. Accordingly, we draw the 
book to a close with the reflections of 18-year old Stephen Kiama Ambrose from South 
Sudan on the nature of the tests that lie ahead of us.    
 
"The human race shall always overcome," said Jommo Kenyatta 
See, I am the ultimate test 
How well do you work together? 
How well coordinated are you? 
* 
COVID-19 is my name 
I know no boundaries or lanes 
No celebrity can match my fame 
Like a roaring flame I engulf all on my path 
The poor and the rich both feel my wrath 
* 
You have a common enemy in me 




Lower your rank, tribe, ethnicity and focus on me 
For can't you see, can't you see? 
I know off no hierarchy 
My presence brings fear and anarchy 
* 
I am stronger than Samson 
For I break the unbreakable 
I'll break your economy 
I'll break your faith 
But that's only if you let me 
For the racism you show only strengthens me 
* 
You like hiding your identity, then wear a mask 
You claim that your hands are clean, then sanitize 
For the death I cause is no man's fault but rather my nature 
You shall overcome me; it's in your blood, it's your nature 
I am no professor, neither is this a lecture 
But only working together can tame my destructive nature 
* 
As Nations cower in fear 
For I grab many victims in a day 
For once they see something worse than war 
For once they see humanity is worth fighting for 
* 
What goes up must come down 
No authority is higher than me 
For I break the laws of traditions 
I break the laws of a normal condition 
But I'll never break the so-called men 
Bend them to their breaking points 
Once they kill me, they forget my wrath and once again I'll strike 
* 
As you suffer because of me 




As I go down the books of history 
Still there's more to come 
Maintain the togetherness 
And there will be no harm 
Share the little you have 
Before I strike and leave you with none 
* 
The only way to survive me, is by joining heads 
Lock your doors for I roam the streets 
Stay alert for like an assassin; you never know my target 
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